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This thesis surveys [he results of a four-year research project financed
by the Common Research Pool of Tilburg JJniversity and Findhoven iJniver-
sity of Technology (Samenwerkingsverband Brabantse Universiteiten).
Some of the results have already been published in journals and collec-
tions. In this way some of the chapters draw on already existing papers.
The chapters two and three survey for convenience of the reader some
relevant elements of the theory on corporate finance and the theory on
the dynamics of the firm and present the information necessary to under-
stand the origin and topic of the book. Many readers may thus be famil-
iar with the literature on which these chapters are hased.
Chapter four contains among others a main results of the paper hy Van
Schijndel (1985) and parts of the working paper by Van Schijndel and
Verheyen (1986), which will be submitted for publication.
Chapter five draws heavely on two papers by Van Schijndel (1986a,b),
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Schijndel (1986c). In addition a specific solution of a more general
problem indicated by J~rgensen, van Schijndel and Kort (1986) is deriv-
ed.
Chapter seven, finally, is an extended version of a paper by Van
Schijndel (1987), which has been accepted for publication in Engineering
Costs and Production Economics.
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SAMENVATTING (Summary in dutch)
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CHAPTER ONE
SCOPE AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
1.1. Principal aim of the book
This book aims to include the effects of a progressive personal tax into
the deterministic dynamic theory of the firm. To that end we investigate
the impact of a progressive personal tax on the optimal dividend, fi-
nancing and investment policy of a shareholder controlled value maximiz-
ing firm. More specific, the principal aim ís the justification of the
thesis that during each stage of their evolution firms will be controll-
ed by ínvestors in different tax brackets. To that end we develop a dy-
namic equilibrium valuation and portfolio theory under certainty, that
considers
- the market value of an arbitrary firm such that no excess demand for
or supply of shares exists
- the portfolio selection of differently taxed investors
- the succession of differently taxed investors, who possess the shares
of any value maximizing firm, in the course of time
- the optimal resulting policy string and corresponding evolution of a
firm ín the course of time.
The above descríption of the problem field finds its origins in the the-
ory of corporate finance and the theory of the dynamics of the firm.
1.2. Theory of corporate finance
The impact of both corporate and personal taxation on the optimal policy
of the firm and the behaviour of investors is still a central issue in
recent contributions in finance theory. One of the principal motives to
study this subject is the so-called 'non neutrality' of most of the tax
z
regimes with regard to the policy of firms and the choices by investors:
corporate and personal decisions are affected by taxation. Moreover the
ínclusion of a progressive personal tax, that is, a personal tax rate
which rises with the income or initial wealth of the investor, bríngs on
the notion that personal taxes will induce tax clienteles: due to its
policy a firm will attract investors ín specific tax brackets. The an-
nouncement of a particular policy by the firm's management thus induces
individuals in specific tax brackets to invest in the firm. On the other
hand taxation provides an incentíve for decision makers to prefer one
method or possibility over another. This situation occurs if the invest-
or or shareholder is capable to control the firm, so that the polícy of
the firm corresponds with the investor's preferences. Although we con-
sider in this book also the notíon of tax induced clienteles, we empha-
size on the latter mentioned implication of personal taxation.
Wíth regard to the topic of this book the above choice brings on two
issues to point out.
Firstly, we mostly assume that the shareholder of a particular firm is
both owner and controller of that firm, that is, we assume non separa-
bilíty of ownership and management. In this way we thus exclude corpora-
tions which are controlled by its management that afterwards may be
called to account at the shareholders'-meeting. In such a situation the
shareholders have delegated the decision making process to the manage-
ment of the firm. However, the shares of such large firms are owned by
so many unknown ínvestors that it wíll be quite impossible to achieve a
common policy by consulting the owners. Moreover, it is beyond doubt
that the numbér of (relative) small private firms, owned and controlled
by e.g, families and partners, is of such proportion, that we still con-
sider the majority of firms in the total business market.
Secondly, we focus throughout the book at three important features of
the firm: the financing, the dividend and the investment policy. This
selection is not supposed to imply that all other decision problems are
of minor importance. Since we restrict ourselves, however, to finance
theory, this selection covers well the corresponding research field.
Besides, this selection links up with the dynamic financial models, the
second origin of our problem field.
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1.3. Dynamics of the firm
Time is of utmost importance with regard to the economic decision making
process. All kind of decisions should be seen in the context of time.
Moreover, the real world is a process of dynamic change. It is thus no
surprise that the inclusion of time in a variety of management science
problems has attracted the attention of many economists. The introduc-
tion of dynamic optimization techniques, such as the Maxímum Princíple
and llynamic Programming, has opened the possibility to analyse the in-
tertemporal structure of many economic problems under consideratíon. In
particular 'Optímal Control Theory' has proved to be a very efficient
tool to study the dynamics of economic processes. It can fruitfully be
applied to several problems in management science. An important applica-
tion is the research field coined 'the dynamics of the firm'. These
studies mostly consider the optimal dynamic behaviour of a value maxim-
izing firm by determining simultaneously the optimal financing, dividend
and investment policies. This selection of controls may be extended by
including others, such as the choíce of production techniques and the
location of capital and labour.
The general result of these studies is that the optimal evolution pat-
tern of a fírm can be described by a succession of different policies
concerning the above mentíoned controls. So, the firm will not immediat-
ely pursue an equilibríum steady state policy, but it wíll continuously
adjust its policy to the circumstances.
These dynamic models, also named dynamic growth models, are already
extended in several ways. Although many authors are aware of the effects
of personal taxation their studies in a dynamic setting are lacking this
subject, however. Research into thís subject has been conducted by some
authors. As a result of their specífic assumptions, however, a number of
interestíng topics are stíll left out of consideration.
1.4. Relevance and motivation of the book
The aim of this book, the inclusion of personal taxatíon into the dynam-
ic theory of the firm, is quite obvious. We may clarify this purpose
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both from a theoretical as well as from an empirical point of view.
In order to point out the [heoretical motive, we recall some conclu-
sions of the theory on corporate finance and the theory on the dynamics
of the firm, that are indicated in the previous sections and will be
considered in depth in the chapters two and three:
- a mutual dependence can be observed between some financial policies of
the firm and the level of the personal tax rate of the firm's share-
holders. This conclusion holds in particular with respect to the fi-
nancing, dividend and, as it will turn out, the inves[ment policy.
- the evolution of a firm can be descríbed by a succession of different
policíes concerning e.g. finance, dívidend and investment.
The confrontation of these features in one problem setting is thus by no
means surprising, since the two statements amplify each other. Moreover,
[his book fills up a gap in both the theories; that is, we extend the
theory on corporate finance in this respect by including another dimen-
sion: dynamics, and we extend the dynamic theory of the firm by includ-
ing personal taxation.
Empirically, we are now able to get a better description of that what
we observe in the real world. 5ince we include some very important feat-
ures, we may get a better insight in the decisions both corporations and
investors make in the course of time.
Of course, we still neglect some other characteristics of the real
world in our problem formulation. One of them is the uncertainty we dai-
ly face. From a pure theoretical point of view uncertainty can be in-
cluded in a dynamic problem by applying stochastic optimization tech-
niques, such as stochastic optimal control. However, due to the mathe-
matical difficulties, that then will be encountered, less striking, less
clear and less interpretable results will be obtained.
1.5. Subproblems
In order to fulfill our principal aim, we will carry out the analysis
stepwise by consideríng the next subproblems:
5
- In which way are the three main decisions in finance theory, viz, the
financing, the dividend and the investment policy, affected by person-
al taxation?
- What will be the equilibrium values of firms in a market with progres-
sive personal taxation within a static setting?
- What is the impact of personal taxation on the optimal evolution of a
single value maximizing firm?
- Is it possible that the state of the firm is such that other share-
holders will take over the control of the present shareholders in or-
der to pursue the policy they advocate? That is, we consider the case
of one single value maximízing firm and more differently taxed inves-
tors.
- What is the dynamic equilibrium situation in case of more firms and
more investors?
The above enumeration indicates the contents of the remaining chapters
of this book which we elucidate in the next subsection.
1.6. Outline of the book
The contents of this book can be divided into three parts. In the chap-
ters two and three we survey for convenience of the reader some relevant
elements of the theory on corporate finance and the dynamic theory of
the firm. Readers familiar with these theories will not find anything
new in them, but others will get the information necessary to understand
the origin and topic of this book. The first mentioned readers may re-
gard these chapters to be unnecessarily long; the last mentioned readers
may appreciate its length from a pedagogical point of view. Thereafter,
in chapter four, we díscuss, extend and improve some topics in finance
theory. Finally, we focus on the principal aim of the book: in the chap-
ters five, six and seven we investigate stepwise the impact of personal
taxation wí[hin the dynamic theory of the firm.
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In more detail the contents of the chapters are as follows:
In chapter two we focus on the relevance of time with regard to the
economíc decision process. We stress the general interest of economísts
to include time into a variety of management science problems by pre-
senting some examples, which are taken from the literature and which
illustrate in addition the progress in dynamic optimization theory. It
turns out that in particular 'Optimal Control Theory' has provided a
useful framework for the analysis of intertemporal economic decision
processes. We apply this optimization theory, when we focus in thís
chapter on the so-called 'dynamics of the firm', the field of research
that forms the topíc of the book. We consider in particular a basic mod-
el that descríbes the optimal dynamic behaviour of a value maximizing
firm. We determine simultaneously the optimal financing, dividend and
investment policy ín the course of time.
We describe the impact of taxation, both corporate and personal, on
the optimal policy of the firm as well as on the behaviour of investors
in chapter three. We elaborate on the concept of 'fiscal (non) neutral-
ity' and illustrate this concept by means of some examples, in partícu-
lar with respect to the value of a firm in relation to its leverage,
that is, the debt to equity ratio. We start this analysis with the well
known Modiglíani b~ Miller leverage irrelevancy theorem, that is derived
under absence of any taxation, and end up with Miller's irrelevancy
theorem, which is based on an 'after [ax' equilíbrium theory wíth a pro-
gressive personal tax.
In chapter four we once again elaborate on the firm's equilibrium mar-
ket value under taxation and its implicatíon with respect to tax induced
clíenteles: due to its policy a firm wíll attract investors subject to
particular tax rate levels. We use a model, based on the DeAngelo 5
Masulis model, in order to clarífy once again Míller's irrelevancy the-
orem and to show the existence of tax induced 'dívidend' and 'financial
leverage' clienteles. In addition, we introduce 'investment clienteles'
as a result of the corporate investment policy and extend the lleAngelo S
Masulis framework by considering the implications of different tax re-
gimes. A main part of this chapter is devoted to a comprehensive discus-
sion of the Gordon criticism of Miller's result. We point out a correct-
7
ed version of the equilibrium approach that Gordon uses, and we question
the adjustment process he describes.
In chapter five we return to the dynamic theory of the firm. We fo~
mulate a basic model which describes the dynamic dividend, financing and
investment problem of a value maximizing firm under personal taxation
during a fixed planning period. We elaborate on the analytical solution,
that we obtain by means of Optimal Control Theory and the iterative pol-
icy connecting procedure designed by Van Loon. We derive some decision
rules with respect to the three men[ioned policies and combine these in
a way which enables us to indicate the optimal policy as a function of
only the rate of return on equity. Furthermore, we present an analysis
of the economic results, including a sensitivity analysis with regard to
some financial and fiscal parameters. We compare the results of the
problem under consideration with those of problems without personal tax-
ation and discuss the striking differences.
Chapter six enlarges the analysis of the previous chapter by allowing
investors to sell the shares of the firm under consideration at some
unknown moment in time. In a way we consider an optimal control problem
with a free end point at which a'shareholder take-over' may occur. So,
contrary to chapter five, at least two or more investors are now involv-
ed. We use several formulations and techniques to model and solve the
problem, including a'switching dynamics'-like approach and a coopera-
tive differential game approach.
The purpose of chapter seven is an attempt to justify the principal
thesis of the book that during each stage of their evolution firms will
be controlled by investors in different tax brackets. To that end we
consider in a dynamic setting the impact of personal taxation on the
optimal policy string of many value maximizing firms and the equilibriimm
portfolio selection of differently taxed investors, both under the as-
sumption of no separation of ownership and control. In this line a dyna-
mic valuation and portfolio selection theory is derived, such as indi-
cated in the first section.
Finally, we summarize the conclusion of this book in chapter eight.
In general, the chapters of this book are split up into sections, that
may in turn be subdivided in subsections. All remaining chapters start
with an introductory section and end up with the main conclusions. Tech-
8
nical derivations and proofs are placed in the appendices, whereas the
chapters itselves emphasize on the economic presentation and interpreta-
tion of problem and solution respectively.
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CHAPTER TWO
MODELS OF DYNAMIC FIRM BEHAVIOUR
2.1 Introduction
Time is of utmost importance with regard to the economic decision making
process. Many, or perhaps all, decisions of enterprise behaviour are
based on time dependent data, environmental circumstances and opportuni-
ties: decisions should be seen in the historical contexts. In addition,
time brings along the necessity to plan ahead, not only because of the
lagged response on present actions, but also because present decisions
affect future events by making certain opportunities available, by pre-
cluding others and by altering the costs or revenues of still others.
Present decisions are, therefore, always taken with a view towards the
future. Quoting Kamien and Schwartz we may say:
"If present decisions do not affect future opportunities, the planning
problem is trivial. One need then only make the best decision for the
present." [Kamien fi Schwartz (1985), p. 3].
Observing the way business enterprises operate in the economy we dis-
cover clear differences among their behaviour. Some firms may keep on a
stationary level and have no incentive to alter their steady state poli-
cy. Other firms, however, may have the opportunity to grow, that is, to
enlarge their production capacity level and corresponding sales level,
whereas still others are forced to pursue a contraction policy e.g. be-
cause of low efficiency or pessimistic future expectations. Accordingly,
"the market is a process of dynamic change" and "it is no surpise that
the position of enterprises change as well" [Appels (1986) p. 244 and p.
243 respectively]. We may stress this conclusion by a statement of Van
Loon (1983) who quotes Hicks:
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"In mechanics, statics i s concerned with rest, dynamics with motion,
but no economic system is ever at rest in anything like the mechanical
sense." [Van Loon (1983), p. 4].
Studies in management science frequently consider comparative static or
comparative dynamic analysis techniques. As implied by its name, a com-
parative static analysis is purely static and is concerned with the in-
tratemporal effects of a change in a certain parameter or variable upon
other variables such as prices and output. A comparative dynamic analy-
sis is concerned with the comparison of different steady state equili-
bria of the system. "Because, however, it only yields steady state solu-
tions, it does not give any information about the time path of the ad-
justment." [Friedlaender S Vandendorpe (1978), p. 9]. This is an impor-
tant deficiency because the history and future course of any company
differs from every other, that is every firm tells its own story. The
use of dynamic models is, therefore, of utmost importance in order to
describe the evolution of characteristic features or variables of the
process in the course of the time.
The application of dynamic models with corresponding optimization
techniques has assumed large proportions ín management science since
Pontryagin et al. (1962) published their pathbreaking work on the maxi-
mum principle. The formalism on which this principle is based, forms a
basis for the field coined Optimal Control Theory. This theory in parti-
cular has provided an usefull framework for the analysis of intertempo-
ral economic decision processes. Feichtinger argues that Optimal Control
Theory is of importance in economics because "it is able to provide
deeper insight into the dynamic interdependence between the model vari-
ables, í.e. into the intertemporal structure of the economic phenomenon
under consideration." [Feichtinger (1985), p. v].
The above clarifies the general interest of economists during the last
decade to apply Optimal Control Theory to a variety of management
science problems. In line with this, we firstly present some examples
showing in which manner time can be included in economic modelling (sec-
tion 2.2). Thereafter, we focus on the so-called 'dynamics of the firm',
the field of research that forms the topic of this book. We consider in
particular the optimal dynamic behaviour of a value maximizing firm by
determining simultaneously the optimal financing, investment and divi-
11
dend policies over a finite horizon (section 2.3). The corresponding
model and its solution are our starting-points for the further research
of this book. Finally, we briefly survey the chapter and the most fruit-
ful applications of continuous ~ptimal Control Theory in management
science.
2.2. Dynamic and management modelling
In the two volumes of his book Tapiero (1977) comprehensively elaborates
on the temporal dimensions relevant to operations management. One of his
conclusions is: "The inclusion of time in the modeling and analysis of
operational systems is by no means easy, but it is a factor that must be
considered in the practice of operations management" [Tapiero (1977), p.
45]. This inclusion of time can be done in many ways. We give three ex-
amples which also illustrate the progress in dynamic optimization.
2.2.1. Exponential growth
The use of exponential growth is a well known procedure in economics to
include time. All time dependent variables are assumed to change accord-
ing a particular rate of growth, say g. The value of such a variable X
is then fixed by:
X(T) - x~(lfg)T discrete case
X(T) - xOegT continuous case
where
T : time
x~: initial value of R
(2.2)
A well known, nowadays classical, application of the exponential growth
method is due to Gordon. In 1962 he published a model in order to fix
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the optimal division of the firm's net cash flow into retentions and
dividend payments. The problem, that he hereby encounters, is that on
the one hand a retention of profit reduces the amount of current divi-
dend payments. On the other hand, however, the level of future dividend
probably rises because of the increase of production capacity due to the
current gross investment, financed through the retention under consider-
ation.
Before presenting the model, we first define some varíables and con-
stants. In the present and next chapters we describe constants by small
letters and variables by capitals:
CF(T): net cash flow at T
D(T) : divídend at T
K(T) : production capacity level at T
b : retention rate, 0 c b C 1
i : time preference rate of shareholders
r' : net return on capital
Gordon considers a shareholder owned firm, that is, the firm is supposed
to act as if it maximizes its value as conceived by its shareholders.
The firm's value may then be defined as the present value of the divi-
dend flow over an infinite horizon. The discount rate, we use, is repre-
sented by the time preference rate of the shareholders. Hence, the ob-





Dividend is assumed to equal the fraction (1-b) of the firm's cash flow
implying that a fraction b is retained in order to finance new itrvest-
ment. The firm is all equity financed and issues of new shares are not
allowed. Thus,
D(T) - (1-b).CF(T) (2.4)
K(T) :- áT(T) - b.CF(T) (2.5)
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A dot denotes the derivative of the variable with respect to the time.
Gordon assumes constant returns to scale, so:
CF(T) - r'K(T) (2.6)
The aim is to determine the retention rate b in such a way that the pre-
sent value of the firm is maximized. To get this optimal solution, we
reduce the model into one single expression. To that end, we firstly
solve the differential equation (2.5), which is an easy task because of
the constant-returns-to-scale-assumption (2.6). Thereafter, we substi-
tute the expression, we found for K(T) in (2.6) and successively (2.6)
in (2.4) and (2.4) on its turn in the objective functional (2.3). The
result is the next maximization problem:
m -i(1-bi)T
maximize J (1-b)CF(0)e dT
Otbtl T-0
(2.7)
The optimal retention rate b~ obviously depends on the value of the time
preference rate in relation to the rate of return on capital. We dis-
tinguish three cases:
~a) in case r' ~ i the optimal retention rate equals zero: b- 0. Be-
cause the rate of return is less than the time preference rate, that
is, the rate of return shareholders obtain elsewhere, cash flow is
totally paid out as dividend.
b) the value of the firm is independent of the retention rate when r' -
i. Shareholders take a neutral view with regard to the policy of the
firm. With the exception of b- 1, all values of b over the range
zero to one result in the same optimal value.
c) if r' ~ i we only obtain results in case of finite horizons. The val-
ue,of the firm is then maximized when the growth rate of capital equ-
als the time preference rate. So, b~ - i~r'.
Due to the assumptíon of constant returns to scale we get a solution,
which is constant in the course of time. The inclusion of time by means
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of exponential growth rates does not bring on a real dynamic solution in
the sense that the current control affects the state and control space
of future decisions. Expression (2.7) makes clear that the model can be
reduced to a standard static optimization problem, which solution b~
satisfies the first order condition for optímality.
2.2.2. Multiperiod constraints
A second manner to ínclude time in economic modeling is the introduction
of time dependent restrictions or multiperiod constraints. We illustrate
this way of modeling on the basis of the investment selection problem
designed by Lorie S Savage (1955). This problem belongs to the so-called
'constrained capital budgeting problems' [see e.g. Copeland S Weston
(1983), pp. 55-6Qj.
Suppose a firm is comparing a finite number of investment projects
with, for simplicity, equal duration. In addition to the known invest-
ment costs, each investment may periodically yield outlays. A meaningful
multiperiod budget constraint is imposed on the firm, however. Let us
further assume that cash flows can not be transferred between time pe-
riods, that external liabilities are not available, and that the cash
budgets in the succeeding periods are known. The problem is then to find
the set of investment projects which maximizes the net present value and





subject to E F C(T) G E F R(T), T~ ~j~l j j j-1 j j
where
Rj(T): revenue project j in period T
Fj : acceptance indicator project j, F-{Q,1}
j
Cj(T): cash outlays project j in period T
NPVj : net present value project j




The inclusion of time by multiperiod constraints brings on the interest-
ing result that a project with negative net present value may be accept-
ed in the optimal solution if it supplies the funds needed during other
time periods to undertake very profitable projects.
The optimal dynamic solution, however, is once again trivial, that is,
in the decision making period the optimal values of Fj are determined
and these values may not change in the course of time. If we assume that
the planning period is restricted to a finite number of discrete time
periods, say z, and that it is possible to undertake fractions of pro-
jects, then the problem may be formulated using linear programming. In
fact, Weingarter (1963) solved the sample of Lorie d~ Savage by using
linear programming. If projects are indivisible, then integer programm-
ing may be used.
So, the problem of multiperiod constraints, may be formulated as the
maximization of an objective subject to at least z restrictions (other
restrictions may exist), where z is the number of time periods under
consideration.
2.2.3. Ilynamic control
Following in the step of Verheyen (1976) we transform the model of
Gordon in order to eliminate two major objections:
- the assumption of a constant retention rate
- the assumption of constant returns to scale.
We, therefore, remodel the expressions (2.4) through ( 2.6) into the fol-
lowing ones:
D(T) ~ (1-B(T)).CF(T) (2.10)
R(T) 3 B(T).CF(T) (2.11)
CF(T) - S(K(T)) (2.12)
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where the retention rate B(T) may vary in the course of time and cash
flow is a concave function of the production capacity K, S(K), at T,
that i s, we assume decreasing returns to scale.
S(K)
7 K
Figure 2.1: Cash flow as concave function of K: S(K).
The problem has now become truly dynamic because the current retention
rate not only affects current dividend, but also future dividend deci-
sions. In addition, the first order condition now depends on the produc-
tion capacity level because of the decreasing returns to scale. Similar
to the original Gordon model the optimal retention rate still depends on
the value of the time preference rate in relatíon to the rate of return
on capítal, which is not a constant anymore. It is not surprising there-
~
fore, that the solution is a function B(T), that gives the finn's opti-
mal retention rate at each point in time over its planning period. This
optimal solution, which can be found by means of several optimization
techniques, is depicted in figure 2.2. To get such a solution we have to





Figure 2.2: Optimal solution dynamic model of Gordon.
At first the firm retains its total cash flow in order to grow at maxi-
mum speed: B~(T) - 1, T ~ t~, This policy is the optimal one because net
return on capital exceeds the time preference rate. However, net return
on capital is not a constant, but a decreasíng function of the produc-
tion capacity level: dS(K)~dK. So, a retention policy not only produces
an increase of production capacity level, but decreases the net return
on capital, which is equivalent to marginal revenue, as well. As soon as
~the level K is reached, where
K(t~) - K~ p ~K~) - i (2.13)
it is profitable to stop expansion and to pay out all earnings instead.
If the firm would contínue its expansion investment, marginal revenue
would fall below the time preference rate. Similar to case a) of the
original Gordon model a maximum pay out policy would be the result. So,
~
from T- t on the firm pays out its cash flow and keeps the production
capacity on a constant level:
~
B (T) - 0
~ ~




for T ~ t (2.14)
1R
Finally, we notice that the time preference rate reflects the return
shareholders may obtain elsewhere. [dithin this deterministic setting,
and the absence of debt financing, the time preference rate is equiva-
lent to the firm's cost of equity capital. The optimal policy, there-
fore, depends on the well known balance between marginal revenue and
marginal costs: as long as revenue of an additional unit production ca-
pacity exceeds the capital costs of this unit, it is profitable to raise
production capacity; as soon as an equality occurs, the optimal equi-
librium level is reached. It is due to the decreasing net return func-
tion that this example clarifies the dynamics of the model: current pol-
icy affects the decision critericn of future policies.
For two purposes we may reformulate the dynamic variant of the Gordon
model.
Firstly, the Gordon problem may be modeled in expressions that are
common in the dynamic theory of the firm and in the formulations we use
in the remainder of the hook in particular. In addition, it will enahle
the reader to realize the correspondence between the dynamic Gordon mod-
el and the model that we will elaborate on in the following section and
that will be the basis for the further analysis in the book. In fact,
the dynamic (',ordon model may be considered as a kind of precursor of the
basic model of the next section.
Secondly, the formulation enables us to explain something about the
jargon of 'Optimal Control Theory'. Although it is beyond our scope to
deal ín great detail with the field of dynamic optimization techniques,
it will be convenient for the reader to have some knowledge of the com-
mon technical terms and language used in Optimal Control Theory. We sug-
gest the reader who is in great detail interested in Optimal Control
Theory, to read the available standard literature on this topic. A broad
outline of dynamic modeling is given by the survey paper of Tapiero
(1978), whereas more comprehensive and extensive, but still readable,
considerations may be found in e.g. Sethi à Thompson (1981), Kamien S
Schwartz (1985) or Feichtinger tr Hartl (19A6).
We reformulate the model by eliminating the retention rate B(T) and
introducing the dividend variable n(T) as control variable instead. In
particular, we rewrite expression (2.11) into:
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K(T) - B(T).CF(T)
- CF(T) - (1-B(T)).CF(T)
- S(K(T)) - D(T)









K(0) - k0 ~ 0 (2.18)
S(K(T)) - D(T) ~ 0 (2.1g)
D(T) ~ 0 (2.20)
K(T) ~ 0 (2.21)
A description of the above problem in the jargon of Optimal Control The-
ory can now be given as follows [see e.g. Sethi á Thompson (1981), p.
2]:
The s stem to be controlled is the firm. The state of the system is
represented by state variables. The above problem has only one state
variable, viz. K(T). The value of K(T) is controlled by the decision
or control variable D(T). Given the values of the state and control
variable, the state equation (2.17) determines the instantaneous rate
of change of the state variable. So, based on the initial value k0,
fixed by the initial condition (2.1f3), and the values of D(T) over the
planning period, that is, the control history, we can integrate over
time to get the state trajectory of the firm. The aim of the control
is to maximize the value of the firm, that is, the objectíve function-
al (2.16). The decision maker has to reckon with the laws of motion as
described in (2.17) and (2.18), with the state constraínt (2.21), the
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control constraint (2.20) and the mixed constraint (2.19). Any plan,
fulfilling these conditions is called a feasible solution; the optimal
plan is named the optimal policy string and optimal state trajectory
respectively.
2.3. A dynamic theory of the firm: investment, finance and dividend
In this section we investigate the optimal dynamic behaviour of a value
maximizing firm by determining simultaneously the optimal financing,
investment and dividend policy over a finite horizon. To do so, we ela-
borate on the formulation of an optimal control problem and its solu-
tion, which is determined by means of the so-called maximum principle.
We will deal in great detail with the expressions of the model, which
has much in common wíth both the model Lesourne (1973) has designed as
well as with the underlying financial model of the activity analysis
problem considered by Van Loon (1983). In addition, we survey formula-
tions that have been considered by other authors. The model will form
the basis for the research of next chapters.
2.3.1. The firm's objective
The specification of the firm's objective is of utmost importance, be-
cause it determines the direction of the firm's activities in a large
measure. The objective considerably depends on the decision maker or
party that has an interest in the firm.
We may distinguish three parties of goalsetters: managers, employees
and shareholders. We elaborate on the latter party and glance at the two
first mentioned ones because these are of nonimportance for our purpose.
Managers are generally supposed to pursue power, prestíge and income.
In case they are the dominant party within the firm, but supposed that
they are not the owners, that is, ownership and control are separated,
the objective of the firm will mostly be the maximization of growth in
terms of discounted sales in combination with either a restriction on
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the minimal amount of dividend to be paid out, or a restriction on the
minimal profit level per unit equity to be maintained [see e.g. Leland
(1972)].
Labour may be the rulling party in so-called 'labour managed' firms.
In this type of firms "Labour receives the residual revenue after the
other input factors including capital, have received their predetermined
renumeration". [Ekman (1978, p. 17]. In this situation, the firm maxi-
mizes income per employee.
In finance theory, however, shareholders mostly act as the dominant
participating party in the firm's decisions. Accordingly, the firm is
supposed to act as if it maximizes its value conceived by the shareholá-
ers. In the remainder of the book this will be named the assiunption of
no separation of ownership and control. The value of the firm is then
defined as the present value of either the dividend or the cash flow,
both over an infinite period of time [Krouse á~ Lee (1973), Sethi
(1978)]. When a finite planning horizon is introduced, the firm's dis-
count value at the end of the planning period has to reflect all future
returns. This salvage value may be a function of the value of final
equity or the discounted value of final equity itself [Ludwig (1978),
Van Loon (1983)]. Depending on the problem under consideration we will
use either the infinite horizon objective or the latter, more specific,
finite horizon definition.
In this chapter we consider a shareholder owned value maximizing firm,
which at some known planning time z may stop its actívities. As we as-
sume no separation of ownership and control, the objective functional is
given by:
z
f D(T)e iTdT t X(z)e-iz
T-0
where
X(T): equity at T.
(2.22)
In general, the group of shareholders may change due to mutual buy and
sell transactions among shareholders or due to issues of new shares. In
these cases the objective is defined as: maximizing the value of the
z2
firm as conceived by the present shareholders. We will deal in detail
with the former situation in chapters 6 and 7; the latter will be beyond
our scope.
2.3.2. Input, and its transformation to output
A firm achieves its profit by transforming inputs into outputs. As any
company may have its own unique combination of inputs and outputs, we
need to specify the firm's production function. Although a firm may use
a large variety of inputs, we restrict ourselves to only two: we assume
that the firm produces output by means of labour and capital goods.
Most publications making this distinction between inputs postulate a
perfect labour market, which ímplies a constant wage rate and perfect
adaptability. Due to the resulting fixed optimal labour productivity,
the amount of labour appears to adapt itself perfectly all the time [see
e.g. Jorgenson (1963), (1967)]. Imperfections in labour markets may be
due to a restriction on a firing policy or hiring and firing cost func-
tions [Leban (1982), Feichtinger and Luptacik (1983)].
In the líterature, the market of capital goods is mostly supposed to
be perfect, so that the firm can buy its assets at fixed prices. Several
authors, however, have studied the case of an imperfect market in the
framework of so-called adjustment cost models: each firm does not im-
mediately adapt its optimal size because of costs inherent to the ad-
justment proces. A survey of the theory on adjustment costs may be found
in SBderstróm (1976), whereas Kort (1986, 1987) incorporates adjustment
costs in a dynamic financing~investment model of the firm.
Using combinations of labour and capital the firm produces output. In
the case of only one single production technique any output level cor
responds with one combination of inputs. Although the assumption of a
single production technique will mostly be satisfactory for the purpose
of the topic under consideration, research has been done to the optimal
choice of production techniques.
Many publications dealing with the allocation of labour and capital in
the dynamic theory of the firm assume a continuous production function
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that mostly belongs to a specific class of Cobb-Douglas type function
[see e.g. Lesourne S Leban (1978)]. Such a production function requires
that the firm can choose at each moment in time between an infinite num-
ber of production possibilities.
In the opinion of Van Loon, a continuous production function is not a
realistic concept, because "in reality the management of the firm always
chooses between a limited number of productíon possibilities" [Van Loon
(1983), p. 40]. He, therefore, introduces an activity analysis to de-
scribe the link between the inputs of labour and capital goods, and the
output of the firm. In particular he considers two linear production
activities, one that is capital intensive and one that is labour-intens-
ive.
With regard to the output, the production quantity is as a matter of
course positively correlated to the number of outputs. This dependence
may be linear or nonlinear.
In the latter case production is mostly assumed to be an increasing,
concave function of the inputs, which implies decreasing returns to
scale. The output market may also be postulated as a perfect one, that
is, the price does not change when the amount of output of the firm va-
ries. In that case, the value of the output, that is the sales level,
will be a concave function of the inputs too. If the labour market is
also perfect, the optimal labour productivity will be fixed, which, ac-
cordingly, implies that both production and sales may be considered as
concave functions of only capital. So, any value K of the amount of cap-
ital goods corresponds uniquely with a marginal productivity [see Van
Loon (1983), p. 120].
In the former case output is proportional to input, the labour to ca-
pital rate is fixed and an imperfect output market is considered. Prices
decrease when output quantity increases. Sales, however, are agaín a
concave function of the amount of capital goods.
In this book we assume that the firm produces a single output by means
of two inputs: labour and capital. The input markets are perfect and to
facilitate the analysis, the value per unit of a capital good is fixed
at one unit of money. We further assume absence of other imperfections,
such as inflation and technícal progress. We also equalize the technical
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deterioration rate and the depreciation rate, which implies that the
value of the amount of capital goods in the firm equals the number of
capital goods. The afore mentioned assumptions enable us to describe the
impact of investments on the amount of capital goods by the nowadays
generally used formulation of net investments. If we assume depreciation
to be proportional to the amount of capital goods, we may write:
K(T) - I(T) - aK(T) (2.23)
where
I(T): gross investment, that is the number of assets bought or sold
by the firm
a . depreciation rate
Assuming a fixed labour to capital rate, production will be proportional
to the inputs:




JC : labour to capital rate
q : capital productivity
(2.24)
Let us assume, for simplicity, the capital productivity to equal one,
q- 1. This implies that the amount of capital goods may be named the
production capacity. For sake of readability we sometimes use both ex-
pressions for this phenomenon.
In this book we postulate an imperfect output market, which implies that
the firm is operating under decreasing returns to scale. Due to the fix-
ed labour to capital rate, sales less labour costs is a concave function
of K. In addition, we introduce the phenomenon 'operating income', which
stands for the revenue before interest payments and corporate taxation
(see also subsection 2.3.3). In our terminology, operating income is
equal to sales less labour costs and depreciation. Aence,
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0(K) - S(K) - wL(K) - aK (2.25)
where
0(K) - operating income
S(K) - sales income
w - wage rate.
We should note that for the sake of readability we have dropped in
(2.25) the obvious time argument T. Due to earlier assumptions, 0(K) is
a concave function of only the production capacity level K and its de-
piction is similar to that of S(K) in figure 2.1. We will use 0(K) be-
cause of its convenience and simplicity.
2.3.3. Finance and government
Generally speaking the firm's assets are financed by either equity or
debt. Because it is beyond our scope we do not elaborate on the existing
variety of money capital. The reader may think of shares when speaking
of equity, whereas loans and bonds are examples of debt money.
In the literature on dynamic modeling debt is treated in different
ways with regard to its mathematical features. Leland (1972), who was
the first to include aspects of production as well as of financing, as-
sumes the total amount of debt to alter only due to inflow of new debt:
Y(T) - B(T) (2.26)
where
B(T) - inflow of debt
Y(T) - total amount of debt
Ludwig (197íi) amends Leland's state equation of debt by introducing a
fixed redemption rate b~ 0. Hence,
Y(T) - B(T) - bY(T) (?..27)
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Dealing with debt in this way, the firm is forced to keep a certain
amount of debt all the time, due to the fixed redemption rate. That is,
given a positive initial value the total amount of debt is always non-
negative in the course of time. To Ludwig, this continuous presence of
debt money in the firm is a realistic aspect of his approach. Van Loon
(1983), however, wonders whether the origin of it, that is, the infinite
pay off period, is such a realistic feature. He, therefore, treats the
total amount of debt itself as a decision variable of the firm's manage-
ment. As a consequence, debt may adjust instantaneously upwards and
downwards. Moreover, it may be even negative, that is, the firm may also
lend money.
This replacement of a state variable into a control variable is a fac~
reaching simplification of the model in view of the mathematical diffi-
culties to encounter. In spite of this simplification, however, it turns
out that the nature of the solution, that is the nature of the optimal
policy of the management as a function of the time is not affected. The
quantities may differ, the quality of the decision is the same, however.
Lenders of debt money may plead their interest either by making condi-
tions on loans in such a way as to minimize risk or by claiming rewards
proportional to their risk bearing.
The former formulation mostly assumes an imperfect capital market in
such a way that the firm is subject to a certain kind of credit ration-
ing. Credit rationing means that lenders are willing to invest funds
into the firm only up to a certain limit. Such an upperbound, together
with a fixed ínterest rate is an indication of the risk class to which
the firm belongs. The upperbound may be considered as a condition on the
financial structure of the firm, that must be fulfilled in order to stay
in the relevant risk class. Ludwig (1978) surveys alternative ways to
formulate these limits of borrowing as presented in the literature. One
possible formulation is a definition in terms of flows, that is, the
upperbound may be on new debt as a function of the cash flow [Lesourne
(1973), p. 222] or of the investment expenditures [Ludwig (1978), p.
92]. Another formulation is one in terms of stock, e.g. an upperbound on
the total amount of debt as a(linear) function of equity, implying a
maximum leverage [Lesourne (1973), p. 206 or Va n Loon (1983), p. 45].
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In the latter formulation, the firm is allowed to invest in such a way
that its risk profile changes. Authors dealing with this assumption for-
mulate the demanded interest rate as a function of the leverage
[Senchack (1975) and Tuovila (1983)].
Equity is the firm's most important liability as it is an necessity for
viability. The amount of equity may increase through issues of new shax~
es, enterprise subsidies by the government and through retentions.
Only few publications deal with the topic of issues of share. Mostly,
those papers assume an imperfect capital market, that is, issuing new
shares is subject to floatation costs [Senchack (1975)] or limitations
[Tuovila (1983)]. For many purposes, however, it is not necessary to
allow issues of new shares.
Enterprise subsidies are politically powerful and beloved governmental
instrinnents to stimulate economic progress and innovation. The reader
interested in this topic is referred to the comprehensive work of Appels
(1986). Van Loon (1983) was the first to include enterprise subsidies in
the dynamic theory of the firm. He argues that the fírm can raise its
equity also by acquiring investment grants. In his 1985 article Van Loon
reviews the Dutch battlefield of finding the best way to stimulate
trade, industry and employment by comparing the impact of alternative
measures on the optimal trajectory of a firm. Although it is beyond
doubt that investment grants affect the firm's policy, we will neglect
it.
The last possibility to raise equity is through retentions. Instead of
paying out dividend, the firm may decide to retain earnings, which may
be used
- to pay back debt money, or, if the amount of debt is already nega-
tive, to lend money
- to get cash money or short term cash balance positions; short term
cash policies, however, do not play an important part in investment
policies when forecasts are certain
- to ftnance new investments.
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Equity will fall when the firm pays out more dividend than it earns.
With net earnings we mean the operating i ncome after corporate taxation
and tax deductible interest payments.
The firm under consideration, has only one asset: capital goods K. Be-
cause we postulate our basic model within a deterministic setting, we
may neglect short term cash policies. The firm may attract the usual
kinds of money capital: equity X(T) and debt Y(T). The balance sheet is
therefore:
K(T) - X(T) f Y(T) (2.28)
We furthermore assume that no transaction costs are incurred when bor-
rowing or paying off debt money and corporate tax is proportional to
profits and paid at once. Issues of new share are prohibited, interest
payments are tax deductible and earnings after corporate tax are used to
issue (nonnegative) dividend or to increase the level of equity through
retentions. This leads to:
X(T) - (1-tc)[0(K) - rY(T)] - D(T) (2.29)
where
r : interest rate
rc: corporate tax rate.
We limit debt, which is treated as a control variable, by introducing an
upperbound in terms of a maximum debt to equity rate h:
Y(T) c hX(T), h ~ 0 (2.30)
Finally, we remark that the expressions we have designed up to now, may
also be derived from the well known financial records of the firm: the
balance sheet, the income statement and the cash account [see e.g. Van
I,oon (1983), pp. 43-44 and Van Schijndel (1986b)].
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2.3.4. Additional assumptions
To complete the set of general assumptions for the basic model we dis-
cuss and add the next four.
1. (1-TCK(0) ~ max{(1-tc)r,i} (2.31)
The marginal revenue of the first product to be sold exceeds each of
the financial costs implying that the firm will consider only those
alternatives that are profitable from the start.
2. i ~ (1-TC)r (2.32)
In this way we avoid degenerated solutions. Moreover, as Van Loon
argues, only by coincidence the prices of equity and debt to be paid
by the same firm, equal each other. As lenders of debt money and
shareholders have different interests and intentions, the markets of
debt and equity are separated [Van Loon (19R3), p. 48]. When intro-
ducing personal taxation an additional justification of this assump-
tion will be given (see section 5.2).
3. The firm owns certain known initial amounts of equity and debt, such
that
Y(~) - hX(Q) R(0) - x~ ~ 0
X(0) t Y(0) - K(0) K(0) - k~ ~ 0 (2.33)
4. All variables are nonnegative at all times. This assumption implies
that the firm may not divest or lend money.
2.3.5. Summary of the basic model and general solution procedure
We are now ready to combine the analysis of the previous subsections
into the basic model of the firm. The problem to be solved is formulated
as an optimal control problem. The objective to maximize the present
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value of the firm is given by expression (2.22). The state equations
governing the system are obtained from (2.23) and (2.29). Both the deci-
sion variables and the state variables are subject to constraints. The
problem is to determine the time paths of the control variables D(T),
I(T) and Y(T) so that the objective will be maximized. The dividend pol-
icy has a direct influence on the objective, whereas investment and debt
enter indirectly via the state equations.
For convenience, we summarize the problem in its full length:
z
maximize f D(T)e iTdT -~ X(z)e-iz
D,I,Y T-0
subject to the state equations
K - I - aK
X - (1-t )[0(K) - rYj - Dc
with the initial conditions
K(0) - (lfh)x(0)
X(0) - x0 ~ 0
subject to the following constraints:








D~ 0, I~ 0, Y~ 0, K~ 0, X~ 0 (2.34)
Furthermore, the additional assumptions (2.31) and (2.32) should hold.
This dynamic problem can be solved analytically by means of Optimal Con-
trol Theory [see e.g. Sethi fi Thompson (19R1), Kamien S Schwartz (19R5)
or Feichtinger h Hartl (19R6)1. It is for convenience of the reader that
in appendix A1 the necessary, and in our case also sufficient, condi-
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tions for an optimal solution are derived from a principle that strongly
resembles on the standard maximum principle of Pontryagin c.s. (1962).
This principle consists of a set of first order conditions with respect
to the control variables, F.uler Lagrange equations, complementary slack-
ness conditions, transversality conditions and some additional condi-
tions concerning continuity properties. We make use of these conditíons
by applying the 'iterative policy connecting'-procedure designed by Van
Loon (1983, pp. 115-117). This procedure is a very fruitful and conve-
nient method in order to determine from the set of necessary conditions
a solution for the optimal policy of the firm over the whole planning
period.
2.3.6. Optimal policy strings
In the description of the optimal policy strinqs we will, for simplicity
only, disregard contraction policies by considering only those cases for
which the initial value of K is sufficiently low.
Applying Van Loon's iterative solution procedure we may discern five
different feasible optimal time paths, each characterized by different
policies concerning leverage, investment and dividend. Although we have
derived these policies analytically in appendix A1, it suffices for the
moment to summarize the findings in the next table, in which the con-
policy Y D I X Y K K feasible
1 hX 0 max f f f
~
~ I~X always
2 (O,hX) ~ aK t - 0
~
- KYX always
3 0 0 max t 0 t
~
~ KYX always
4 0 f aK 0 0 0
~
- K )ri~(1-rX c
5 hX f aK 0 0 0 ~- K )ri~(1-tY c
Table 2.1.: Features of feasible policies.
stant production capacities K~ , K~ and KY satisfy:
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~
K - ]~ p (1-TC)dO~dK - (1-ic)r
~
K- KX p(1-tc)dOIdK 3 i
~




With regard to the production capacity K we may distinguish three kinds
of policies: growth policies, stationary policies and contraction pol-
icies. For the moment we elaborate only on the first two mentioned pol-
icies, for reason that contraction policies occur only then as an opti-
mal policy, when the initial production capacity exceeds the desired
optimal level. We assume, however, a sufficiently low initial production
capacity level so that the latter situation will not ocuur. For that
reason we neglect these policies in table 2.1.
Within the stationary policies we distinguish two stationary equilib-
rium policies and one consolfdation policy. Dependent on the inequality
in (1-rc)r ~ i, that is the relatíve values of the cost of capital, two
~ ~
optimal equilibrium levels of the production capacity exist: KX and KY
respectively. If the total amount of capital goods equals such a value,
the firm has no incentive to alter the size of the firm, because at
those levels the marginal return to equity equals the shareholders time
preference rate i. Recause the latter expresses the rate of return that
shareholders may obtain elsewhere, marg,inal return to equity equals mar-
ginal cost to equity. Accordingly, the optimal policy is to keep to the
equilibrium level during the remaining planning period by investing such
a level as necessary to replace absoleted capital goods. So, we postu-
late the next dividend~investment decision rule:
The optimal policy is, in general, to pay out dividend and to invest
only at replacement level as long as the marginal return to equity
equals the time preference rate.
Van Loon (1983, p. 64) shows that in the dynamic model we consider the
usual expression of marginal return to equity holds:
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RX - R f (R-CY)
X
or




(marginal) cost of debt
marginal return to equity
R: marginal return to total capital.
(2.38)
After substitution of marginal revenue and leverage of the stationary~ ~equilibrium levels KX and KY, expression (2.38) points out that the cor-
responding policies 4 and 5 satisfy the abovementioned dividend~invest-
ment decision rule.
The firm's prime ender.vour is to reach the desired stationary dividend
level as quick as possible. For this purpose it may be profitable to
stop at some time the expansion drift of the firm in order to rearrange
its financial structure, characterized by the relative amounts of debt
and equity. The former is restricted by the latter. So, the financial
structure has two extreme cases: the case that the assets are financed
by means of the maximum allowed amount of debt and the case that the
firm is financed by equity only. Which of both is the optimal one de-
pends on the marginal return to equity. Expression (2.38) clarifies the
contribution of leverage to marginal return to equity. From this expres-
sion we can conclude that a decrease of the leverage factor Y~X results
in a higher return to equity as soon as (1-tc)dO~dK c(1-TC)r. Using
(2.35) we now postulate the financial decision rule:
The firm will try to realize such a financial structure as to maximize
at any state marginal return to equity. It chooses for a maximum debt
financing policy as long as debt has a positive impact on the marginal
return to equity. That is, it prefers a self-financing policy when~ ~
K~ KYX and a maximum debt financing policy when K c KYX.
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During the consolidation phase the firm uses all its revenue to replace
debt by equity (policy 2). Such a redemption may stimulate future expan-
sion due to the lower cost of capital.
Two policies are left to discuss: policy 1 and 3 respectively. Both
policies have excellent possibilities for growth. Subject to these poli-
cies the firm will retain all earnings. If debt financing has still a
positive contribution to marginal return to equity, the firm also at-
tracts as much debt as possible (policy 1). Both retentions and debt are
used to finance expansion investments in order to realize a maximum in-
crease of the amount of capital goods.
We are ready to combine the different policies into optimal policy
strings, which describe the evolution of the firm in the course of time.
Dependent on the inequality in (1-rc)r ~ i we get two different master
trajectories.
The first one occurs if i~(1-TC)r and is represented by figure 2.3.
~
The desired optimal stationary production capacity level is equal to KX.
Although debt financing is more expensive than self financing the firm's
initial optimal policy is to borrow the maximum amount that is possible
given the size of equity. In case that the initial amount of debt is
below the maximum allowed level, an instantaneously adjustment upwards
turns out to be optimal. As borrowing increases profit and thus raises
the rate of growth of equity, it is profitable to borrow as long as the
resulting marginal cost is less than marginal revenue. Accordingly, the
firm grows at maximum speed ín order to realize a maximum increase of
the income stream and amount of cheap equity (policy 1). Corresponding
expression (2.3Fi) and the financial decision rule this policy is the




As soon as the amount of capital goods K(T) reaches the level K~, where
~
K - K~ p (1-T )dO~dK - ( 1-T )rc c ( 2.39)
it is profitable to use retentions to pay back debt money, for
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Figure 2.3: Optimal master trajectory if (1-TC)r ~ i.
- issuing earnings is valued by the shareholders according their time
preference rate i ~ (1-TC)r
- continuing expansion investments yields a net return, (1-TC)dO~dK,
less than (1-i )r, due to the decreasing returns to scalec
- paying back debt money saves (1-TC)r rent payments per unit.
So, the firm stops its expansion in order to use all its revenue to re-
place debt by equity (policy 2).
After this period of consolidation it still makes sense to expand the
amount of capital goods, because it ís financed now at lower costs by
equity only. As no dividend is issued, the firm starts increasing as
fast as possible again (policy 3).




K - KX p (1-TC)dO~dK - i (2.40)
is reached as quick as possible. At this state i t is useless to continue
expansion iirvestments because additional net cost will exceed net reve-
nue (policy 4). Investment falls down to the replacement level and re-
maining earnings are issued to the shareholders.
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The second optimal master evolution pattern or policy string occurs if
debt is cheap compared to equity (see figure 2.4).





Figure 2.4: Optimal master trajectory if (1-1c)r ~ i.
The start of this policy string is the same as the start of the pre-
vious one: due to the cheapness of debt money it is optimal to borrow
the maximum amount that is possible and invest both retained earnings
and debt in capital goods in order to realize a maximum growth of the
income stream (policy 1).
~
It is worth investing at the maximum level till K- KY, because at
~
levels lower that KY the marginal income after taxation exceeds marginal
financing costs in case of maximum debt financing. As soon as the amount
~
of capital goods equals KY, this accelerated growth is cut off abruptly
because marginal net revenue equals the weighted sum of net costs of
debt and equity:








implies an equality of marginal return to equity and the
rate i( see expression (2.38)). According to the divi-
decision rule it is optimal to keep to the equilibrium
the remaining planning period by investing such a level
replace absoleted capital goods. Remaining earnings are
again paid out to the shareholders.
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2.3.7. Summary and conclusions
In the previous sections we elaborated on the optimal dynamic behaviour
of a value maximizing firm by determining optimal policies and combine
these in time to an optimal policy string. We emphasize the conclusion
that the optimal evolution pattern consists of a string of subsequent
policies concerning dividend, finance and investment. So, the firm will
not immediately pursue an equilibriwn steady state policy, but will con-
tinuously adjust its policy to the circumstances, that is the state of
the firm, in order to reach its equilibrium level as quick as possible.
We did not pay attention to a further analysis. One may e.g. study the
influence of environmental changes on features of the optimal policy
string. This would be a sensitivity analysis concerning parameters that
are interestíng for economic analysis. For two reasons, however, we do
not consider this kind of analysis at this moment. Firstly, it is beyond
our scope to deal in great detail with the results of analyses which
have been already carried out by other authors in the past [see e.g. Van
Loon (1983)j. We only use the model presented here as a starting point
for further research and as an introduction into the dynamics of the
firm. Secondly, we will present some of the sensitivity results in one
of the next chapters when we consider an extension of this basic
problem.
The research postulated in this chapter may be extended in several
ways. Most of the possible extensions are already mentioned in previous
subsections: activity analysis, labour managed firms, adjustment costs,
investment grants, issues of new shares, etc. The aim of our research is
to extend the dynamic theory of the firm by introducing personal taxa-
tion, a topic which continues to be a central issue in recent contribu-
tions in finance theory.
Finally, we refer the reader interested in the application of dynamic
optimization into the analysis of the dynamics of the firm to two survey
papers. The first one is due to Stepan á Swoboda (1982). In their paper
they survey the application of Optimal Control Theory to dynamic finan-
cing models by comparing a number of existing theories and models. The
paper of Lesourne 6 Leban (1982) gives an overview of the general state-
of-art by considering three types of problems: one firm facing a certain
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environment (deterministic control), a firm facing a stochastic environ-
ment with a risk of bankruptcy (stochastic control) and firms facing
duopolistic competition (differential games).
2.4. Dynamic modeling: survey and conclusions
In the past two decades control theory has proved to be a very useful
tool to study the dynamics of economic processes. The interest for thís
line of research is probably due to increasing insatisfaction raised by
static analysis and by its unability to take into account changing en-
vironments.
The collections of papers of e.g. Bensoussan, Kleindorfer and Tapiero
(1978) and Feichtinger (1982a, 1985) contain many examples in which the
theory of the firm is extended by using Optimal Control Theory to solve
real dynamic models analytically. Deterministic control theory has also
fruitfully been applied to several problems in management science, such
as advertising, production and inventory, maintenance and replacement,
natural resources, transportation and cash balance. A survey of applica-
tions of Optimal Control Theory to management science has been written
by Feichtinger (1982b), whereas also Sethi and Thompson (1981) pay at-
tention to many economic applications.
In the last ten years papers began to appear on essential stochastic
environments. "In most real situations the introduction of the time com-
ponent leads simultaneously to the introduction of uncertainties"
[Bensoussan et al. (1974), p. 30]. Uncertainty arises from external
sources, from limited knowledge about the internal operation of the sys-
tem and about the effects of decisions on the process and also from a
partial observability of the state of the firm. An overview of stochas-
tic Optimal Control Theory and its applications to operational research
is given by Neck (1984). Stochastic control theory can be regarded as
the most general approach for single decisionmaker problems. Even
Tapiero (1977), a fervent advocate of optimal control theory, however,
points out a severe limitation of ít: stochastic control is mathematic-
ally difficult, which causes a larger than usual communication gap bet-
ween theorists and potential appliers; analytical solutions are avail-
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able only for very simple problems. Ten years after this statement the
number of fruitful applications, whích are solved analytically, is still
poor.
Finally, some remarks on the theory of differential games, which has
provided a convenient tool for an extension of the dynamic models to
some classes of competitive situations. The most simple case is evident-
ly the class of duopolistic competition. A survey paper by Feichtinger ~
Jórgensen (1983) reviews a nianber of differential games applications to
management science, such as investment, consumption, employment, bar-
gaining, production, inventory and maintenance. A survey of differential




TAXATION AND SOME IMPLICATIONS
3.1. Introductíon
The impact of both corporate and personal taxation on the optimal policy
of the firm and the behaviour of investors continues to be a central
issue in recent contributions in both finance theory and the theory of
public policy. In these studies both firms and investors are operating
in a particular environment that is characterized by several types of
fiscal regime that apply to them. It appears, however, that most of the
fiscal regimes are not 'neutral' with regard to the optimal policy of
firms and investors' choices. For this reason fiscal policy is a major
and flexible tool of governmental policy.
We restrict ourselves to finance theory, that is, we consider only the
impact of a certain fiscal system on the optimal policy of both inves-
tors and firms. We do not care for which reasons a particular fiscal
regime is postulated by the government. We focus on the interaction be-
tween the different taxes involved, both corporate profit tax and dif-
ferent personal taxes, particularly because of the importance regarding
the effects of these taxes found in the finance literature.
Although of considerable importance, we neglect several other taxes,
such as unit input~output tax, value added tax and lump sum tax. We also
pay no attention to the impact of taxes on capital depreciation and in-
vestmen[ allowances. These topics, which are discussed by e.g. Moerland
(1978b), are, however, beyond our scope.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, we illustrate the
impact of taxation by means of some examples applied to management
science. Afterwards, we define and explain, in section 3.3, the concept
of 'fiscal (non) neutrality', a concept of u[most importance in fiscal
theory. Section 3.4 contains a description of four different tax sys-
tems, that may be relevant to our study. This provides a basis for the
analysis of the effect of taxation on corporate financial policy given
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in the remaíning part of this chapter. We elaborate on the impact of
leverage on the value of a firm, that is operating under different tax
regimes, by considering the evolution and progress of the valuation the-
ory. The value of a firm in relation to its leverage will appear to be
an excellent example to illustrate the impact of taxation on corporate
policy. In addition, ít is a useful illustration in view of the topíc of
this book. We start the analysis with the well known leverage irrele-
vancy theorem of Modigliani h Miller (1958), derived under absence of
any taxation, and end up with Miller's irrelevancy theorem, which is
based on an 'after tax' equilibrium theory with a progressive personal
tax [Miller (1977)].
Finally, we note that this chapter has been included for the reader's
convenience; that is, readers familiar with the [heory of finance will
be acquainted with the contents of this chapter.
3.2. Some examples
In this section we illustrate some problems that occur as soon as taxa-
tion is involved in the decision making process. In our text, we borrow
heavily from the literature, in particular from Verheyen (1981). Some of
the examples are outside the scope of this book. Nevertheless, we use
them in order to make the reader familiar with the impact of taxation on
corporate policy.
The first example is related to merger and acquisition policy, which can
be viewed as both an investment problem and a financial structure prob-
lem. The impact of a merger on the cash flow, the share value, the bond
value and the total value of the firm depends on the nature of the eco-
nomic system under consideration. As taxation is a part of the system,
it will possibly influence the merger decision.
We illustrate this by considering two firms, one or both of which have
outstanding risky debt before the merger. Haley 6 Schall (1979) now ar-
gue that as long as the income streams of the premerger firms are such
that one firm can become insolvent (and goes bankrupt) while the other
firm has a possitive equity position, a merger will produce a corporate
43
coinsurance effect. If the firms are separate, the creditors of the
bankrupt firm will sustain a loss. However, if the firms are merged, the
cash flows of the solvent firm are available to service the debt re-
quirement of the other firm, The merged firms, thus, provide each other
with a form of corporate coinsurance, which reduces the bankruptcy risk
to the creditors of the merged firm. In this situation lenders of debt
money may well be willing to supply debt up to a higher level at the
same rate.
As the cost of debt is tax deductible, synergistic effects may occur
from the merger, and since the coinsurance is in effect provided by the
equity shareholder, stock prices may fall. The final result of a merger
thus depends on the balance between synergistic effects, such as tax
reduction, and the coinsurance loss.
A second example is taken from the theory on maintenance and replace-
ment. The problem of determining the lifetime of an asset simultaneously
with its exploitation during that lifetime is an important problem in
practice. An important result of the classic single machine replacement
theory is that a replacement of an old machine by a new one is only op-
timal when the marginal costs of maintaining the old machine exceed the
marginal costs of starting a new one. That is, the difference between
the maintenance costs, productivity and capital costs of both the mach-
ines is ín favour of the new asset. The management, however, may try to
postpone the replacement by applying preventive maintenance, which will
slow down the rate of decline of the resale value.
Schworm (1979) surveys the machine replacement problem subject to cor-
porate taxation. Obviously, the cost of owning and operating capital
depends on productíon decisions that can be influenced by tax policy.
Schworm shows that changes in the tax rate, depreciation allowances and
investment tax credits have an indeterminate qualititative effect on
capital utilization and maintenance. As a consequence, accelerated de-
preciation or an investment tax credit can either increase or decrease
the demand for new assets. Schworm thus concludes that "predicting the
effect oE tax policy on capital use and capital purchases requires de-
tailed knowledge of the influence of capital use on operating costs and
capital deterioration" [Schworm (1979), p. 192].
44
Our final example concerns the net return on riskless corporate and gov-
ernmental securities. The existence of taxes represents one of the more
important ways in which actual security markets differ from the ideal
markets assumed in finance theory.
Due to the changing marke[ interest rates over time, the market value
or price of a security may be above or below its parity. Under the theo-
retical assumption of perfect security markets, the equilibrium price of
two different securities will be such that their returns, that is the
sum of the discounted interest yields (coupon) and the capital Hain or
loss due to drawings over the market price, equal each other. Further-
more, all investors attach homogeneous returns.
The introduction of a progressive personal tax, however, provides he-
terogeneous returns because of the different tax treatment of interest
yields and capital gains or losses. As a consequence, the value of bonds
varies along investors subject to different personal tax rates. On its
turn, this results in 'tax induced clienteles', that is, a security is
rationally held by investors in only particular tax brackets. Schaeffer
(1982) illustrates the former point by considering the prices of two
hypothetical one-period bonds and the cash flows received by a tax-
exempt investor and a tax payer. If the prices are such that the tax-
exempt investor faces the same return on both bonds, then from his point
of view, neither bond dominates the other. However, the tax payer ob-
tains a higher return from the bond with the lower coupon interest rate,
due to the difference between the personal tax rates on interest and
capital gain. So, for him there is an important difference.
3.3. Fiscal (non) neutralitY
The effects of taxation on corporate behaviour are often described by
means of the concept of 'fiscal ( non) neutrality'. Neutrality of a fis-
cal system does not necessarily imply that taxation has no impact on
carporate values: tax payments e.g. reduce net profit of the firm. A tax
system i s neutral, however, i f decisions are not affected by taxation
that is, it provides no incentive for the decision maker to prefer one
alternative over another.
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In the theory of the firm corporate decisions are mostly based on
marginal values of the relevant variables. So, "a fiscal regime is de-
fined as neutral in the context of an individual firm if its introduc-
tion or modification does not affect the marginal costs of the inputs"
[Moerland (1978a), p. 43].
We may illustrate fiscal non-neutrality by considering the well known
'tax-correction proposition' of Modigliani 5 Miller (1963). When the
government subsidizes interest payments to providers of debt capital by
allowing the corporation to deduct interest payments as an expense, the
market value of a corporation can increase when the corporation takes on
more and more risk free debt. With the tax deductibility of interest -
contrary to the cost of equity - debt is clearly prefered to equity. In
the framework of Modigliani and Miller corporate profít tax thus is non-
neutral with respect to the cost of capital.
Finally, we refine the definition of fiscal (non) neutrality by quot-
ing Moerland: "The degree of fiscal (non) neutrality is expressed by the
semi-elasticity of the marginal cost of an input with respect to some
relevant characteristic of a fiscal regime. ...The degree of fiscal non-
neutrality - for a particular firm - may differ between inputs. Also,
taxation may be neutral with respect to the marginal costs of some in-
puts while it is non-neutral with respect to the marginal costs of ot-
hers.... If the degrees of (non) neutrality are identical for all itr
puts, we call the fiscal regime homogeneously (non) neutral". If there
is at least one degree that differs from the others, the fiscal system
is called non-homogeneously non-neutral. "By definition, a neutral re-
gime is homogeneous. Non-homogeneity can only apply to non-neutral sys-
tems" [Moerland (1978b), pp. 17-18].
3.4. Different types of profit and income tax regimes
"One major weakness in much popular discussion on taxation is the fail-
ure to consider the interaction between different taxes involved" [King
(1977), p. 6]. The effect of a tax may depend quite critically on the
constellation of other taxes with which it is employed. We will, there-
fore, take a look at the tax system as a whole. To do so, we review four
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different tax systems, that may be relevant to our study: the classical
system, the two-rate system, the imputation system and the integrated
system.
As stated before, we pay no attention to several kinds of special cor-
porate taxes, investment allowances and capital depreciation possibili-
ties. We elaborate on the interaction between the different tax rates
that are relevant to the purpose of our research, such as corporate
profit tax and personal taxes on dividend, interest and capítal gain.
This is done in order to make the reader familiar with the topic of tax-
ation.
Before discussing the four basic tax systems, we remark that capital
gain is mostly treated separate from other personal taxes. As a conse-
quence, it is no part of the fiscal regimes we next consider. When eva-
luating the fiscal (non) neutrality, however, capital gain tax need to
be included.
3.4.1. Classical system
The classical system consists of the known concept of separate taxation
of the company and its shareholders, with the tax liability of the com-
pany to corporation tax being independent of personal taxes. Under this
system of taxation, total corporate profits (distributed or retained)
are taxed by a flat rate of corporate profit tax, which we shall denote
by T, while only distributed profits are additionaly taxed by a person-c
al income tax. No attempt ís made to allow shareholders credit for tax
paid by the company. This system thus effects double taxation of divi-
dends. The total tax liability excluding the tax payments on interest,
capital gain, wages and other personal income, TTL, is therefore given
by
TTL- TE~- TDc p
or, using the expression of our basic model of chapter 2:





E : total corporate profit
T: personal tax rate on private income
P
As a consequence, the tax rate on dividend, Td, equals the private in-
come tax rate: Td - T.
P
The classical system is used in a number of countries, notahly the
United States and the Netherlands. In most of these countries, however,
a small amount of dividend is tax exempt from income tax. The classical
system was also tried and subsequently abandonned in France, West
Germany and the United Kingdom.
3.4.2. Two rate system
One of the major objections to the classical system is that it involves
a double taxation of dividends. The two-rate system (also named split-
rate or dual-rate system) aims to alleviate at least some of the double
taxation of dividends by taxing distributed profits at a lower rate than
undistributed profits. Hence,
TTL - Tc[0(K) - rY - D] t TcdD f TPD
- Tc[0(K) - rY] f [Tp - (TC - Tcd)]D
where
Tcd' corporate tax rate on distributed profits, Tcd ~ Tc'
(3.3)
As Tc - Tcd i O, the two-rate system relieves the double taxation of
dividend by alleviations in the corporate tax sphere.
Variants of the two-rate system have been tried in e.g. West Germany
and the United Kingdom.
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3.4.3. Imputation system
As with the two-rate system, the imputation system attempts to give
shareholders credit for tax paid by the company. Unlike the two-rate
system, however, there is only a single rate of corporate profit tax.
So, total profits (distributed or retained) are taxed by the corporate
profit tax, whíle profits distributed are taxed, once again, by a modi-
fied personal income tax. Part of the corporate tax liability on distri-
buted profits is imputed to the shareholders and regarded as a pre-pay-
ment, which the shareholders receive in the form of a tax credit. Some
fraction of the corporation tax paid on dividends is allowed to be sub-
tracted from the personal income tax. Hence,
TTL - tc[0(K) - rY] t(rp - Ts)D
where
ts: rate of imputation.
(3.4)
The imputation system relíeves the double taxation of dívidends by alle-
viations in the personal tax sphere.
The imputation system and its variants are employed in e.g. Belgium,
France and the United Kingdom.
3.4.4. Integrated system
Neither the two-rate nor the imputation system succeeds in eliminating
the tax discrimination between dividends and retentions completely. Only
the integrated system completely integrates the corporate tax system
with the personal tax system. Profits are imputed to shareholders in
proportion to their shareholdíngs, and this imputed income is subject to
personal income tax. Under such a system we have
TTL - Tp[0(K) - rY] (3.5)
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Although a fully integrated system was recommended for Canada and was
seriously considered by West Germany, neither country has adopted the
system, however.
3.4.5. Neutrality of the tax regimes
The choice of tax system is a topic of almost constant debate in politi-
cal circles, as evidenced by the number of changes of the system that
have occured. As stated before, fiscal policy is a major tool of govern-
mental policy. The choice of a fiscal system mostly is a political is-
sue, which may be illustrated by the variety of corporate tax systems in
the EEC-countries. In this context it is not surprising, that there has
been much discussion about tax harmonization in the F.EC.
The degree to which a tax system is neutral with respect to financing
policy is one of the more important considerations in choosing the sys-
tem. As this book is not concerned with the policy problem of the choice
of tax system, we will not evaluate the tax systems with respect to
their fiscal (non) neutrality characteristic. This, as a matter of fact,
has already been done by several authors, such as King (1977), Moerland
(1978b), Stapleton S Burke (1977) and Atkinson ~ Stiglitz (1980). To
illustrate the results of the studies, we quote King: "Only the classi-
cal and integrated system, therefore, are capable of achieving neutrali-
ty with respect to the choice of financial polícy for any value of the
income tax rate. The imputation and two-rate system could be neutral
only if there were a single rate of personal income tax". [King (1977),
p. 110]. For the classical system e.g. to be neutral, capital gains must
be taxed as income and no deductibility provision may be extended to
interest payments.
3.5. Leverage and the value of a firm
Given the firm's investment policy, the management must determine the
means of financing. In this section we consider the question how finan-
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cing decisions affect the value of the firm to its shareholders, which
is a very important issue in finance theory. It turns out that the im-
pact of leverage on the market value of the firm considerably depends on
the fiscal regime under consideration. We focus on this well-known theo-
ry because its result is relevant to our research with regard to the
dynamic theory of the firm.
IJe examine the above mentioned problem by considering two almost iden-
tical firms, that is, except of the financial structure, both firms are
in the same risk class and are anticipated to have the same total cash
earnings or operating income. One of both firms is levered, that is, ít
finances its investment by both equity and debt, whereas the other firm
is unlevered, that is, its capital structure is composed entírely of
common stock. In addition we assume that except for their taxation the
firms face perfect markets. We thus assume:
- firms are in the same risk class
- capital markets are frictionless
- individuals can borrow and lend at the risk free rate
- there are no costs to bankruptcy
- firms issue only two types of claims: risk-free debt and equity
- all cash flow streams are perpetuities.
We will study three different cases:
- no taxes, personal nor corporate
- corporate taxes, no personal taxation
- taxes on corporate and personal incomes.









3.5.1. Irrelevancy theorem of Modigliani 5 Miller
We start our analysis in an imaginary world without taxes of any kind.
We consider an investor who holds (a fraction of) the shares of the un-
levered firm U. The market value of both firm and shares is VU - SU. His
return on this investment is (1(K). Thus,
return firm U 0(K)
market value shares U SU
Firm L, on the contrary, has to pay interest on debt. If the total
amount of debt financing is equal to Y, shareholder's earnings equal
~(K) - rY. The market value of these shares is SL.
The investor may, however, obtain exactly the same return as in the
first case by buying (the same proportions of) both the common stock and
bonds of the levered firm, that is, he could invest BL in the debt of
the levered firm and SL in the shares of the levered firm. Since rY is
the payment to the firm's debt-holders, investor's total earnings are
0(K). In this way, the firm's leverage is cancelled out by a'homemade'
or personal leverage. Hence,
earnings shares L 0(K) - rY
earnings bonds L rY
total return (1(K)
value shares L SL
value bonds L AL
total value investment SL f BL
Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, equilibriwn requires




We now easily derive that
VU - SU - SL f BL -(ViBL) f BL - VL (3.7)
We conclude that in equilibrium the total market value of the two firms
must equal each other. This conclusion is consistent with the well known
leverage irrelevancy theorem of Modigliani S Miller: "The average cost
of capital to any firm is completely independent of its capital struc-
ture". [Modiglíani á~ Miller (1958), p. 268], or: given their production
and investment decisions, the market values of firms, operating in per-
fect capital markets, are unaffected by differences in their capital
structure.
3.5.2. Corporate tax correction theorem
In this subsection we gíve attention to corporate tax laws by which a
firm can deduct interest payments on its debt in computing its income
tax purposes, but other payments, that is, dividends to security holders
are not tax deductible. In their 1963 tax-correction paper Modigliani S
Miller argue that the inclusion of such a tax law results in a higher
market value of a levered firm than of an identical unlevered firm.
The analysis, we carry out to clarify this statement, is analoguous to
that of the previous subsection. We assume again the existence of two
firms identical in all aspects except their capital structure. The
shareholders posttax earnings of the unlevered firm are now (1-tc)0(K),
whereas the market value is assumed to be SU. Thus,
earnings shares U (1-rc)0(K)
market value shares U SU
The aftertax earnings available to the investor holding the shares of an
identical levered firm are (1-z )[0(K) - rY]. Those shares have a pro-c
posed market value of SL. Accordingly, an investment in the shares of
the levered fiitn will yield exactly the same return as an investment in
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the shares of the unlevered firm by adding only such an amount of debt
that yields a return of (1-i )rY. Because the bonds of the levered firmc
yield rY, we see that the aftertax earnings available to the security
holders of the levered firm, that is, both the share- and bondholders,
are greater than those available to the security holders of the unlever-
ed firm by the quantity T rY. It is as if the government pays a subsidyc
of z rY to the levered firm for having debt in its capital structure.
c
Since we assume that a risk free security with a return of rY has a mar-
ket value of BL, the investor's total investment is SL f(1-TC)BL. Sum-













F.qual earnings again require equal market values. Hence,
SU - SL t (1-tc)BL
Using expression (3.6) we get




VL - VU t tcBL (3.10)
The value of the levered firm is equal to the value of the unlevered
firm plus the tax shield provided by debt. "This is perhaps the single
most important reault in the theory of corporation finance obtained in
the last 25 years. It says that in the absence of any market imperfec-
tions including corporate taxes (i.e. if t~ 0), the value of the firmc
is completely independent of the type of financing used for its pro-
54
jects. However, when the government subsidizes interest payments to pro-
viders of debt capital by allowing the corporation to deduct interest
payments on debt as an expense, the market value of the corporation can
increase as it takes on more and more (risk free) debt. Ideally (given
the assumptions of the model) the firm should take on 1007. debt."
[Copeland á Weston (1983), pp. 387-389).
We notice that the market values of the shares ceteris paribus decline
when leverage increases. By investing the difference SUSL in risk free
bonds total return increases, however.
Of course, when the market values of the two firms are in the equilib-
rivm given by equation (3.10), there are no advantages or disadvantages
to the investor who purchases shares of the unlevered rather than the
equivalent unlevered position involving the bonds and the shares of the
levered firm. However, the shareholders of any firm are better off,
whenever the firm increases its leverage.
3.5.3. Leverage related costs
Following the publication of the Modigliani á Miller (1963) tax correc-
tion paper, many writers have sought to reconcile the MSM maximum lever-
age prediction with observed capital structure. Such a'corner solution'
is, of course, an unsatisfactory result, because actual firms do not,
and in fact cannot, achieve anywhere near that degree of leverage.
Clearly, the analysis of the previous subsection did not capture all the
relevant factors influencing the financing decision.
Many writers have attempted to explain the low levels of leverage by
resort to 'leverage related costs'. They are convinced that a capital
structure equilibrium for corporations requires at least some market
imperfections, such as leverage related costs, which increase with the
debt-to-equity ratio in order to avoid a corner solution of 1007, debt.
These leverage related costs need to be very large and include bankrupt-
cy costs [Brennan á Schwartz (1977), Kim (1978)], contracting and moni-
toring costs [Jensen á Meckling (1976)], information and signaling costs
[Vermaelen (1981)] and incomplete markets [Modigliani (1982)J. In addi-
tion De Angelo á Masulis argue that the presence of corporate tax shield
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substitutes for debt, such as accounting depreciation, deple[ion allow-
ances and investment tax credits implies "a market equilibrium in which
each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decísion (with or with-
out leverage related costs)" [De Angelo á~ Masulis (1980a), p. 3].
The inclusion of these increasing leverage related costs results in





Figure 3.1: market value of a levered firm subject to
corporate taxation and leverage related costs.
The striking feature of this analysis is the existence of an optimal
~debt-to-equity ratio. Up to the point L of figure 3.1. the value of the
firm rises as debt is introduced into the capital structure; however,
beyond thís point, increasing the use of leverage lowers the value of
the firm, because the leverage related costs become dominant. So, the
balancing of the leverage related costs against the tax gains of debt
finance gives rise to an optimal capital structure, just as the tradi-




In addition to the leverage related costs also market imperfections on
the other side of the trade-off may be used to explain the variety of
debt-to-equity ratios and thus to avoid the unrealistic corner solution
of 100Y debt. Moreover, the great emphasis on the then known leverage
related costs seems to Miller to have been misplaced: "For big business,
at least (...), the supposed trade-off between tax gains and bankruptcy
costs looks suspiciously like the recipe for the fabled horse-and-rabbít
stew - one horse and one rabbit" [Miller (1977), p. 264]. In addition,
Miller cannot understand, why observed capital structure have shown so
little change over time? Miller is convinced, that personal taxes could
offset corporate taxes, such that in equilibrium even the value of any
individual firm would be independent of its leverage.
This far reaching conclusion will be discussed in one of the next sub-
sections. For the moment being we focus on the impact of uniform perso-
nal taxes on the value of the firm in relation to its leverage. We will
use the same framework as in the previous subsections.
Let re be the personal tax rate on equity income. So, re equals rd when
the firm distributes all profit; it equals the personal tax rate on ca-
pital gain rg when the company adopts a zero dividend policy and it
will, finally, take on an intermediate value when a policy of dividend
distribution is combined with capital gains as well.
An individual who owns the shares of the unlevered firm will have a
post tax income equal to (1-re)(1-rc)0(K), while the market value is
supposed to be SU. This individual can obtain an identical income stream
by purchasing the shares of the levered firm and an amount of bonds that
yields a net return of (1-re)(1-rc)rY. Since, interest income is taxed
according to the personal tax rate r, the investor thus has to buy anr
amount of corporate debt equal (1-re)(1-rc)rY~(1-rr), however. We still
assume that a risk free security with a pre-tax return of rY has a mar-
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In accordance to previous analyses and again using expression (3.6) we
now get:
VU - SU - SL t BL(1-Te)(1-T~)I(1-Tr)
- (VL - BL) f BL(1-Te)(1-TC)I(1-Tr) (3.11)
or
VL - VU ~- [ 1 -
(1-T ) (1-T )
(1-Tr) c ~BL (3.12)
Note that expression (3.12) confirms both the Modigliani h Miller irre-
levancy theorem and their 1963 tax correction paper: in a world without
any taxation the market value of a firm is independent of its financial
leverage, while the introduction of corporate taxation benefits debt
financing. However, due to the introducticn of a tax rate on income from
shares, which is less than the tax on interest yields, this gain from
leverage will be reduced. In fact, for a wide range of values for T,c
Te and Tr, the gain from leverage vanishes or even turns negative. An
illustration of this result is given in figure 3.2.
Finally, we note that under a maximum dividend policy and the classical
tax system, implying Te - Td - Tr, the impact of personal taxes is abol-
ished, that is, we get the Modigliani-Miller maximum debt prediction.
Figure 3.2: market value of a firm under uniform personal
taxation.
3.6. Leverage and market equilibrium
In the previous section we have found an expression to indicate the val-
ue of a firm as a function of its leverage and the personal tax rate of
its shareholder. The problem now is to find an equilibrium market value
of the firm in the case that the shareholders are partitioned into tax
groups. In this line, the final result of the previous section may be
used to analyse the impact of leverage on the equilibritan market value
of a firm in case share and debt income are taxed at different rates,
but with each rate the same for all investors. In fact, this variation
in the firm's value with its leverage is described by Arditti, Levy S
Sarnat (1977). The results are similar to those depicted in figure 3.2.
In this section we focus on the equilibrium valuatíon problem under a
progressive personal income tax, that is, we consider different income
tax rates varying along investors. As a consequence, investors may have
different opinions with regard to the value of the firm's securities.
Given these different taxes and valuations, we now explore how adjust-
ment in the demand for, and supply of, these differently taxed securi-
ties affect the resulting set of equilibrium values of debt and equity.
To do so, we distinguish two major models of equilibrium, that are the
most widely accepted in the literature on financial theory at this time.
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The first one is labeled the 'Before Tax Theory' and is associated
with Modigliani S Miller (1963), as well as with Miller ~ Scholes
(1978). The second one, with which we will be concerned with i n the next
chapter, i s called the 'After Tax Theory' and is most frequently associ-
ated with Miller (1977).
3.6.1. Before Tax Theory
The 'Before Tax Theory' essentially concludes that all personal income
taxes to investors can be effectively laundered. The corporate profit
tax is thus the only tax imperfection. Consequently, the resulting situ-
ation can be appropriately described by means of the tax correction mod-
el of Modigliani S Miller (1963) in combination with at least some other
market imperfection, such as leverage related costs. In this way a cor-
ner solution of 100Y debt is avoided, so that the model can be used to
explain the variety of debt-to-equity ratios.
The tax laundery may, for example, be illustrated by the Miller ~
Scholes' "Dividend and taxes" (1978) argument. They claim that many fis-
cal systems establishes so many easy ways to save and invest at before
tax rates of return, so that the effective personal tax rate applicable
on a dollar of dividends is essentially zero. This result would hold for
any shareholder in any and all tax brackets under the assumption of an
approximately zero tax rate on capital gain.
The procedure required to avoid paying personal taxes on dividends is
to borrow on personal account ensuring that the interest expense on his
personal debt, which is tax deductible, equals the net dividend receiv-
ed, so that they cancel out. The proceeds of the loan can then be in-
vested at a before tax rate of return. In this way the dividend income
tax is eliminated, whereas the individual's personal capital structure
is not affected and tax rules not violated.
Finally, we remark that the same method can be applied, in principle,
on a dollar of interest received from bonds.
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3.6.2. After Tax Theory
In "Debt and taxes" Miller (1977) argues that personal taxes could off-
set corporate taxes such that in equilibrium the value of any individual
firm would be independent of its leverage. In addition to the usual as-
sumptions, we have mentioned before, this 'After Tax Theory' is explored
under the following suppositions.
Firstly, Miller assumes that the effective personal tax rate on equity
income, T, is zero. Miller sets this rate equal to zero in order toe
facilitate his equilibrium analysis. This assumption may be fairly rea-
listic, since a firm, which should minimize the combined tax exposures
to itself and its investors, should adopt a zero dividend policy, that
is, the stockholders pay the capital gain tax rather that the personal
tax. In many countries the former is equal or close to zero. However,
similar qualitative results may be obtained in case of a positive, but
relative small and constant, personal tax rate Te [see e.g. Hamada á~
Scholes (1985)].
Secondly, in some countries such as the United States, individuals may
invest in risk free, tax exempt municipal bonds to earn a tax free yield
r~. For that reason, the rate of interest on taxable bonds must include
compensation for the personal tax burden that these bonds impose on the
investor. An individual with a marginal tax rate on income from bonds
equal to rrp will only hold bonds if they pay r0~(1-Trp), that is, their
return must be 'grossed up'. Furthermore, the existence of a progressive
personal tax structure means that this compensation must increase when
larger quantities of bonds are issued. The demand for bonds is thus giv-
en by the upward sloping curve labeled rdíY), that is depicted in figure
3.3. The flat stretch of the curve represents the demand for fully tax-
able bonds by fully tax exempt investors.
On the supply side firms are willing to issue only bonds relative to
equity as long as the before tax cost of deb[ is below the 'grossed up'
after tax cost of equity, which under the presented assumptions equals
r~~(1-TC). The factor 'gross up' reflects the fact that corporate debt
is tax deductible. Therefore, the supply curve is drawn at the horizon-
tal level rp~(1-TC).
Equilibrium in the corporate bond market, then, is established, where
supply is equal to demand, that is, where the before-tax cost of corpor-
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ate debt is equal to the rate which would be paid by tax-exempt orp,ani-
zations 'grossed up' by the corporate tax rate. So, "there will be an
equilibrium level of aggregate corporate debt, Y~, and hence an equilib-
rium debt-equity ratio for the corporate sector as a whole. But there
would be no opttmum debt ratio Eor any indivídual firm" [Miller (1977),
p. 269]. To see that this is true, let us recall that the personal tax
~ rd' rs
JY
Figure 3.3: aggregate supply and demand for corporate bonds.
rate on equity income is assumed to be zero and rewrite the value of a
levered firm:
VL - VU t [1 - (1-ic)I(1-Trp)]BL
The equilibrium prices (or costs) of debt and equity are such that
rs - r~I(1-TC) - rd - r~l(1-r~)
(3.13)
(3.14)
where T~ is the personal tax rate of the marginal investor and rs the
label of the supply curve. Consequently,
(1-TC) ~ (1-t~) (3.15)
r (Y)
s
which on its turn implies that VL equals V~~, If the supply rate of re-
turn differs from then the gain from leverage will be positive
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or negative and all corporations will either try to have a capital
structure containing 100i debt or issue no debt at all.
Anticipating the next chapter, we indicate an important implication of
Miller's argument, which says that "companies following a no-leverage or
low leverage strategy (...) would find a market along investors in the
high tax brackets; those opting for a high leverage strategy (...) would
find the natural clientele for their securities at the other end of the
scale. But one clientele is as good as the other". [Miller (1977), p.
269]. This phenomenon, which was first noticed by Farrar á~ Selwyn
(1967), is often called the 'financial leverage clientele' effect. In
the next chapter we will pay more attention to it, when discussing some
important subsequent contributions, which study and extend the Miller
hypothesis.
3.7. Conclusion
In this section an introduction has been given to the impact of taxation
on corporate policy. We restricted ourselves to the leverage decision of
a firm, which appeared to be an illustrative example. In the next chap-
ter, however, we enlarge the analysis by additionally considering the
dividend and investment policy of the firm as well as the investors's
choices with respect to their desired kind of income. To do so, we ela-
borate on some contributions that study, extend and dispute the 'After
Tax' equilibrium theory of Miller.
We close this chapter with a remark with regard to the distinction
between the two equilibrium theories, presented in section 3.6 and which
to some extend are competitive. This distinction does not seem very
feasible with what most people consider our current real world. In
Hamada 5 Scholes (1985) a comprehensive díscussion and comparison of
both theories is given. They conclude that theoretically "the answer to
our question, why two separate tax theories, rests on who is the margirr
al investor". [p. 201]. In addition, "some (empirical) evidence supports
the before tax and some the after tax equilibriian model". [p. 217].
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Therefore, we finally mention the attempt of Harris (19fi0) to combine
both theories by includíng leverage related costs within the Miller
framework. He derives an adjusted value function of a levered firm:
(1-T ) (1-T )
VL - VU f [1 - (1-T )c ]BL - C(L)rp
(3.16)
where C(L) denoted the impact of leverage L related costs on the value
of the levered firm. Harris states that the evidence presented in his
book provides support for an affirmative answer to the question whether
the inclusion of personal income taxes in the model at corporate capital
structure will a dequately explain observed patterns of behaviour. His
conclusions are: "marginal investors incorporate personal taxes in their
valuation and investment decisions. Financial managers may pursue widely
divergent capital structure policies all of which may be optimal. Opti-
mality results from the dominance of personal effects, which offset the
differences in non-tax related expected cash outflows to third parties"




FINANCIAL MARKF.T EQIJILIRRIUM UNDER TAXATION
AND TAX INDUCED CLIENTELES EFFECTS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we enlarge the analysis given in the previous one. In
addition to the leverage irrelevancy theorem we discuss the impact of
taxation on the corporate dividend and investment policy as well as on
the investors' choices as a function of their disposable personal in-
come. To do so, we once again elaborate on the firm`s equilibrium market
value onder taxation and its implications with respect to tax induced
clienteles.
The notion that personal taxes will induce tax clienteles was first
suggested by Farrar S Selwyn (1967). Although their analysis was not
based on an equilibrium valuation framework, and thus their conclusion
about financial leverage clienteles in particular was largely conjectur-
al, more recent contributions, such as that of Brennan (1970), Stapleton
(1972) and Stiglitz (1973), did not reject them. Moreover, in the pre-
vious chapter we have seen that Miller (1977) uses the idea of financial
leverage clienteles to argue that personal taxation could offset corpor-
ate taxes such that in equilibrium the value of any individual firm
would be independent of its leverage.
Miller's approach stimulated several contributions studying, extending
and disputing his hypothesis that companies following a low leverage
strategy will find a market along investors in high tax brackets, while
the stock of highly levered firms will be held by investors with low
personal tax rates.
At first, many subsequent papers by Kim, Lewellen 14 McConnell (1979),
DeAngelo S Masulis (1980b), Auerbach fi King (1983), and others, accepted
and clarified the thruth of Miller's conclusion. In 1982, however, the
discussion was again opened through Gordon, who "could not understand
how Miller reached this conclusion". [Gordon (1982), p. 483). The cor-
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rectness of Gordon's result, that the equilibrium value of a firm is a
convex function of its leverage, is to our opinion on its turn doubtful.
We first present a model, based on DeAngelo b Masulis (1980a), to clari-
fy once again Miller's irrelevancy theorem (section 4.2). In section 4.3
a dividend irrelevancy theorem and the existence of dividend clienteles
is discussed, that is, depending on its dividend policy, a firm will
attract investors subject to specific tax brackets. In addition, the
framework of DeAngelo and Masulis is extended by specifying the rela-
tions between the personal tax rates, that is, by considering some tax
regimes. Section 4.4 presents Gordon's criticism of Miller's results,
followed by a comprehensive discussion in which we will show that the
equilibriutn concept, that Gordon uses, is not correct. In section 4.6 we
point out a corrected equilibrium approach, which will turn out to be a
valuable tool for the dynamic analysis of chapter 7 in particular. Fi-
nally, we introduce 'tax induced investment clienteles' as a result of
the corporate investment policy. Contrary to the 'financial leverage'
and ~dividend'-clientele-effects this phenomenon is not yet based on an
equilibrium framework. The inclusion of this topic, however, completes
our analysis with respect to the impact of personal taxation on three
important issues that we consider throughout this book: the financing,
dividend and investment policy.
4.2. Dividend and leverage irrelevancy theorem under personal taxation
The model, we describe below, is a simplified version of the framework
that DeAngelo fi Masulis (1980b) explored in order to show that in equi-
librium the market value of any firm is independent of its financing and
dividend policy. Contrary to DeAngelo and Masulis, we eliminate differ-
ences in risk by assuming that all rates of return are certainty equi-
valents. Since DeAngelo and Masulis assume complete markets in which
firms can issue a complete set of so-called Arrow-Debreu securities in
both debt and equity, there is no formal distinction between the analy-
sis of certainty and uncertainty. The result of DeAngelo and Masulis
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thus is a natural extension of the result that holds under certainty
[see e.g. Auerbach (1979)].
We employ a decision model in which value maximizing firms sell equity
and debt claims in order to finance investments at a given level. These
securities yield constant returns which are taxable to its holders ar
cording to the corresponding personal tax rates, which differ across
investors. We assume all debt payments tax deductible to the firm and
all firm net income taxable at the corporate tax rate rc, which is
cross-sectionally constant. Both debt and equity markets are assumed
complete, perfectly competitive and frictionless, so that no single in-
vestor or firm is significant enough to alter security prices. In addi-
tion, both markets are effectively segmented against personal arbitrage.
Given the level of investment, the problem of the firm is to determine
its financial structure and its dividend policy. It will adopt the fi-
nancing-dividend decision which provides the greatest total net present
market value. Hence, the firm maximizes
VL - SL f BL
where
SL: market value of shares or equity claims
BL: market value of bonds or debt claims
(4.1)
The equity claims may be separated into dividend and capital gain compo-
nents respectively. Thus,
SL - SD f SG (4.2)
where
SD: market value dividend claims
SG: market value capital gain claims
Let PD, PG and PY be the current market prices per dollar of dividend,
capital gain and debt income respectively. We may now write the objec-
tive as to maximize
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VL -(PD.D t PG.G) t PY.rY
- PD.D t PG[(1-tc)(0(K)-rY) - D] t PY.rY
where
G: capital gain through retained earnings.
(4.3)
The optimal dividend and financing policies depend on the sign of the
first order derivatives wíth respect to the control variables D and Y
respectively. Hence,
2VL




- r[PY - (1-TC)PGJ (4.5)
Since all firms face the same market prices and by assumption the same
corporate tax rate, the analysis applies to each and every firm. For
example, the aggregate supply of equity claims ( both dividend as capital
gain) will be zero i f PD - PG and PY -(1-tc)PG ~ 0.
On the demand side we assume the existence of many investors with per-
sonal tax rates, that are continuously distributed over the range of
feasible values. For simplicity, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980a,b) assume
in particular that i nvestors are differently taxed so that at least one








(1-Tri) ~ ( 1-Tdi)(1-TC)
The debt-equity demand of an individual depends on his personal prefer-
ences represented by an utility function subject to a budget constraint.
In order to facilitate the analysis we may transform the objective of
any investor into the maximization of the net return on investment.
Hence,
(1-Tdi) (1-TQi) (1-Tri)
áax{ali. PD t a2i. PO { a3i. PY f
~i








We now argue that positive quantities of both debt and equity can be
supplied in the aggregate simultaneously only if there is no after tax
premium. Hence,
~ ~ ~
PY - PD(1-TC) - P~(1-TC)
To clarify this result, let us assume a premium such that
PY ~ PD(1-TC) - P~(1-TC)
(4.9)
(4,10)
Using (4.5) we obtain that market prices at such levels will stimulate
firms to supply only debt claims in order to increase the value of the
firm. However, investors i for whom
(1-Tdi)(1-TC) ~ (1-Tri) (4.11)
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prefer equity to debt claims if PD, PG and PY are at levels satisfying
(4.10), that is, investors i will pay a price for any equity claim that
exceeds any PY satisfying (4.10). To see that this is true, let us recal
the objective functional (4.6) which says that any investor i will pre-




Pp ' PG PY (4,12)
If we assume, only for simplicity, that Tdi - rgi, market prices at lev-
els satisfying (4.10) imply for any investor i that
(1-rdi) (1-Tri) (1-Tri)
PD ~ (1-TC)PD ~ PY
(4.11) (4.10)
(4,13)
which in turn implies that investors i prefer equity claims rather than
debt claims. But, with PY (1-TC)PD ~ 0, expression (4.5) points out that
no firm will issue any equity. This means that any PY, PD and PG satis-
fying (4.10) in a market with no equity available cannot be in equilib-
rium. Moreover, investors i will offer up to prices that make them in-
different between debt and equity; that is, they are willing to pay more
for equity claims than their going price PD (or PG). This will drive up
the equity claim prices as an result.
On the other hand, a similar reasoning can be made when PY (1-TC)PD ~0
by recalling the existence of investors j with (1-rdj)(1-TC) ~(1-Trj).
These investors will prefer debt claims although no firm is willing to
supply such claims.
Notice, that similar results may be obtained when rdi ~ T i or wheng
other premi~nns are assumed. So, no premium can exíst at equilibrium if
there are i- and j-type investors in the market. The interaction of sup-
~ ~ ~
ply and demand will cause an equilibriimm with prices PY, PD and PG
satisfying (4,9), at which fiims will issue both debt and equity claims.
Moreover, such an equilibriimm confirms the Miller hypothesis that the
value of a firm is independent of its leverage rate. This result can
easily be obtained by substituting the equilibrium prices in the first
order condition (4.5). In addition, the firm's value may be independent
of its dividend policy too.
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So, under the assimmption that investors are continuously distributed
over the range of possible tax rates, at equilibrium the choice among
debt, dividends and capital gain is a mat[er of indifference to any giv-
en firm.
4.3. Dividend and financial leverage clienteles
Proceeding on the assumptions and results of the previous section we now
derive the phenomenon of tax induced clienteles; that is, depending on
its policy, a firm will attract investors subject to specific tax brack-
ets. In this section we focus on dividend and financial leverage clien-
teles in particular. Moreover, we consider the latter phenomenon under
both the classical and the imputation tax system. Finally, the tax in-
duced net return clienteles as a result of the firm's investment policy
will be discussed in section 4.7.
Recalling the results of the previous section, we know that at equilib-
rium the value of any firm will be independent of its dividend policy,
that is, the choice of equity claim to be supplied is a matter of indif-
ference to the firm.
On the demand side, however, the revenues of these claims are differi
ently taxed. According to the objective functional (4.6) the choice of










So, capital gain claims are prefered by investors subject to [ax rates
on capi[al gain less than their tax rate on dividend. As the latter tax
rate mostly exceeds the former, only fully tax exempt investors are wil-
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ling to hold dividend claims, however. The result of dividend clienteles
thus is on one hand obvious and on the other hand trivial.
To obtain the result of financial leverage clienteles, we firstly de-~
fine PE as the equilibrium market value of one dollar equity claim. PE
may take on the polar values pD and pG respectively, or interior values
due to a combination of both equity claims.
In the previous section we have seen that equilibrium prices are such
that firms are willing to issue simultaneously both equity and debt~ ~
claims, that is PE(1-tc) - PY. Consequently, investors' preferences de-
pend on whichever (in)equality holds in







This condition corresponds to the results of the third chapter. In addi-
tion, it confirms the statement of Miller (1977) that low-income iLrvest-
ors prefer corporate debt and high-income investors personal debt. This
notion of financial leverage clienteles may be easily obtained by set-
tíng T equal to zero. However, the existence of the phenomena stronglye
depends on the kind of equity claim as well as on the tax system under
consideration.
To clarify the above mentioned statement we first consider the case in
which the firm is supplying dividend claims only, and thereafter the
case in which the firm is supplying capital gaín claims as well. Acco~
dingly, we rewrite (4.17) into
(1-rdi)(i-TC) ~ (1-Tri) (4.18)
Under the classical tax system (Tdi - Tri) this condition implies that
no single investor, neither subject to personal taxation nor tax exempt,
will demand a positive quantity of equity claims. The introduction of a
dividend personal tax shelter [see DeAngelo S Masulis (1980b)J or a re-
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form of the tax system into an imputation tax system may establish such
a positive demand. In the latter case (Tdi - Tri - Ts) expression (4.18)
turns into
Ts (1-TC) ~ (1-Tri)
c
(4.19)
So, in case Ts - Tc, that is, the total fractíon of the corporate tax
paid on distributed profit is allowed to be subtracted from the personal
income tax, investor i's choice depends on the balance between the cor-
porate tax rate and the personal tax rate on debt income. This result is
in particular similar to Miller's result when assuming rdi ~ 0.
Secondly, we consider the case in which the firm is supplying both divi-
dend and capital gain claims. In addition we introduce the following
relation between the personal tax rates on debt and dividend income re-
spectively:




Using the investor's objective (4.6) and the equilibrium condition (4.9)
we obtain following conditions:
Investor i prefers
(a) debt claims rather than capital gain claims if
(1-Tri) - (1-Tgi)(1-TC) ~ 0
(b) dividend claims rather than capital gain claims if




(c) debt claims rather than dividend claims if
(1-Tri) - (1-TC)s ~ 0 (4.23)
Investors now may be partitioned according to their personal tax rate on
debt income into three tax groups. Each group is characterized by a
preference for a certain kind of income. This result is depicted in fi-
gure 4.1.





Figure 4.1: Partitioning of investors according to their
personal tax rate into claim-preference groups.
The above mentioned partitioning is only feasible if demand for and sup-
ply of all security claims simultaneously exist in the market. Supply is
guaranteed by the equilibriwn condition (4.9). To guarantee the demand
for dividend claims in particular, the imputation factor must be such






Since the personal tax on capital gain mostly is at a rate close to ze-
ro, the imputation factor must be around one; that is, investors only
will demand positive quantities of dividend claims, if at least the to-
tal fraction of the corporate tax paid on dividends is allowed to be
substracted from the personal income tax. Note, that under the classical
tax system (ts~0), condition (4.25) will always be violated; that is, in
case investors demand for positive quantíties of equity claims, it will
be capital gain claims rather than dividend claims.
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Finally, in correspondence with (4.17) the choice between debt and
capital gain obviously depends on whichever (in)equality holds in
(1-Tgi)(1-tc) ~ (1-tri) (4.26)
that is, if (1-Tgi)(1-tc) ~(1-Tri) the investor prefers capital gain
claims, if the equality-sign holds he takes an indifferent position and
otherwise he prefers debt claims.
4.4. Equilibrium market value reconsidered by Gordon
In his 1982 paper Gordon states: "I could not understand how Miller
reached this conclusion, and subsequent papers - by Kim, Lewellen and
McConnell (1979), Chen and Kim (1979), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980a), and
others - which accepted the truth of Miller's conclusíon did not clarify
Míller's argument to me." jGordon (1982), p. 483]. In his opinion it is
not possible to prove that under Miller's assumptions the equilibrium
value of each firm is independent of its leverage rate. Employing the
Modigliani-Miller theoretical framework, Gordon claims that only in a
special case Miller's conclusion holds. In general, however, the equi-
librium value of a firm is found to be a convex function of its leverage
rate. Consequently, the optimal (value maximizing) policy for all firms
is the maxim~mm possible leverage rate.
Gordon starts his analysis by assuming a zero tax rate on equity income
(in agreement with Miller) and a uniform personal income tax rate on
debt. Using the work of Arditti, Levy and Sarnat (1977), Gordon then
points out that the straight lines Vi, as depicted in figure 4.2, re-
present the relationship between value and leverage for the case where
the personal tax rate of all individuals is Tri (see also figure 3.2).
These personal value functions are given by
V (L) ~ V f (7 -7 )L (4.27)pi u ri c
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where
V i(L): personal value of a firm with leverage L to an investor
P
subject to tri and Td - 0.
Figure 4.2: Relation between the value of a firm and its leverage
rate under a progressive personal tax on debt income
and a corporate tax of rc - 0.5.
Next, Gordon assumes that the personal tax rate on the proceeds from
debt is at a rate which varies with the investor's wealth. In addition,
investors are supposed to be distributed over the range of tax rates
Tri ~ 0.0 to tri - 0.5, whereas firms are arbitrarily distributed over
the range of leverage rates L~ to Lmax' F.ach V i in figure 4.2 now re-P
presents the equilibrium values of firms for those investors with the
indicated tax rate on debt.
Gordon then argues that none of the straight lines in figure 4.2 pro-
vides an equilibrium set of values for the firms, since only persons
subject to the indicated tax rate will be indifferent to which firm is
ín his portfolio. Investors subject to lower personal tax rates than the
indicated one, will find all firms undervalued and will move into firms
with the highest leverage rate in order to maximize their personal gain.
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Similarly, investors in higher tax brackets will find all firms over-
valued and they will move into unlevered firms in order to minimize
their personal loss.
Instead of the individual straight lines Vi, the equilibrium market
value of the firms is represented by the upward sloping curve Vm, in
figure 4.2, that is, this curve represents the equilibritun relationship
between value and leverage. The construction of the Vmcurve is such
that the excess demand for shares at each leverage rate is equal to ze-
ro. Gordon argues that any investor will move into the shares and corre-
sponding debt of those firms for which the slope of Vm is the same as
the slope of his 'personal value'-function V i. For example, investors
P
subject to tri - 0.25 will find that V0.25 Vm, the excess of a firm's
personal value over its market value, is maximized by holding shares of
a firm with the leverage rate of L0.25'
To clarify the construction of the line Vm, it is sufficient to de-
scribe the solution in case investors are subject to just three tax rat-
es, say rri - 0.0, 0.25 and 0.5. Let firms be partitioned according to
theír leverage rate into three groups as indicated in figure 4.3.
L2
Figure 4.3: Relation between the value of a firm and its leverage
rate under progressive personal tax rate on debt at the
rates Tri - 0.~, 0.25 and 0.5, and a corporate tax of
t - 0.5.c
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The partitioning i s such that the total share value of the firms in the
first group i s equal to the share wealth of persons with tri - Tc - 0.5,
for this group of investors is willing to buy shares of firms following
a zero or low leverage strategy. Next, investors subject to Tri - 0.25
fix the equilibrium value of the firm in such way that V0.25-Vm is the
same for all shares in the corresponding tax group. Moreover, shares in
the other tax group would only provide smaller values for V0~25-Vm. The
total share value of the firms in the second group is once again equal
to the share wealth of persons with rri - 0.25.
Similarly, the remaining shares are hold by the remaining investors,
those with Tr - 0.0. So, "with each person's goal the maximization of
Vi - Vm, the Vmcurve in fígure 4.3 results in an equilibrium" [Gordon
(1982), p. 490]. Finally, the size of the intervals adjust to make the
excess demand for shares in each tax group equal to zero. Ry extending
the number of tax rates and corresponding tax groups the curve Vm tends
to the convex curve as depicted in figure 4.2, implying that the equili-
brium value of a firm is a convex function of its leverage rate.
Proceeding on this result Gordon then argues that any firm, that has
the above knowledge on valuation and that issues debt and equity securi-
ties in the proportion that maximizes market value, will adopt a maximum
leverage capital structure at which point all firms have the same value.
Gordon concludes that Miller's assumptions do not lead to his explana-
tion of capital structure; that is, the value of the firm is not inde-
pendent of its capital structure, so that Miller failed to explain the
wide range of capital structures that we actually observe.
4.5. Discussion and extension of Gordon's framework
In this chapter we have presented two conflicting views with regard to
the after tax equilibrium value of a levered firm. For simplicity, we
label the underlying concepts the Miller and Gordon theory respectively.
The Miller theory in particular has been supported by several subse-
quent contributions [Kim, Lewellen and McConnell (1979), DeAngelo and
Masulis (1980a), Rim (1982), Auerbach and King (1983)]. It was Gordon
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(19R2) who first questioned the correctness of Miller's result. In his
opinion Miller's assumptions do not result in a leverage irrelevancy
theorem.
In this section we discuss Gordon's criticism by questioning the cor-
rectness both of the objective functional Gordon uses to obtain the up-
wards sloping market value curve (suhsection 4.5.1) as well as of the
supply adjustment process he describes afterwards (subsections 4,5.7. and
4.5.3). We review some díscussion in the literature on the latter topic
and add some new arguments, because the results that are known at the
moment, are still unsatisfactory. We conclude that on his turn Gordon
failed to disprove Miller's explanation of capital structure. Moreover,
Gordon's approach is very useful to prove once again the correctness of
the Miller leverage irrelevancy theorem.
4.5.1. The investor's oblective and the Modigliani-Miller framework
One of Gordon's main objections is the abandonment of the Modigliani-
Miller framework by Miller (1977) and subsequent authors. In additíon,
"they did not reconcile their results with that (MtrM) framework."
[Gordon, (1982), p. 4R31. Therefore, Gordon explores the Modigliani-
Miller framework with perfect markets and introduces in sequence: cor-
porate debt, a corporate profit tax, a uniform personal tax and a pro-
gressive personal tax on debt income. As soon as progressive personal
taxation is included, a distinction can be made between the personal
value, which we label by V i, and the market value of a firm, Vm; thatP
is, maximization of the firm's market value is not longer equivalent to
the maximization of the investor's personal values.
To carry out his analysís, Gordon is partitioning the firms according
to their leverage rate into different groups in a way, such that the
total share value of the firms in each group is equal to the share
wealth of investors in the corresponding tax group. Proceeding on the
assumption that each investor's goal is the maximization of the excess
of the personal value over the market value, Gordon argues that the Vm
curve in figure 4.3 results in an equilibrium "because a person subject
to the rri -th tax rate finds Vi - Vm the same for all shares in the tax
so
group, and shares in the other tax groups would only provide smaller
values for V1 - Vm." [Gordon (1982), p. 490].
The maximization of the excess of the personal value over the market
value in real terms is a reasonable objective if investors are allowed
to lend and borrow unlimited amounts of debt at a constant risk free
rate, which is actually the case in the Modigliani-Miller framework. In
our opinion, however, Gordon's work does not proceed on the assumption
of unlimited liabilities. On the contrary, capital rationing is slumber-
ing into his analysis, which may be illustrated by the next features:
- the assumption that the personal tax rate on the proceeds from debt is
a rate which varies only with the investor's initial wealth is a fair
assumption if the amount of taxable income is limited. However, in
absence of capital rationing investors may lend and borrow unlimited
amounts and the personal tax rate, which is assumed to be a progres-
sive one, will thus be affected.
- the partitioning into tax groups, such that the share wealth of the
investors equal the share value of the firms in that group is only
possíble if capital rationing is included.
It is not surprising, that such a capital rationing is slumbering into
Gordon's equilibrium analysis, for Auerbach and King have shown "that ín
a world in which investors face different tax rates, no equilibrium ex-
ists unless constraints are imposed". [Auerbach and King (1983), p.
608].
In our opinion, Gordon should have used the Present Value Index, which
is a modification of the net present value in order to consider con-
strained capital budgeting problems with projects that differ with re-
spect to their scale. Due to the limited liabilities, the scale of an
investment becomes important and a project will thus be valued according
to the return per dollar invested. The presen[ value index, PVI, is de-
fined as the present value of cash inflows divided by the present value
of cash outflows [see Copeland and Weston, (1983), p. 56]; that is,
PVI - ~resent value of inflows (4.28)present value of outflows
si
Of course, it makes no difference if we would take the net present value
index, that is, if we replace the present value of inflows by the net
present value. In this way, we are able to say something about the pres-
ent gain in relation to the present value of outflows, that is, the
present rate of return on investment.
Using this latter index, the investor's objective becomes the maximí-
zation of (Vpi-Vm)~Vm. In section 4.6 we carry out the analysis in this
way as an example of a more general equilibrium approach we will use
later on in this book. For the moment, it is important to know that in
the case we use the above criterion, we only obtain quantitative differ-
ences with the Gordon result. Although Gordon explores an incorrect cri-
terion, his conclusion, that the equilibrium market value of a firm is a
convex functíon of its leverage rate, still holds.
In the next subsections, we dispute the supply adjustment process that
leads to Gordon's second conclusion that any value maximizing firm, that
has the above knowledge on valuation, will adopt a maximum leverage cap-
ital structure.
4.5.2. Supply adjustment of debt by firms
Gordon argues that any firm, that issues debt and equity securities in
the proportion that maximizes market value, will adopt a maximum lever-
age capital structure. This extravagant supply of debt security claims
will also induce value adjustments in the market for security claims,
however.
Jaffe and Westerfield (1984) were the first who questioned this con-
clusion of Gordon. Although they agree with Gordon's treatment concern-
ing a fixed supply of debt and equity, they dispute Gordon's later ana-
lysis of supply adjustments. To see their argument, we point at the
presence of investors, such as other companies, subject to a tax rate
equal to the corporate tax rate in order to argue that the value of a
firm is invariant to leverage in such a situation. Jaffe and Westerfield
state that "if the value of a totally levered firm is greater than the
value of an unlevered firm, indíviduals with Tri - tc desire to purchase
stock in unlevered firms but all firms desire to lever" [Jaffe S~
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Westerfield (1984), p. 493]. Since similar arguments may be used in case
the value of a levered firm is less than the value of an unlevered firm,
Jaffe and Westerfield conclude that "an equilibrium arises where (1)
enough firms lever so that all individuals with Tri ~ Tc hold levered
stock, (2) the ratio of unlevered stock to levered stock issued to in-
dividuals with Tri - Tc is indeterminate and (3) the value of a firm is
invariant to its leverage" [Jaffe S Westerfield (1984), p. 493].
Jaffe and Westerfield clarífy their statement by comparing an unlever-
ed and completely levered firm. So, they actually show that VU - Vm(L~)
- Vm(ltnax)- ~though they argue that their conclusions would be unchang-
ed if firms are assumed to issue any intermediate amount of debt as
well, Gordon disputes their general result when replying: "They should
have said that firms at L~ have the same value as firms at Lmax~ [Gordon
(1984), p. 466].
We now obtain this latter result with similar arguments as Gordon uses
to argue the existence of the convex value function of the firm. The
scarcity of debt providers, Gordon introduces, is still present in the
situation in which any firm strives for a maximum leverage position.
Since equilibrium requires the absence of any excess demand for or sup-
ply of shares at each leverage rate, also investors subject to Tri - Tc
have to demand positive quantities of levered equity securities. How-
ever, they are only willing to do so if
Vm(Lmax) - Vi - VT - Vm(L~) .- VUc
(4.2q)
that is, if market prices adapt itselves to levels at which the value of
an unlevered firm equals the value of a completely levered firm.
4.5.3. Value of a firm with interior leverage rate
The analysis of the previous subsection does not clarify, the value of a
firm with an interior leverage rate. Jaffe and Westerfield (1984) argue
that the equilibrium of the corrected version of Gordon's analysis may
lead to an interesting possíble polarization. To see their statement,
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imagine that rri ~ rc for some investors, rri ~ rc for others, but
rri - rc for no investors. Since low-taxed investors prefer stock from a
maximally levered firm while high-taxed investors prefer the unlevered
stock, no invPStor would hold the stock of a firm with an intermediate
leverage rate in this situation, unless the value of this latter type of
firm were less than the value of the other mentioned types of firms.
"Since no firm would issue an intermediate amount of debt, if doing so
reducing its value, firms in our correc[ed version of Gordon's model
either lever at the maximum extent or do not lever at all" [Jaffe b~
Westerfield (19R4), p. 494].
Gordon takes this opportunity to strengthen his statement: "Jaffe and
Westerfield have shown that firms '... either lever to the maximum ex-
tent or do not lever at all' [p. 494]. By implication they also could
find no theoretical basis for the Miller conclusion under the relevant
assumptions. Also, their analysis provides no basis whatsoever for their
statement 'that the value of a firm is invariant to its leverage' [p.
493]." [Gordon (1984), p. 496].
In our opinion this conclusion is, however, besides the mark, for
Jaffe and idesterfield's statement is only valid under the absence of
investors subject to rri - rc. Moreover, in Miller's theory such a situ-
ation would neither imply an equilibrium. Correspondíng to expression
(3.13) of the previous chapter, a supply of debt security claims will be
valued either positive or negative, depending on the balance between rc
and the personal tax rate rri of the marginal investor. Gonsequently, no
equilibrium will occur.
Finally, the equality Vm(Lmax) - Vm(L~) implies that the value of
firms with interior leverages rates equal on their turn the value of
firms with polar leverage rates. If this were not true, any investor
would be better off when realizing his~her personal leverage by purchas-
ing the shares of a firm with the desired íntermediate leverage rather
than the corresponding proportion of shares with polar capital structur-
es. That is,
Vm(La) ~ aVm(Lmax) } (1-a)Vm(LG) - Vm(Lmax) - Vm(LG)
where
(4.30)
Vm(La): market value of a firm with leverage equal to ~max'
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So, with a correct use of the supply adjustment process the Gordon
framework confirms the Miller irrelevancy theorem instead of disproving
it.
4.5.4. Miller versus Gordon
Comparing the analyses of Miller and Gordon it strikes that both appeal
to the scarcity of debt, so that the group of debt providers needs to be
subsequently expanded. In Miller's analysis, the existence of a progres-
sive personal tax structure means that the compensation for the personal
tax burden, that taxable bonds impose on the investor, must increase as
larger quantities of bonds are issued in aggregate. So, in order to en-
large debt capital firms have to attract investors subject to increasing
tax rates.
In Gordon's analysis, it looks as if an additional supply of debt re-
quires a demand for it by investors in still lower tax brackets. How-
ever, Gordon does not treat the problem in such way that still larger
amounts of debt are supplied. Contrary to Miller, he just distributes a
fixed supply of debt and equity among investors, who are partitioned
into different tax groups.
A second distinctíon can be made with respect to the return on debt.
In Miller's analysis increasing aggregate supply of debt provides de-
creasing prices. On the contrary, Gordon assumes constant return to
scale, that is, when describing the adjustment process of debt supply by
firms, he only considers the adaptatíon of the supplied quantity of
debt. Gordon thus neglects the impact an excess supply of debt (that
occurs due to the endeavour of firms to obtain a maximum leverage posi-
tion) imposes on equilibrium market values. In our opinion, this is per-
haps the most striking objection and argument in order to disprove
Gordon's analysis.
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4.6. A corrected equilibrium approach
In this section we describe a corrected version of Gordon's approach to
obtain an equilibrium market value function of the firm, when investors
are subject to progressive personal tax rates and have limited private
means. We elaborate on this approach, because it will turn out to be a
valuable tool for the dynamic analysis we carry out in chapter 7.
Let us recall the problem Gordon (1982) puzzles as depicted by the
straight lines in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Corrected equilibrium value function of the
firm under a progressive personal tax.
The analysis, we carry out, is except for the investor's objective,
quite similar to that of Gordon. Due to the implicit assumption of lim-
ited private liabilities, the investor's objective is changed into the
maximization of the return on personal investment net of corporate and
personal taxes. Equivalently, we use the net present index rather than
the present value rule. The objective of an investor i subject to a per-
sonal tax rate on debt Tri thus is to maximize
(Vi - Vm)IVm - ViIVm - 1 (4.31)
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Similar to Gordon we may now argue that none of the straight lines in
figure 4.4 provides an equilibrium set of values for the firm, but that
the Vmcurve, which differs from the Vm curve in figure 4.3, may repre-
sent the equilibrium relationship between value and leverage.
To clarify the construction of the Vmcurve, let firms again be parti-
tioned according to their leverage rate into three groups as indicated
in figure 4.4 and let this partitioning once again be such that the to-
tal share value of the firms in each group is equal to the share wealth
of investors in the corresponding tax group. The stock of zero- or low-
levered firms will be held by investors subject to rri - 0.5. Since V0.5
is the lowest personal value function, it may be seen as a lower bound
of the equilihrium market value. Hence,
Vm(L) - V0.5(L) if L E[L0~ L1] (4.32)
Next, investors subject to tri - 0.25 fix the equilibrium value of the
firm in such a way that the net present index, (V0.25 Vm)~Vm, is at the
same maximum level for all shares in the corresponding tax group. This
maximum level, denoted by NPI0.25, is determined by
[V (L ) - V (L )] V (L )0.25 1 m 1 0.25 1
Vm(L1) - V0.5(L1)
- 1 :- NPI0.25 (4.33)
The market value of firms in the second group may now be obtained by
rewriting (4.33) into
Vm(L) - V0.25(L)~(1 t NPI0.25) if L E [L1, L21 (4.34)
Finally, the remaining shares are held by the remaining investors those
with Tr - 0.0. Their present value index is fixed by
[~o.0(L2)-Vm(L2)] ~o.o
Vm(L2) '(1 f NPI0.25) V0.25
- 1:- NPI0.0 (4.35)
Hence, the market value of the remaining firms is given by:
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Vm(L) - VN~N(L)~(1 t NPI~~H) if L E[L2, Lmax~ (4.36)
We have now derived a correct equilibrium market value curve, which
makes the excess demand for shares at each leverage rate equal to zero
under the assumptíon of limited private means. It can easily be seen
that the equilibrium market value we obtain, always adapts an equal or
lower value than the equilibrium values under Gordon's approach. Never-
theless, the approach provides the similar qualitative result that the
equilibrium market value of the firm is a convex function of its lever-
age. However, this result is on its turn disputed in subsection 4.5.2
and sequel.
4.7. Tax induced investment clienteles
In this section we introduce 'tax induced investment clienteles' as a
result of the firm's return on net investment, that is, due to the cor-
porate investment policy firms will attract investors in specific tax
brackets. Since our analysis is not yet based on an equilibrium frame-
work, we rather indicate than lay claim on the existence of tax-induced
return clienteles. For that reason, we did not treat this phenomenon in
connection with the dividend and financial leverage clienteles hypothes-
es. Nevertheless, the inclusion of this topic completes our analysis
with respect to the impact of personal taxation on the three issues of
corporate behaviour that we consider throughout this book: the finan-
cing, dividend and investment policy.
To carry out the analysis we proceed on the basic model of dynamic
firm behaviour, which we have presented in chapter two, and we assume a
complete separation of management and ownership. So, we study the impact
of personal taxation on the behaviour of investors in response to chang-
es in the investment policy of the firm, which is autonomously control-
led by its management.
Let us recall the dynamic model of chapter two and its solution. For
mathematical convenience we modify the objective by assuming an infinite
planning horizon instead of a finite one. Moreover, due to the separa-
sa
tion of management and ownership this ís a nearly fair assumption. So,
the firm's management maximizes the present value of the dividend stream
before personal taxes. As we assume that many unknown investors possess
shares of the firm, the management uses an estimation of the market time
preference rate to fix the discount rate i'. Hence,
W - ~maximize J D(T)e i TdT
D,I,Y T~0
(4.37)
subject to the state equations and constraints as formulated by (2.23)
through (2.33). The resulting optimal master trajectories are quite sim-
ilar to those as depicted in figures 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. Since we
assume an infinite planning horizon the final (dividend) policy is of
infinite duration. In the case that the manager's discount rate is less
than the net cost of debt i' ~(1-i )r, we get the master trajectory asc
depicted in figure 4.5. We now study the reaction of taxable sharehol-
ders to this varying policy.
As we deal with certainty it is admissible to assume investor's behav-
iour to be dependent on three relevant variables: the value of the
firm's shares, the net revenue and the net revenue of alternative in-
vestment opportunities.
The value of the shares of a firm at time T for investor i, Vi(T), is
assumed to be equal to the net discounted value of an infinite stream of
constant dividend payments at the firm's net profit level at T, that is
~ -r(1-t )(S-T)
Vi(T) - J (1-tdi)D(T)e ri dS
S-T
(1-Tdi) D(T)
- (1-Tri) ' r (4.38)
We are aware of neglecting the impact of future policies of the firm on
the present value. However, this assumption may be justified by pointing
at the investor's unconsciousness of the whole future investment poli-
cies. In addítion, this approach corresponds with the perpetual approach
we used to obtain the dividend and financial leverage clienteles ef-
fects. In fact, we use a non-dynamic approach.
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Note that we propose the time preference rate of the investor to be
equal to the market interest rate after taxation. Applyin~ the classical
tax system ( Tdi - Tri)' the personal value of the firm equals U(T)~r. So
t~e value of the firm V(T), is independent of the investor's tax rates.
0 t23 t34
Figure 4.5: Optimal master trajectory if i' C(1-T )r and thec
resulting tax induced investment clienteles.
We distinghuish two kínds of share revenue: dividend and capital gain,
both taxed in accordance to the corresponding personal tax rate. So the




With the help of expression (2.28) and the optimal trajectory presented
by figure 4.5 we derive following values:
V(T) - (1-T )(0(K)-rY)~rc
V(T) -~ V(T)(1-tcdK if t12 t T ~ t34





if t34 c T ~ ~
0
[ (1-tc)0(K)
if 0 c T ~ t34
if t34 C T ~ m
( 4.42)
Aased on the above values we can specify the net return per dollar,
which will be continuously compared with the revenue of having a bank
account. Thus
(1-Tgi)(1-TC)(dR } h(dK - r)) ~(1-iri)r if 0 c T ~ t12
(1-Tgi)(1-ic~ -(1-t8i)(1-TC)r ~(1-Tri)r if t12 t T~ t23
(1-Tgi)(1-TCK ~(1-Tri)r if t23 C T ~ t34
(1-Tdi)r -(1-Tri)r if t34 c T ~~
As operating income 0(K) is assumed to be a concave function of the
amount of capital goods, which rate of change is determined by state
equation (2.23) and which thus is a time- and state-dependent variable,
the above expressions not only depend on the level of the personal tax
rate Tri, but also on the state of the firm expressed by the marginal
return on new investment.
If net return on new investment exceeds the net market interest rate
investors prefer a policy of retaining earnings. Otherwise, dividend
income or cash account is more profitable. As during the lifecycle of
the firm the financing, dividend and investment policy will be liable to
changes, investors' preferences may alter in the course of time. In this
way we obtain 'tax induced investment clienteles'.
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The declining slope curve as depicted in figure 4.5 satisfies the well
known personal equilibrium condition [see e.g. King (1977), p. 901:
(1-Tdi)D(T) f (1-Tgi)V(T) - (1-iri)rV(T)
(4.43)
Investors subject to a personal tax rate below this curve may agree with
a policy of retaining earnings in order to finance new investment with a
net return corresponding the state of the firm. Investors in lower tax
brackets prefer dividend at that specific state of the firm.
The marked area indicates the tax rates of investors, who may agree to
the policy of the firm and may thus have the willingness to hold shares
of the firm. As soon as the firm changes its policy from retentions into
dividend distribution, all investors will be indifferent between posses-
sing shares or having a bank account of the same size.
4.8. Conclusion
In this chapter the present theory on market equilibrium valuation under
personal taxation is discussed and extended. We have explored the Miller
'after tax' theory within the framework of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980b).
Thereafter, we have discussed Gordon's criticism on the Miller theory
and showed that on his turn Gordon (1982, 1984) failed to disprove the
Miller leverage irrelevancy theorem. Moreover, we have described a cor-
rected version of Gordon's approach to obtain a market equilibrium value
function of the firm.
We have also discussed the existence of tax induced clienteles, in
particular divídend-, financial leverage- and investment clienteles. The
former two are explored with in the framework of DeAngelo and Masulis
(1980b), which on its turn has been extended by including both the clas-
sical and the imputation system. Since we did not yet consider an equi-
librium framework, the existence of the latter clientele-effect has only
been indicated rather than proved. In addition, we have assumed a com-
plete separation of management and ownership. So, we have studied the
behaviour of investors in different tax brackets in response to changes
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in both the state and investment policy of the firm, which is autono-
mously controlled by its management.
Proceeding on this assumptions Van Schijndel (1985) has described and
solved the investor's dynamic portfolio problem by means of a optimal
control model. As we will focus on situations in which investors deter-
mine or at least influence the firm's policy we will confine ourselves
to refering to the work mentioned.
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CHAPTER FIVE
OPTIMAL POLICY STRING OF A SINGLE VALIIF. MAXIMI7,ING FIRM
UPIDER PERSONAL TAXATION
5.1. Introduction
In this and the following chapters we focus on the dynamic modeling of
the financing, dividend and investment decisions of firms under both
corporate and personal taxation.
As we have stated in the introductory chapter, the aim of this book is
the inclusion of corporate and personal taxation into the dynamic theory
of the firm. In previous chapters we draw attention to some of the many
contributions in finance theory that consicier the impact of taxation on
corporate and personal policy, and on the financing policy in particu-
lar. The purpose of this and the following chapters is the extension of
these static results by adding another dimension: time.
In chapter two we already argued that time is of utmost importance
with regard to the economic decision proces~. The survey of Feichtinger
(1982b) and the collections of Aensoussan, Kleindorfer and Tapiero
(1978) and Feichtinger (1982a, 1985) show very well that many recent
contributions extend the theory of the firm by using dynamic optimiza-
tion techniques to solve dynamic problems analytically. The use of this
kind of dynamic models and optimization techniques has turned out to be
an excellent tool in order to describe the evolution of characteristic
features or variables of the process in the course of time.
Accordingly, this chapter is related to the financial models such as
those of Leland (1972), Lesourne (1973), Ludwig (1977), Sethi (1978),
Van Loon (1983) and others ~see also the survey papers of Lesourne and
Leban (1982) and Stepan and Swoboda (1982)]. These papers are ciealing
with specífic problems in finance, dividend and investment optimization.
When discussing the basic model of our dynamic analysis in chapter
two, we already pointed out some extensions of this kind of management
modeling. Although many authors are aware of the effects of personal
taxation their studies in a dynamic setting are lacking this subject,
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however. Research into this subject has been conducted by Yla-
Liedenpohja (1978), but by the assumption of an infinite tíme horizon
and taking debt financing not especíally into account, a number of in-
teresting topics were left out of consideration. Also Tuovila (1983) has
considered this topic. Although he has derived the optimal policies, he
has paid more attention to a numerical solution of the problem; that is,
the optimal trajectory, that covers the policy of the firm during the
whole planning period, was numerically demonstrated using three oil-
product distribution firms rather than analytically derived.
In section 5.2 we will describe a deterministic dynamic model of a sing-
le firm which behaves as if it maximizes its value conceived by tax ho-
mogeneous shareholders. In fact, we assume no separation of ownership
and control. To do so, we modify the basic model of chapter two by in-
cluding different personal tax rates. We use Optimal Control Theory to
províde the analytical solution of the problem, which is indicated in
section 5.3 and proved ín appendix A1. Section 5.4 presents a further
analysis of the economic results. Since we distinguish between personal
tax rates on capital gain and dividend, it turns out that in the final
stages it could be optimal to retain all earnings in order to finance
investment, although the net return is less than the time preference
rate of the shareholders. In addition, the firm will at last finance
investment with equity only, even in the case of cheap debt financing.
Finally, we present in section 5.5 results of a sensitivity analysis
concerning parameters that are interesting for economic analysis, such
as the personal tax rates and the discount rate.
5.2. The model
In this section we postulate a dynamic control model in order to analyse
the impact of both corporate and personal taxation on the optimal dynam-
ic policy of a single shareholder controlled firm. To that end we only
need to modify the objective function of the basic model of chapter two.
So, within a deterministic setting we consider a value maximizing
firm, which will at some known planning time z stop its activities. This
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planning horizon may be fixed by e.g. the investor's day of retirement.
Ide may also, however, use another description of the problem: we consid-
er a value maximizing investor who will sell the shares of a particular
firm at some known time z. Formula[ing the prohlem in this way, the firm
is allowed to continue íts activities.
The shareholder of the firm is assumed to have personal tax rates on
dividend Tdi and captial gain T i. In agreement with most of the tax
g
systems in use the tax rate on dividend is assumed to exceed the tax
rate on capital gain, so that the ratio (1-Tgi)I(1-tdi) exceeds one. Let
X(T) be the amount of equity and D(T) the level of dividend payments at
time T, then the shareholder has an investment which is valued by
J (1-Tdi)D(T)e-iTdT f X(z)e-iz - rgi(X(z)-X(~))e-iz (S.1)
T-~
where i is the shareholder's discount rate after personal taxes. For-
mulating the objective in this way, that is, with a separation of divi-
dend income and capital gain, it turns out that not only the difference
between the levels of the personal tax rates, but also the time lag val-
ued by the time preference rate i will be of crucial importance.
Furthermore, the inclusion of personal taxation enables us to give
another justification and explanation of the additional assumption
(2.31), that is
i ~ (1-TC)r (5.2)
As stated in subsection 2.3.4 the purpose of this assumption is to avoid
degenerated solutions. This assumption is justified by means of Van
Loon's (19A3) argument that only by coincidence an equality occurs, be-
cause of the separation of the debt and equity market. The inclusion of
personal taxation generates another explanation of this assumption. A
deterministic framework with perfect information and without taxation
requires an equality between [he discount rate and the interest rate.
Since the shareholders' discount rate or tíme preference rate can be
seen as the return after personal taxation, we may rewrite in the tradi-
tion of Brealey and Myers (1981) expression (5.2) into
(1-Tri)r ~ (1-TC)r (5.3)
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where rri denotes the personal tax rate on debt income of shareholder i.
So, in fact only the case Tri - Tc is excluded by assumption (5.2).
Finally, we explicitly rule out contraction policies hy assuming a
sufficiently low initial production capacity, that is
(1-TCK(K(~)) ~ max (i, (1-ic)r)





and we remark that the former assumption implies, due to the concavity
of 0(K), the latter one.
For convenience, we survey the model in its full length. Non relevant
variables are omitted however.
z
Maximize (1-Tdi) f D(T)e-iTdT f( 1-t i)X(z)e-iz
D,I,Y T-0 g
subject to K- I- aK





Y t hX ( 5.1(1)
Y(0) - hX(~) - hxn ~ 0 (5.11)
D~ 0, I~ 0, Y~ 0, K) 0, X) 0 ( 5.12)
and subject to the additional assumptions (5.2) and (5.4).
The dynamic problem, described by the above formulated model can be
solved analytically by using (lptimal ~ontrol Theory. In appendix A1 the
97
necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal solution are derived
by means of a principle that strongly resembles the standard maximum
principle of Pontryagin c.s. (1962), followed by the 'iterative policy
connecting' procedure designed hy Van Loon (1QR.3) in order to transform
the set of necessary conditions into a solution that concerns the opti-
mal policy of the firm over the whole planning period.
5.3. Optimal solution
Applying the procedure of Van Loon (19~3) we may discern five different
feasible paths or stages, each characterized by the set of restrictions
that is active or inactive during the relevant period. These feasible
paths result in different policies with regard to capital structure,
investment and~or dividend. Since both the two state equations as well
as all contraints are the same as in the model of chapter two, we obtain
the same policies. It suffices now to summarize the economic interpreta-
tion of these policies (see also table 2.1).
Policy 1: maximum growth
The policy is to attract as much debt as possible, to retain all earn-
ings and to use this money to finance new investment in order to realize
a maximum increase of the amount of capital goods.
Policy 2: consolidation
~The amount of capital goods remaíns on a constant level I~X such that
marginal revenue equals marginal net cost of debt. Retentions are used
to pay back debt money and investment is put down to replacement level.
Policy 3: growth with equity only
The firm possesses no debt and no dividend is distributed. Retentions
are used to finance investment in order to increase the amount of capi-
tal goods.
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Policy 4: stationary stage with equity only
~
The amoun[ of capital goods remains on a constant level KX such that
marginal revenue equals the time preference rate of the shareholders.
Investment is on the corresponding replacement level and remaining earn-
ings are distributed to the shareholders. This policy is only feasible
if equity is relatively cheap. That is, if i ~(1-rc)r.
Policy 5: stationary stage with maximum debt
~
Again the amount of capital goods i s on a constant level KY, but now
such that marginal net revenue equals the weighted sum of the costs of
equity and debt. Similar to policy 4 investment is on its corresponding
replacement level and remaining earnings are distributed to the share-
holders. Contrary to policy 4 this policy i s only feasible if
i ~ (1-TC)r.
Van Loon's iterative policy connecting procedure enables us to couple
two different policies. By applying the necessary tes[ing procedure
again and again, we may find a still longer string of subsequent poli-
cies. Whether a coupling of two policies will be successful depends
among others on the values of the financial and fiscal parameters i,
r, Tc, rdi, rgi and iri. Since all policy strings are suhsets of only
two different policy strings, we discuss only the 'master string' and
corresponding master trajectory of each set.
The first set occurs if i~(1-TC)r. Its master trajectory is depicted
in figure 5.1 and is a result of the policy string:
policy 1 i policy 2 t policy 3 i policy 4 t policy 3
The sequence and explanation of the first four policies is similar to
those of the basic model without personal taxation. The reader may find
its description ín subsection 2.3.6. However, due to the fixed planning
horizon and the non-neutrality of the tax regime with respect to the
distribution of corporate profit, it holds for T~ t43 that one dollar
dividend net of taxes is less worth than a net increase of equity at T-
z caused by a re[ention of one dollar:
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(1-Tdi)e-iTaX(T) ~ ( 1-rgi)e-iz2X(z) for T ~ t43 (5.13)
Although marginal net revenue (1-T )d~~dK will. fall helow the discountc
rate i, the optimal policy is to stop dividend payment and start expan-
sion investment again, hecause this loss is counterbalanced hy the tax
advantage. So, the advantage of the lower tax rate on capital gain
(Tgi ~ Tdi) exceeds the drawback of discounting the salvage value at the
planning horizon. Consequently, the discount rate not longer expresses
the desired rate of return on equity. In section 5.4 we study this case
extensively.
The second set of policy strings occurs if the discount rate exceeds the
net cost of debt: i~(1-r )r. The master trajectory starts in the samec
way as both the previous one and the corresponding trajectory of the
basic model without personal taxation: due to the cheapness of debt mon-
ey it is optimal to borrow the maximum amount that is possible and in-
vest both retentions and debt in capital goods (see figure 5.2). As soon
~
as the production capacity has reached the level KY, this accelerated
growth is cut off at once at T- t15. At this level marginal net corpor-
ate revenue equals the weighted sum of net costs of debt and equity:
d0 1 h(1-rc dK - lfh 1 } lth (1-rc)r (5.14)
As showed in subsection 2.3.6 this expression implies an equality of
marginal return on equity and the discount rate i. Investment falls down
to replacement level and remaining earnings are issued to the sharehold-
ers.
Corresponding to the previous master policy string a moment occurs at
which the firm stops its dividend distribution and starts expansion in-
vestment by retaining earnings. Furthermore, it is optimal to borrow as
much as possible because borrowing still increases profit and thus rais-~
es the rate of growth till K- KYX (policy 1). According to the case of
relatively expensive debt, the firm now drops debt to save (1-t )r in-c
terest payments per unit (policy 2) and finally it starts growing in a
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figure 5.1: optimal master trajectory if i~(1-rc)r
)T
figure 5.2: optimal master trajectory if i~(1-TC)r
policy I i policy 5-~ policy 1-~ policy 2~ policy 3
The optimal policy string succeeding policy 5 depends among others on
the spread between the personal tax rates, that is, the tax advantage
yielded by the shareholders receiving capital gain instead of dividend.
A lower value of (1-Tgi)~(1-tdi) will not only alter the final policy,
hut also postpone the moment T- t51 and reduce the number of stages to
pass through (see also subsection 5.5.1). Note, that the firm wants to
get rid of debt although it is cheap compared to the corporate cost of
equity. Altough we will explain thís striking result in the next sec-
tion, we notice that the net corporate marginal revenue (1-T )dQ~dK mayc
fall below the net cost of debt due to the expansion drift of the in-
vestor as a result of the non-neutrality of the tax system.
A first comparison of the master trajectories with those of a problem
without personal taxation shows two striking differences:
- in final stages it may be optimal to retain all earnings in order to
finance expansion investment with a net corporate return less than
the shareholder's discount rate, instead of distributing profit at a
constant level, which is the optimal policy of our basis model with-
out personal taxation
- the firm will at last finance investment with equity only, that is,
the firm may want to get rid of debt, even when (1-TC)r ~ i.
In the next sections we will extensively consider the impact of personal
taxation on the optimal decision rules and compare the problems with and
without personal taxation with each other.
5.4. Further analysis
In addition to the previous presentation of the optimal policy strings,
we modify the two global decision rules, which we have presented in sub-
section 2.3.6 and which together constitute the optimal policy of the
firm.
1~2
As we have argued in the above mentioned subsection the financial struc-
ture of the firm has two extreme cases: the case that the assets are
financed by equíty only and the case that the firm is levered at the
maximum rate. At each state the firm will try to realize such a finan-
cial structure as to maximize marginal return to equity RX. Since the
profit distribution policy of the firm and thus personal taxation has no
impact on the present marginal return to equity, we may, given the level
of the production capacity, still write
RX - (1-TCdK t (1-tc)(aK - r)X (5.15)
~






Consequently, personal taxation has no impact on the financing decision
rule of the firm.
With respect to the dividend~investment decision rule, the firm may
spend its earnings in two ways: to pay out dividend or to retain it in
order to finance investment and~or pay back debt money. The last men-
tioned decision has been discussed implicitly in the financing decision
rule: (5.16) redemption of debt starts as soon as the firm attains the
~
KYXlevel on which selffinancing becomes optimal. The second sit~iation,
financing new investment, is certainly preferable as long as marginal
return to equity exceeds the discount of the shareholders, for this rate
expresses the rate of return that shareholders can obtaín elsewhere.
Accordingly, the optimal policy is in general to pay out dividend and
invest only on the replacement level as soon as marginal return to equi-
ty equals the discount rate.
So far so good, but what happens if the discount rate exceeds marginal
return to equity? In absence of personal taxation one can argue that
this situation only occurs if the initial amount of capital goods is too
high to make production at that level profitable. Van Loon (19íi3) argues
that the optimal policy is a decrease of the capital stock by issuing
ln3
all revenues. On top of this statement, however, the introduction of
personal taxation brings on a second possible situation, which results
in an additional dividend~ínvestment decision rule to point out.
On the stationary dividend stages 4 and S the firm has to decide whet-
her it will continue dividend distribution or start to retain earnings.
If we suppose the firm to hold this earning in cash, so that no addi-
tional revenue is obtained, shareholders value the former possihility
by (1-Tdi)e-iT and the latter one by (1-rgi)e-iz. This means that capi-
tal gain on one hand will be more profitable in view of the tax advan-
tage (rd ~ 1), but on the other hand less due to the time lap, z-T ~ 0.
g
So, the decision to continue profit distribution or to start retaining
earnings and to hold cash money depends on whichever (in)equality holds
in
-iT ~ -iz(1-Tdi)e ~ (1-Tgi)e (5.17)
It is obvious that given the values of the tax rates, the díscount rate
~
and the planning horizon at only one time instand, T- t the equalityex
sign of expression (5.17) will hold. Pdote that in absence of personal
taxation the decision always will be in favour of a dividend policy and,
~
consequently, teX equals z.
In spite of the decreasing marginal return to equity, however, expan-
sion investment still acquires positive revenue which can be used again
to finance more expansion investment. So, the shareholders will not only
receive the dollar of retention but also the total increase of eqiiity
during the tíme interval ~T,zl. This increase depends on the rate of
return on equity during that relevant time interval. The value of time,
~
T- teX, therefore, will he determined by
~
(1-Tdi)e- teX.3X(tex) - (1-Tgi)e-iz~3X(z)
In appendix A2 we will prove that this is equivalent to
~






where RX denotes the marginal return to equity, which is given by
-r(1-tc dK if Y(T) - 0R~ Il
(1-tc)(~lfh)-hr) if Y(T) ~ 0
(5.2~)
This discussion thus results in the next dividend~investment decision
rule:
- do not pay out dividend and increase the amount of equity
if RX ~ i
~
or RX ~ i and T~ t ex
(5.21)
(5.22)
- invest only on replacement level and pay out all remaining earnings
if RX - i (5.23)
- decrease capital stock and pay out all earnings
~
if RX ~ i and T ~ tex (5.24)
If we combine the dividend~investment and financing decision rules, we
get table 5.1. Since we only need to know the value of the marginal re-
turn to equity, this tahle is very useful to achieve the optimal policy
of the firm.
ln5
~ r(1-tR ) RX ~ r(1-tc)cX
expansion expansion
RX ~ i investment investment
with debt without debt
R - r(1-z ) redemption of debty c
stationary stationary
RX - í dividend dívidend
with debt without debt
contraction
RX ~ i without debt contraction
~
T ~ t redemptionex
expansion expansion
RX ~ i investment investment
~
T~ t with debt without debtex
Table 5,1: optimal financing, investment and dividend policy where
~
teX satisfies expression (5.2~) and RX denotes the rate of
return on equity.
We remark that this table includes, for the sake of com-
pleteness, the conditions under which a contraction policy
is optimal.
S.S. Sensitivity analysis
In this section we study the influence of environmental changes on six
different features of the optimal policy string. This is a sensitivity
analysis concerning parameters that are interesting for economic analy-
sis: interest rate r, discount rate í, corporate tax rate Tc and espec-
ially personal tax rates Tdi and T i. In addition we show the impact of
g
changes in the initial production capacíty level K(~) and the planning
horizon z.
Features of the policy string are the level of capital goods K~ on
stationary stages, speed of growth of equíty ?C, level of capital gain
~
X(z)-X(~), entry and exit point of the stationary dividend stage, ten~and t respectively, and leverage rate Y~X.ex ~
Finally, we have to ~ustify the selection of X as the speed of growth
of the firm. ~Je can measure a firm's size by means of several standards
such as sales, employment or equity. Smyth et al (1975) and Shalit 6
Sankar (1477), have, however, shown that these standards are not simply
interchangeable and different conclusions can be drawn depending on the
measure chosen. As in our problem, where the shareholder's wealth after
taxation has to be maximized, we have chosen equity as a measure of size
of the firm, because this standard is relevant for the shareholder.
5.5.1. Influence of the fiscal parameters
a. corporate taxes
A reduction of the corporate tax rate has two direct consequences:
- a rise of the net cost of debt due to the tax decuctibility
- possibilities to increase (expansion) investment in view of lower tax
payments.
The first one enables a switch of the inequality in i~(1-tc)r result-
ing in a policy switch of the firm in a low leverage strategy. Moreover,
according to (5.3) such a reduction of the corporate tax rate implies
that still lower taxed investors prefer a low leverage strategy. Contra-
ry to marginal revenue, however, net marginal cost of finance is only
partially influenced. Thus, such a reduction results into increasing
profit and a larger amount of capital goods at stationary stages. A re-
duction of the corporate tax rate also increases earnings after tax pay-
ments from which (expansion) investment is to be paid. In this way
growth accelerates which is demonstrated by
2X - p(K)-rY ~ 0 (5.25)aTc
lm
On top of this we find that such a reduction will put forward the finish
of the stationary stage, because of the increased value of the marginal
return on equity. In addition, the final policy may change Ísee table
5.2). No conclusion, however, is possible with respect to the start of
dividend stages, because a reduction of the corporate tax rate causes
two opposite influences: a rise of the speed of growth and a larger
amount of capital goods to be reached. Nevertheless, we conclude that a
reduction of the corporate tax rate rises the val.ue of the firm and
stimulates enterpreneur's activities.
b. personal taxes
The impact of changes in the value of the personal tax rates on the
features, of the firm are obvious: a decrease of the dividend tax rate
causes declining interest in capital gain, which results in a postpone-
ment of the finish of the stationary stages 4 and 5 respectively. As the
speed of growth does not change, the total amount of net dividend pay-
ments rises. In addition, the final policy may alter due to the post-
~
ponement of t. By means of the transversality conditions we selectex
those policies that may be final ones, that is, feasihle at T~ z(see
appendix A1). Using the features of the several stages we find the con-
ditions that are expressed in table 5.2. t,le distinguish a financial and
a fiscal condition. The first one depends on the financial setting of
the firm and is the same as in models without personal taxes. The latter
one indicates the investor's attitude towards the desired kind of in-
come: the bigger the difference between the personal tax rates the more
he prefers captial gain, that is, a rise of the amount of equity, in-
stead of dividend.
The fiscal condition of table 5.2 is well understandahle if we consid-
er that the return on equity net of all taxes of a dividend paying firm
is equal to (1-Tdi)i. So, a policy of retaining earníngs e.g. is only
optimal at T- z if the net return after all taxes, (1-ig)(1-TC)d(1~dK,
equals at least (1-zd)i. Recalling the features of the policies (,see
e.g. table 2.1), we see e.g. that policy 3 is the optimal final policy
if
(1-Tgi)(1-rc)r ~ (1-igi)(1-TC)aK - (1-Tdi)i (5.26)
IOR
policy final policy if
1 i~ (1-r )r and 1 ~ (1-r ) ~)I(1-r 1I(1-r )rc gi di c
2 í~ )r(1-r and (1-r ) -)I(1-r )riI(1-rc dii
S
c
3 i~ )r(1-r and (1-r )I(1-r ) ~ )riI(1-rc dii
g
c
5 1~ (1-r )r and (1-r )I(1-r ) - 1c i di
g
3 i ~ (1-r )r and (1-r i)I(1-rdi) ~ 1c
g
4 i ~ (1-r )r and (1-r )I(1-r ) - 1c gi di
Table 5.2: Conditions for final policies.
So, due to a lower value of the dividend tax rate, net return of a divi-
dend paying policy rises and, accordingly, a policy of retaining earn-
ings remains an optimal policy only if marginal return rises up to the
higher level of (1-rdi)i. Therefore, policy 2 or even policy 1 becomes a
feasible final policy. Consequently, it turns out that the firm not al-
ways wants to get rid of debt money.
Finally note that dividend is distributed on a final stage only when
the personal tax rates equal each other. This condition shows that sím-
ilar models without personal taxation (see e.g. Ludwig (197R) or Van
Loon (19R3)) are in this respect special cases of our model.
If we consider, on the other hand, a rise of the dividend tax rate,
the possibility occurs that the stationary dividend stage will dis-
appear, that is, the difference between rdi and rgi is such that it is
never optimal to pay out dividend (see the dividendlinvestment decísion
r~ile, pointed out in section 5.4).
A fall or rise of the tax rate on capital gain gives almost the oppos-
ite picture of a change in the dividend tax rate.
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5.5.2. Influence of the financial parameters
As earlier research has dealt with a sensitivity analysis in relation to
financial parameters ( see e.g. Van Loon (1983)) we discuss these results
only briefly and refer for a comprehensive discussion to the research
mentioned.
A rise of the interest rate causes increasing costs of finance imply-
ing a drop in the speed of growth in stages with both debt and equity.
In the case of expensive debt the exit point of the stationary dividend
stage will be postponed. A switch of inequality in i~(1-TC)r resulting
in a switch of the policy of the firms belongs also to the possibili-
ties.
An increase in the value of the discount rate has no influence on the
speed of growth. The level of capital goods in stationary stages will
decline and the exit points of these paths will be postponed due to the
larger revenue for the investor elsewhere.
The results of an analysis with respect to the opposite changes, that
is a fall of the relevant parameters, are summarized in table 5.3.
a fall of
impact on
Tc rdi rgi r i
~level stationar stage K f 0 0 t~- t
speed of growth X t 0 0 t 0
capital gain X(z)-X(0) f - f t t
~
entry stationary stage t ? 0 0 ?~- -en
~
exit stationary stage t - f - -~0 -eX
leverage Y~X - 0 0 f -
Table 5.3: sensitivity analysis.
where
}: rise of the feature value
-: fall of the feature value
0: no influence on the relevant feature
?: no conclusion possible due to opposite influences
.~.: conclusion before separation sign applies only i f i((1-TC)r,
after separation sign if i~(1-T )r.c
5.5.3. Interaction of fiscal parameters and the time preference rate
As stated before, the time preference rate i expresses the rate of re-
turn after taxation, that a shareholder can obtain elsewhere. In a de-
terministic setting this implies that the time preference rate depends
on the market interest rate and the personal tax rate on debt income. As
in most of the tax regimes the tax rate on dívidends is positively cor-
related with the tax rate on debt income, we can write
i - i(idi,r)
where
aT ~ 0 and ár ~ 0
di
(5.27)
So, a rise of the personal tax rate will generally reduce the discount
rate. Considering this dependence we study once more the optimal policy
string of the firm by considering two extreme cases.
The results of figure 5.3 are achieved under the assumption that the
tax rate on dividend of investor A, tdA, differs much from the tax rate
on capital gain, which is assumed to be a constant t, and has such a
g
value that
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figure 5.3: optímal master trajectory if iA ~(1-TC)r
]T
figure 5.4: optimal master trajectory i f i~ ~(1-TC)r and
(1-t~)~(1-T~A) C iR~(1-TC)r
According to the Miller hypothesis this investor would prefer firms to
follow a low leverage strategy, low dividend payments and high capital
gains.
In the second case we assume that the tax rate on capital gain remains
the same, but the tax rate on dividend of investors B, TdB, differs only
little from this rate and has such a value that
iB ~ (1-TC)r and ( 1-Tg)~(1-TdB) ~ iB~(1-TC)r (5.29)
Under these circumstances the optimal evolution of the firm, represented
by figure 5.4, will end up with policy 1. In the opinion of investor B
the firm has to choose for a high leverage strategy and has to issue as
much dividend as possible. These results can be obtained by analyzing
tables 5.2 and 5.3.
So, similar to the Miller hypothesis we obtain clear differences be-
tween these two policy strings. On top of this similarity the Miller
hypothesis is enlarged by the introduction of dynamics: investors in low
tax brackets not only prefer a high leverage strategy and dividend rat-
her than capital gain, but they also like to receive earnings as quick
as possible, whereas investors in high tax brackets are willing to post-
pone earnings in view of their tax advantage and low time preference
rate.
5.5.4. Switch of tax regime
Until now we have not specified the relation between the personal tax
rates, that is, we did not select a specific tax regime. Suppose, how-
ever, that we have carried out the previous analyses under the classical
tax regime, that is, Tdi - Trí'
~ich results will then provide a switch
into the imputation system or two-rate system?
The imputation system attempts to give shareholders credit for tax
paid by the firm by modifying the personal income tax. So, some fraction
of the corporation tax paid on dividends is allowed to be subtracted
from the personal income tax. Although this can be done in several ways,
the final result is a decrease of the personal tax rate on dividend in
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relation to the tax rate on debt income: Tdi ~ Tri' Hence, the results
of a switch from the classical into the imputation system can be achiev-
ed by analyzing the impact of a decrease of the personal tax rate on
dividend on the optimal policy string of the firm. Recalling the results
of table 5.3 we get a postponement of the finish of the stationary divi-
dend policy and a decreasing interest in capital gain. Since the other
policies and the level of the amount of capital goods on the stationary
dividend stage do not change, the value of the firm's objective func-
tion, and thus the value of the firm, sharply rises.
~ontrary to the imputation system, the two-rate system relieves the
double taxation of dividends by alleviations in the corporate tax sphere
rather than the personal tax sphere. When analyzing the results of a
switch of tax system into the two-rate system, we are thus forced to
modify the underlying dynami.c model, in particular expression (5.R). So,
x- n(x) - rY - f7~(~(x)-rY-n)f t~dnl
- (1-tc)[~(K)-rYj - fl-(tc-tcd)jn
where
Tcd' corporate tax rate on distributed profit (TC ~ Tcd)'
(5.3~)
Recalling the results of table 5.3 we see that none of the parameters
will change due to the introduction of the two-rate system. Therefore,
the optimal policy string remains the same. However, since also the pro-
duction capacity level ~(K) on the stationary dividend stage (and the
amount of debt) will be unchanged, it turns out that the dividend level
will rise (see expression (5.31) and thus the value of the firm.
Finally, we notice that high taxed investors, such as investor A of
the previous s~ibsection, profit more by such a switch of tax regime than
low taxed investors.
5.5.5. Initial value and planning horizon
Given the initial values of equity xG and debt y~, the planning horizon
z must be such that the firm is able to pass through the presented mas-
ter trajectories. If the planning period is shorter than depicted in
figures 5.1 and 5.2, parts of the master trajectories wíll decay.
Given the values of financial parameters after corporate tax the exit
point of the stationary dividend policy depends only on the personal tax
rates on dividend and capital gain, Tdi and t i respectively, and the
g
planning horizon z. A shorter planning period, by putting forward z,
thus results in a shorter stationary dividend stage, since the start of
this stage will be unaffected.
A change of the initial values of equity and debt has no impact on the
evolution pattern after finishing the stationary dividend policy. A rise
of the initial values will shorten the first stage through with the
start of the dividend policy will put forward. As the finish of this
policy will be unchanged, a longer statíonary dividend stage occurs.
We conclude that the stationary dividend stage will be very flexible
and functions as a buffer in changes of initial values and the planning
horizon.
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we considered especially the impact of tax systems on
the optimal dynamic policy of a value maximizing firm by introducing
both corporate and personal taxation. In this way we extended the dynam-
ic theory of the firm. We derived an analytical solutíon by means of Op-
timal Control Theory. In addition, we discussed a decision rule in terms
of the net return on equity, which constitutes the entire optimal policy
string of the firm.
It turns out that the results differ from those of similar dynamic
models without personal taxation in three ways:
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- in final stages no dividend will be issued
- in some situations the firm wants to get rid of debt, even when debt
is relatively cheap
- due to the difference between the tax rate on dividend and capital
gain, it may be optimal to start expansion investment with a net re-
turn less than the díscount rate.
Finally, sensitivity analysis showed the importance of the value of the
personal tax rate in providing the optimal (final) policy. Assuming the
discount rate to the dependent on the interest rate and the personal tax
rate on dividend, we considered especially two extreme optimal policy
strings to show the similarities with the Miller hypothesis. Contrary to
Miller, however, we did not yet consider market equilibrium situations
at which we will pay attention in chapter seven.
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CHAPTER SIX
INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR REHAVIOUR UNDF.R EQUILIRRItJM C~NDITIONS
6.1. Introduction
In this chapter we enlarge the analysis of the previous chapter by al-
lowing investors to sell the shares of the firm under consideration at
some unknown point in time. Consequently, the investor's task is not
only to determine the optimal policy of the firm during the period he
owns and controls the corporation, but also the optimal selling moment
of the shares at some market price. Thereafter, the investor may invest
his money in the shares of another firm or in other investment opportu-
nities.
In a way we consider an optimal control problem with a free endpoint.
In this way we bear up against a possible criticism on the fixed end-
point analysis of the previous chapter: although the controller's aim is
to reach the maximum value of his investment, his overall result may be
poor, due to the obligation to control the firm until the end of the
fixed plan period. In addition, we abandon the implicit assumption that
the firm will liquidate at the planning horizon, or, at all events, that
the investor will sell the firm at liquidation value. We now take the
view that the firm will continue íts activities after the actual plan-
ning horizon of the initial investor, so that a purchase will take place
at market value. When characterizing the above described problem we may
say that we consider a single firm that will be subsequently controlled
by different value maximizing investors.
The allowance of shareholder-take-overs forces us to consider the mar-
ket value of the firm at any poínt in time. This can be done in two
ways. In section 6.1 we assume that the market value of the firm is exo-
geneously determined. That is, we consider the optimization prohlem of a
single taxed investor who may at some unknown point in time sell the
shares of the single firm under consideration at a known príce. There-
after, in section 6.3 we explore a model in which the selling price of
the shares, that is, the share market value of the firm, is endogeneous-
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ly determined. This model describes simultaneously the optimal policy
problem of both the initial investor as well as of the second investor,
who takes over the control of the firm. This second investor will be
regarded as a representative of the market. The market value of the firm
thus depends on the optimal policy string of the second investor. We
will use an optimal control formulation with switching dynamics. Final-
ly, we glance at a differential game approach. We will, however, consid-
er a problem, that slightly differs from the former two analyses, since
we assume that the investors will cooperate (section 6.4).
6.2. Free-endpoint approach under equilihrium conditions
In this section we focus on a single value maximizing firm, which is
controlled by a single taxed investor. Let Vm(T) be the market value of
the shares of the firm under consideration. In general, this value not
only depends on the time T but also on the state of the firm. We assume
that the market value in all possible situations, that might occur, is
known with certainty. The investor thus has an investment which we value
by
t -i T -i .t
Vj(t) :- J(1-tdj)D(T)e j dT t e ~(1-tgj)vm(t) (b.l)
T-f1
where
Vj: personal value of the firm to investor j which is among others a
function of the endpoint t
t: the unknown selling moment
ij; the investor's time preference rate after taxation
The aim of the investor is to maximize this objective functional by de-
termining simultaneously the dividend, investment and financing policy
t
as well as the optimal selling moment t. Since we may adopt the state
eqtiations and constraints of the basic model presented in chapter two
and used in chapter five, the feasible policies are similar to those of
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chapter five. Moreover, we may use the results of table 5.1 in order to
determine the optimal policy at each state of the firm.
We assume the known market value Vm, to be the result of the also
known policy of a second ínvestor, who buys the shares at T- t. For
simplicity we propose an infiníte planning horizon to the second inves-
tor. In the analysis that follows, we dístinguish two cases: we first
consider the case that the second investor is lower taxed than the ini-
tial one. Hereby, we assume for simplicity only that the second investor
is tax exempted. Thereafter, we focus on the opposite case.
We may now rewrite the objective functional (6.1) of the initial in-
vestor, who is labeled investor 1, into:
t -i1T -ilt W -i2(T-t)
V1((1) -!(1-Tdl)nl(T)e dTf(1-T )e J n(T)e dT (6.2)
T-~ gl T-t 2
~
The optimal selling moment t may be obtained by means of several met-
hods. A simple way is to take the first derívative of (6.2) with respect
to t. Hence,
ev (t) -i t
8t - e 1 f(1-Tdl)nl(t) -(1-tgl)n2(t) f
(6.3)
(i2-il)(1-rgi) J n2(T)e 2 dTl
T-t
~iven the state of the firm and the corresponding policies of both in-
vestors we may now analyse the sign of the above derivative. If the
first derivative is positive, the investor prefers to keep on the shares
of the firm and to postpone the selling moment; if it is equal to zero,
the optimal selling moment t~ is found, whereas a negative value implies
that the optimal selling moment is passed by.
Similar results may, however, be obtained by means of a more formal
method. As we have stated in the introductory section, the problem may
be consídered as an optimal control problem with a free endpoint. To do
so we use (fi.l) as objective functional of the initial investor. Since
the market value of the firm is assumed to be equal to the present value
of investor's 2 dividend policy, that is
i~n
m -i (S-T)
Vm(T) - j DZ(S)e 2 dS
S-T
(6.4)
we may consider Vm as a state variable which satisfies the additional
state equation
Vm(T) - i2V~ - D,, (6.5)
When we adopt furthermore the state equations and constraints of the
basic model, presented in chapter two and applied in chapter five, we
may formulate the problem as follows:
t -i T -i t
max{(1-Tdl) J D1(T)e 1 dT f e 1 V(t)(1-Tgl)}
T-(1
(6.6)
subject to V- i2V - D2 (6.7)
V(~) - ~(1
X - (1-TC)(0(K)-rYl - D1
K- I-aK
K(0) - (lfh)X(0) - (lfh)xD ~ 0
K - X } Y (6.12)
(6.13)
and subject to the assumptions (5.2) and (5.5), which after modification
are expressed by
il ~ (1-TC)r and i2 ~ (1-tc)r




If we apply, in addition to the usual necessary conditions for an opti-
mal solution, the necessary condition to obtain the optimal end point t~
[see e.g. Kamien and Schwartz (1985), p. 148], we get the similar condi-
tion as found above by means of the first derivative of the objective
functional (6.1). The proof of this derivation is given in the appendix
B1. Hence,
if e-ilt[(1-Tdl)D1(t)-(1-Tgl)D2(t)f(12-i1)(1-Tgl)Vm(t)] {~} 0
~
t - 0
then {0 ~ t~ C t} (6.16)
Given the state of the firm and the corresponding policies of both in-
vestors, we may now analyse the above condition. Note that we may neg-
lect exp(-ilt), because it will not affect the inequality in (6.16). To
start our analysis we first recall the five different policies that both
investors have to their disposal: growth with or without debt, redemp-
tion of debt and stationary dividend with or without debt. However, the
final state of the firn produces, due to the policy of the first inves-
tor, the initial states of the firm for the second one. Since il ~ i2,
investor 1 prefers higher levels of K than investor 2 and thus the pos-
sibility occurs, that the ínitial state to the second investor will not
satisfy the assumption (6.15) after necessary modification. That is,
(1-rcd (K(t~)) ~ max{i2, (1-tc)r} (6.17)
This assumption was introduced in order to rule out contraction poli-
cies. For that reason, we have now to admit contraction policies, which
imply a zero investment, so that the amount of capital goods decreases
according to the depreciation rate a. All net sales, that is
(1-TC)[0(K)faK-rY], are used either to pay back present debt or to dis-
tribute dividend.
Secondly, we emphasize that the left hand side policy at T- t~ is
determined by investor 1 and [he right hand side policy by investor 2.
i~o
So, in order to determine the optimal selling moment of the initial in-
vestor, we need to consider only those policies of the two investors,
that both are feasible at one and the same state of the firm.
Finally, we note that in particular the dividend policy is of utmost
importance with respect to the optimal selling moment. Therefore, we
distinguish between three different levels, which can be obtained by
recalling the results of table 5.1. fJhen we focus on the dividend policy
of investor j, we get the results as presented in table 6.1.
optimal dividend labelcondition
level investor j corresponding policy
0 RX ~ ij zero divídend policy
(1-T )[0(K)-rY] RX - ij stationary dividend policyC
(1-TC)[~(K)-rY]faK RX ~ ij contraction policy
table 6.1: ~ptimal dívidend level desired by investor j, given the
production capacity level K and the corresponding rate of
return RX ( see section 5.4.11.
Since any of both ínvestors has three dífferent kinds of dividend poli-
cies to his disposal, we have to check the feasibility and optimality of
nine combinations at the end- or switch-point. These combinations are
summarized in table 6.2.
combination policy investor 1 condition policy investor 2
1 zero dividend RX~12~i1 zero dividend
2 zero dividend i1~R~i2 stationary dividend
3 zero dividend i1~Ry~i2 contraction
4 stationary dividend 11-RX~i2 contraction
5 stationary dividend i1-RXi2 stationary dividend
6 stationary dividend i1-RX~i2 zero dividend
7 contraction i1~RX~i2 zero dividend
R contractíon i1~RXi2 stationary dividend
9 contraction i1~RX~i2 contraction
Table 6.2: combina[ions of dívidend policies at the switching point t~
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However, only the first four mentioned combinations are feasible. Com-
binations 5 and 6 are not satisfying the condition i2 ~ il, whereas the
combinations 7 through 9 are precluded by the initial condition (6.15).
We will thus consider the following four feasible switch situations and
check whether one of it satisfies the equality sign of the optimality
condition (6.16).
Combination 1:
zero dividend policy investor 1 ~ zero dividend policy investor 2.
Both investors are not paid out any dividend. Whether the investors pur-
sue a growth policy with or without debt or even a redemption policy is
not important, since it turns out that the first part of expression
(6.16) is always positive:
(12-i1)(1-rgl)Vm(t) ~ 0 for all t (6.18)
So, in such a situation and state of the firm it is in favour of the
initial investor to continue his policy and to keep the shares of the
firm. Notice that this situation contains all states of the firm at
which it holds that the marginal return to equi[y exceeds the time pref-
erence rate of both the investors: RX ~ max{il,i2} - i2. We may also say
that we have considered all states at which both investors will not dis-
tribute profit.
Combination 2:
zero dividend policy investor 1 a stationary dividend policy investor 2.
Investor 2 prefers to pursue a stationary dividend policy. This implies
that the state of the firm is such that the marginal return to equity is
equal to the time preference rate of the second i nvestor: RX - i 2. Since
il ~ i2 it i s at such a state optimal for investor 1 to retain earnings
instead of paying out dividend. The sign of condítion ( 6.16) is now giv-
en by:
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-(1-tgl)D2(t) f (12-i1)(1-igl)D2(t)Ii2 -
-(1-Tgl)D2(t)(illi2) ~ 0
Since the first derivate is negative, postponement of the selling moment
harms the initial investor.
Combination 3:
zero dividend policy investor 1 a contraction policy investor 2.
This sequence of policies may occur at any state satisfying í1~RX~i2.
However, we can conclude that due to the zero dividend policy of inves-
tor 1 the sign of (6.16) will always be negative. To that end we first
notice that
~ -i (T-t) m -i (T-t)
J D2(T)e 2 dT ~ J D2(t)e 2 dT -
T-t T-t
~ -i (T-t) (1-T )(0(K)-rY)faK




This result is due to the contraction policy of investor 2, which is
succeeded by a stationary dividend policy. Accordingly, D(T) will des-
cend to the stationary level.
If we now substitute the corresponding policies, indicated in tahle
6.1 into condition (6.16) and if we neglect the exponential function, we
get
-i (T-t)
-(1-tgl)D2(t) t(i2-il)(1-tgl) f D2(T)e 2 dT ~
T-t
-(1-Tgl)~(1-TC)(~(K)-rY)faKl t (i2-il)(1-igl)I(1-ic)(~(K)-rY)faK)Ii2 -
i
- il (1-tgl)Í(1-TC)(D(K)-rY)}aKl ~ (1 (6.21)
2
125
The negative sign implies that the optimal end point is already passed
by.
Combination 4:
stationary dívidend policy i nvestor 1 a contraction policy investor 2.
Investor 1 only distributes profit when the marginal return to equity
equals his time preference rate: RX - il. Since the time preference rate
of the second investor exceeds that of the first one, the second im~es-
tor prefers at this state a contraction policy. Using (6.21) we now get
W -i (T-t)
(1-Tdl)D1(t) -(1-tgl)D2(t) f(i2-il)(1-Tgl)TJt D2(T)e 2 dT ~
i
(1-rdl)(1-tc)(0(K)-rY) - il (1-Tgl)[(1-tc)(0(K)-rY)faK]
2
(6.22)
Let us assume that
il - r(1-Trl) and i2 - r (6.23)
which is i n agreement with i2 ~ il. Expression (6.22) is thus negative
if
[(1-Tdl)-(1-rgl)(1-rrl)](1-rc)[~(K)-rY]-(1-Tgl)(1-rrl)aK ~ 0 (6.24)
Whether this inequality holds or not, depends on the levels of the tax
rates and both the constants r and a. However, if we consider e.g. the
classical tax regime (T dl-Trl)' we get the condition
Tgl[(1-ic)(0(K)-rY)] - (1-rgl)aK ~ 0 (6.25)
which may hold, since the tax rate on capital gain is often very close
to zero.
When studying the above findings, we first note that no sequence of pol-
icies exists such that the relevant first derivative equals zero. This
1LV
is a result from the discontinuity of the dividend policies. Secondly,
we observe that the inequality in condition (6.16) switches from nega-
tive into positive as soon as the production capacity has reached such a
level that the rate of return on equity equals the time preference rate
of the second investor. To illustrate this observation, we indicate the
locations of the four feasible combinations into the evolution pattern
of the firm.
Figure 6.1: location of feasible switching points.
We may summarize the above findings in the following conclusion:
In case of only one buyer, that is investor 2, it is optimal for the
initial investor to sell the firm's stock as soon as the state of the
firm is such that marginal return to equity equals the time preference
rate of the second investor.
The optimal policy string of the firm under consideration will thus be:
zero dividend policy investor 1 a stationary dividend policy investor 2
Whether the zero-dividend policy of investor 1 contains the evolution
stages 1 to 3, that is, growth with maximum debt, redemption of debt and
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growth without debt, or a subset of these policies, depends on the val-
ues of the relevant time preference ratea and thus of the personal tax
rates. To clarify this, we firstly note that this result is derived un-
der the assumption that the initial investor is subject to personal tax-
ation, whereas the second one is tax exempt. However, the result may be
extended to all cases ín which the tax rates tdl and trl of the initial
investor exceed those of the second one. Hence, in case that
i2 ~(1-ic)r, that is ~ C Tr2 C Tc, the firm's policy stríng consists of
only a maximum growth policy succeeded by a stationary dividend policy,






0 investor l~ investor 2
;Y
Figure 6.2: the firm's optimal policy string when D C Tr2 C Tc~
When í2 C(1-ic)r, or equivalently Tr2 ~ tc, the optimal policy string
consists of four different succeeding policies: growth with maximum
debt, redemption of debt, growth without debt (all pursued by investor
1) and finally a stationary dividend policy without debt pursued by in-
vestor 2 (see figure 6.3).
Finally, the situation rr2 ~ zc is excluded, because it will lead to
degenerate solutions.
We complete this analysis by considering the situation in which the
tax exempt investor is the initial one. It turns out that in case the
marginal return to equity exceeds both the time preference rates, that
is RX ~ i2 ~ il, an immediate switch of investor is optimal, so that we
are back to the previous case. If the initial state of the firm is such
that i nvestor 2 pays out dividend, that is RX ~ i2, he will never sur-
render the control of the firm.
Figure 6.3: the firm's optimal policy string in case Tr2 ~ Tc.
F,3. A competitive approach
In this section we explore a model in which the selling price of the
shares, that is the share market value of the firm, is endogeneously
determined. The model describes simultaneously the optimal policy proh-
lem of both the initial investor as well as of the second investor, who
may take over the control of the firm at some unknown moment t. The val-
ue, that the initíal investor receives at the sales moment, will thus
depend on the optimal future policy string of the second investor.
In fact we consider two problems, that of investor 1 and 2 respective-
ly, which are connected with each other at the sales moment. We will
formulate the problem, however, as a single optimal control problem. For
its description we develop a time dependent linear combination of two
models with a selection variable S(T), which denotes the actual control-




J IS(T)(1-tdl)D1(T)e 1 f
T-~
-1 T'(T) -1 (T-T'(T))
e 1 (1-Tgl)(1-S(T))D2(T)e 2 )dT
where
S: selection variable, 0 ~ S(T) ~ 1
T': artificial time variable
(6.2fi)
Due to the linearity of the model the variable S(T) will behave itself
as an ínteger variable. If S(T) - 1, investor 1 controls the firm,
whereas S(T) ~ 0 implies that investor 2 is the manager and owner of the
firm.
The artificial time variable T'(T) runs at the same pace as natural
time as long as investor 1 manages the firm. As soon as investor 2 will
take over the control, the artificial time T'(T) stops and equals the
~
optimal sales moment t. So, T'(T) can be considered as a state vari-
able, which movement in time is governed by the control variable S(T).
Thus,
T' (T) - S(T)
(h.27)
Modeling the problem in this way, it has much in common with the 'arti-
ficial time'-approach, which has been suggested by Vind (1967) in order
to smooth jumps in the state variables. In this line the model may be
regarded as the formulation of the second problem investor in order to
~
determine the optimal initial jump K(t )- K(0).
We wíll continue the formulation of the linear combination problem by
adopting the state equations and restrictions of the basic model we have
presented in chapter two. Of course, these expressions need to be modi-
fied, since two decision makers are involved in controlling the firm. We
may carry on with a complete separation of the two models by using dif-
ferent state variables for the two investors. Rach state variable evol-
ves accordíng to its own state equation, whereas the right hand side
.on
limit of the state variable of the first investor m~ist equal the left
hand side limit of the corresponding state variable of the second inves-
tor in order to guarantee the continuity of the state variable under
consideration in the switching point.
Another possibility is the use of only one variable to express the
amount of equity and the following description of its evolution:
X- S[(1-rc)(0(K)-rYl) - D1] t(1-S)f(1-TC)(0(K)-rY2) - D2] (6.2R)
X(0) - x~ (6.29)
In this way, the problem may also be considered as a sequence of optimal
control problems. Luhmer (1982) describes this class of problems, which
is labeled 'switching dynamics', and derives the necessary conditions
for an optimal solution. However, it is sufficient to include the switch
variable S in only the objective functional. This is quite reasonable,
since in case that S(T) - 1, positive values of the control variables of
the second investors will only reduce the possibilities of the first
investor, which is on strained terms with the indicated value of S.
Moreover, in appendix R2 we prove that situations, in which, for in-
stance, the first investor is the owner and the control variables of the
second investor are non zero, are implicitly ruled out, so that we may
neglect additional assumptions to avoid such situations. The following
formulatíon thus describes the problem under consideration. Since K-
X f Y, the variable Y has been eliminated.
m -i1T
maximize ( j [S(1-Tdl)Dle f
T-0
-i T' -i (T-T')
(1-S)(1-tgl)e 1 D2e 2 ]dT
subject to
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(lth)X - K ~ 0
D1 ~0 D2 ~0









p c S c 1 (6.41)
Formulating the problem is this way it" looks much like an attempt to
find candidates for a so-called 'Pareto-solution' of a dynamic game be-
tween two cooperative players. In a dynamic game two or more decision
makers will try to control common state variables in a way that their
objective functionals are optimized. In case the decision makers cooper-
ate, we seek for a Pareto-solution. Candidates for a Pareto solution may
be found by solving a related optimal control problem which formulation
is qui[e similar to the above one (see e.g. Leitmann (1974)1, since it
is a linear combination of the objective functionals. However, in case
of finding condidates for a Pareto solution, the variable S is a con-
stant one, since the two players cooperate and have assigned constant
weights S and 1-S to their objective functionals. In our description, S
is a time dependent variable, which will actually alternate between zero
and one. The two investors do not cooperate in the sense of Pareto, but
are maximizing the revenue of their personal investment given the state
of the firm and the possibilities of the other player. As stated in the
introductory section, we in fact consider the optimization problem of a
single taxable investor, who may at some unknown point in time sell the
shares of the single firm under consideration at a price, which is de-
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termined by a second investor, who on his turn is regarded as a repre-
sentative of the market.
The optimal solution can be obtained in the same way as those of the
chapters two and five: we first derive the necessary conditions for op-
timality by means of Pontryagin's maximum principle and thereafter we
apply Van Loon's policy connecting procedure (see appendix B2).
Considering the given description of the problem it is not surprising
that the firm's optimal policy string is the same as derived in the
previous section. The only difference between the two prohlems is the
determination of the optimal policy of the second investor, whích is
exogeneous in section 6.2 and endogeneous in this section. Nevertheless,
in both the cases this policy string satisfies the corresponding opti-
mality conditions.
For the sake of convenience we summarize the above findings by indi-
cating the optimal solution in its full length. The derivation of this
solution is presented in appendix B2.
We first recall the policies that both the investors have to their
disposal:
label policy
l.j growth with maximum debt
2.j redemption of debt
3.j growth without debt
4.j stationary dividend without debt
5.j stationary dividend with debt
6.j contraction
Table 6.3: disposable policies, where j- 1,2 indicates the investor.
The optimal policies strings are now given by:
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if i2 ~ il ~ ( 1-tc)r
~
K(0) ~ KY1 : policy 6.1 i policy 5.1
~
K(0) ~ KY1 : policy 5.2
~ ~
KY2 C K((1) C KY2 : policy 6.2 a policy 5.2
~
K(0) - KY2 : policy 5.2
~
K(0) ~ KY2 : policy 1.1 i policy 5.2
if i2 ~ (1-tc)r ~ il
~
K(0) ~ KX1 : policy 6.1 a policy 4.1
~
K(0) - KX1 : policy 4.1
~ ~
KX2 ~ K(fl) ~ KX1 : policy 6.2 a policy 4.2
~
K((1) - KX2 : policy 4.2
~
K([1) C KX2 : policy 1.1 i policy 5.2
if il C(1-tc)r, i2 C(1-tc)r and i2 C i2
~
K(f1) ~ KX1 : policy 6.1 ; policy 4.1
~
K(0) - KX1 : policy 4.1
~ ~
KX2 C K(fl) C KX1 : policy 6.2 a policy 4.7
~
K(0) ~ KX2 : policy 4.1.
~




d0(K1,~)IdK - lth ij } lfh (1-TC)r
Finally we conclude that under the assumption of a sufficiently low ini-
tial production capacity level K(0) it is optimal for the inítial tax-
able investor to sell the firm's stock as soon as the state of the firm
is such that marginal return to equity equals the time preference rate
of the second investor. The optimal policy string of the firm under con-
sideration will thus be:
zero dividend policy investor 1 i stationary dividend policy investor 2
which is in line with the result of the prevíous section.
6.4. A differential game approach
Looking back at the previous sections we may argue that probably the
dynamic game theory will be an excellent tool to obtain the solution of
the problem under consideration: in a dynamic setting, we observe two
(or more) investors, who are trading to get the shares of a firm in or-
der to pursue the policy that maximizes the return on their investment.
6.4.1. Theory of differential games
The theory of differential games concerns dynamic games, which are games
"in which the position of the players develops continuously ín time".
(Friedman, (1971), p. vii]. Basar and Olsder (1982) refine this state-
ment: "Scientifically, dynamic game theory can be viewed as a child of
the parents game theory and optimal control theory. Its character, how-
ever, is much more versatíle than that of either of its parents, since
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it involves a dynamic decision process evolving in time, with more than
one decision maker, each with his own cost function and possibly having
access to different information." [Basar and Olsder (1982), p. 2]. In
mathematical sense, the striking feature of a differential game model is
the direct or indirect influence of all players on the (common) state
variables.
Although it is beyond the scope of this hook to elaborate on the the-
ory of differential games, it is for convenience of the reader that we
first survey the main lines of this theory. Thereafter we apply the the-
ory on the problem under consideration.
The theory of differential games is by no means easy, not only for
mathematical reasons but also because of the number of assumptions nec-
essarily to define the concept of a solutíon.
Within a continuous time and deterministíc setting we firstly distin-
guish zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. A game is labeled a zero-sum game
if the sum of the values of the objectíve functionals of all players is
a constant. So, the gain of one player is the loss of one or more ot-
hers.
Secondly, as to the choice of the control variables several possibili-
ties are available, depending on the information structure assumed for
the players. Let Ui be the control variable of the i-th players and X
the common state variable. When we mention just those information struc-
tures most commonly used, we may distinguish:
closed-loop : iTi - Ui(X, T, X(0))
feedback : Ui - Ui(X, T)
open-loop : TIi ~ 0i(T, X(0))
Finally, the concept of a solution is not well defined unless the char-
acter or mood of the play has been determined. We distinguish between a
cooperative and a non cooperative mood of play. If the players agree to
cooperate then they seek for a joint solution that is said to be Pareto
optimal. If the players do not cooperate then each player has to consid-
er the problem of what to assume about the other player's decision. The
Nash payoff represents a security level when playing against rational
players of equal strength. If there are differences in strength or in
the amount of information available to the players, then the Stackelberg
solution can be used: in a two-person game one player is called the
leader and the other the follower. The leader announces his strategy and
the follower reacts rationally on it.
For more precise statements and definitions we refer to Leitmann
(1974), Basar and Olsder (19R2) and Mehlmann (19R5). A number of appli-
cations of differential games to management science can be found in
Feichtinger and ,Jbrgensen (19R2), whereas Jbrgensen (19R2) gives a sur-
vey of some differential games in advertising, one of the areas most
frequently explored.
6.4.2. Modeling the problem under consideratíon
The modeling of the problem under consideration depends among others on
the assumption with respect to the separability of ownership and con-
trol. We may distinguish between three cases.
a. Complete separability of ownership and control: in such a situation
the firm is in a way autonomously controlled by the management, which
is not the owner of the firm. Such an assumption does not necessarily
imply that the management neglects the market circumstances in which
the firm is operating. The shareholders have, however, delegated the
daily decisions to the management. Differently taxed investors may
react to the varying policy of the firm by means of selling and buy-
ing shares of the firm. Although the investors' problem may be re-
garded as a differential game problem, Van Schijndel (19R5) used an
optimal control approach. Moreover, as stated in the introductory
chapter we will only consider those situations in which investors may
influence corporate policy.
b. No separability of ownership and control: investors who own the stock
of the firm may also control the policy of that particular firm. In
this way they are able to pursue a policy that maximizes the net re-
turn of their investment. Several solution concepts are available,
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depending on the assumptions with regard to the problem under consid-
eration.
c. Semi-separability of ownership and control: in this case we assume
separation of owner and manager, but both subjects may affect the
evolution of the firm, since they both control parts of it; that is,
we suppose that the manager controls the investment rate and is in
charge of the debt management too. The shareholders, who have diffe-
rent personal tax rates, which, in turn, differ from the corporate
tax rate, control the dividend pay-out and are allowed to buy and
sell shares from each other. The problem may be considered as a non-
cooperative game where the manager acts as a leader in a Stackelberg
game, announcing his strategy and the stockholders respond rationally
as followers by choosing a dividend policy as well as the amount of
internal trade with shares. This problem is subject of current re-
search by Jbrgensen, van Schijndel and Kort (19A6). Apart from the
analytical difficulties they encounter in the analysis of the model
(because of the complexity of the problem, a closed-form solution
e.g. is not attainable), there are some conceptual difficulties with
respect to the division of the roles between the decision makers. In
particular the dividend policy deserves some consideration, since it
will be determined by the investor who owns the majority of the shar-
es. This majority, however, may change over the horizon as a result
of buying and sellíng shares.
In the next subsection we will hriefly consider the second case under
the assumption that the two investors cooperate.
F.4.3. A Pareto solution of the problem
In this subsection we develop a deterministic dynamic model of a corpor-
ate firm with, for simplicity, only two shareholders. We assume that
these shareholders control the firm in a cooperative way. Due to these
assumptions we may adopt the state equations of [he basic model present-
ed in chapter two.
tZR
K - I - aK (~.42)
K(0) - k~




State equation (6.42) describes the impact of gross investment I(T) on
the amount of capital goods K(T), whereas (6.43) points out that the
operating income ()(K) less the interest payment rY after corporate taxes
may be used either to increase the amount of equity through retentions
or to pay out dividend.
Now we turn to the division of the stock. Let Zj be the fraction of
the stock that the j-th investor possesses. Hence,
7.1 f Z2 - 1 (6.44)
Both investors may trade in order to increase or decrease their frac-
tion. To limit the number of control variables we assume that the inves-
tors have the following contractual agreement: if one investor wants to
sell, then the other must buy. Hence a shareholder has always the option
to leave the company. On the other hand, no stockholder can be forced to
sell, that is, nobody can be forced to give up a majority position or to
leave the firm. This implies that only the selling rates are controls.
Since Z1 --Z2 we only need one state equation with respect to division
of shares:
Z1 - S~ - S1
7.1(~) - ~10 ~ (1
(6.45)
where
Sj: the selling rate of the j-th investor~shareholder, j- 1,2
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Also for the sake of simplification, we may fix the príce at which buy-
ing and selling [akes place at p, where p is a positive constant. Thís
rather strong assumption could be relaxed by letting the share prices be
determined by bargaining between the two shareholders or by letting the
price be a function of the amount of equity. However, it will turn out
that this assumption is less crucial than expected, because under our
propositions the buy and sell prices will cancel out. So, we do not need
to make any assumption with respect to the prices.
To construct the payoffs of the inveators we adopt the usual tax rat-
es Tdj and Tg. So, the tax rate on capital gain is assumed to be the
same for both the investors. We further assume that share transaction
between investors are not taxed; this does not seem to be a crucial as-
sumption if such transactions are taxed according the tax rate on capi-
tal gain. The payoff functionals are now given by:
V1 z -i1T
- f [p(S1-SZ) f (1-Tdl)DZlle dT f
T~Q
-ilz
Z1(z)[X(z) - t (X(z)-X(0))]e
S
VZ z -i2T






Finally, we include the usual restrictions: debt is limited in the same
way as in chapter two, all variables are assumed to be nonnegative and,
finally, all control variables have an upper bound in order to avoid
impulse controls.
In order to find candidates for a Pareto solution, let us consider the
simplest problem of maximizing V1 f V2, assuming il ~ 12 and Tdl ~ t -
g
TdZ. We now get the following objective functional:
z -i1T -ilz




The problem can be considered as an optimal control problem, which can
be solved by means of Pontryagin's maximum principle followed by Van
Loon's iterative policy connecting procedure [see appendix B3].
The solution of the above problem has not any surprise in it. Since we
have in fact only one time preference rate, only one desired equilibrium
level of the amount of capital goods exists, which is such that the net
return on equity equals the time preference rate [see results of chapter
two and five and in particular table 5.11:
K- K~ such that RX(K~) - il - i2 (6.49)
where RX is defined by [see also section 5.41:
RX - (1-rc)dO~dK f (1-TC)(dO~dK - r) X (h.5f1)
Furthermore, we recall that the level of K~ depends on the sign of il
- (1-rc)r, that is:
~ ~
if il ~( 1-TC)r then K- KY
~ ~
if il ~(1-TC)r then K- KX
The optimal policy string now depends on the initial values of K and Z1.
We get the next three main possibilities:
~a. if K(~) ( K: zero dividend policy investor 1 and 2 i
stationary dividend policy i nvestor 2.
The policy string starts with a zero dividend policy. Since both in-
vestors completely agree wíth this policy, the value of Z1 is indefi-
nite. However, this evolution path needs to end up with a zero value
of Z1, because on the succeeding stationary dividend policy the se-
cond investor will own all the firm's shares. Finally, the role of
debt is determined by the level of the time preference rate in rela-
tion to the net costs of debt, (1-t )r. As a consequence, thec
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firm's master evolution trajectories are exactly the same as depicted
in the figures 2.1 and 2.2 in chapter two.
~
b. if K(~) - K: stationary dividend policy investor 2 in principle.
The firm's optimal master evolution consists of only one policy and
that is a stationary dividend policy. The second investor owns in
principle the shares of the firm. Because the initial value of Z1 is
positive, that is, the first investor possesses shares of the firm at
the initial moment, he will sell his part of the stock instantaneous-
ly to the second investor: Z1 --~1 --Smax~
~
c. if K(~) ~ K: contraction policy investor 2 in principle i
stationary dividend policy investor 2.
Similar to the previous case 7.1 will be negative at the maximum level
if the initial value of 7,1 is not equal to zero. The firm's evolution
is in first instance determined by the contraction policy succeeded
by the stationary dividend policy. lJhether debt will be adopted or
not depends once again on the balance of the time preference rate and
the net cost of debt.
The main result of the above considerations is that the optimal policy
string of the firm always ends up with a stationary policy of paying out
dividend to the second, that is, lowest taxed, investor. Moreover, this
result was predictable, since the first investor has always to pay over
an equal or greater fraction of his earnings for tax purposes than the
second one. This loss is not counterbalanced by a gain due to a lower
time preference rate. Hence, in that case, the problem will he analytic-
ally hard to solve, since the results will depend on accidental values
of some variahles. For that reason, it will be very difficult or perhaps
impossible to obtain analytical results in the case that the investors
do not cooperate and thus play Nash-strategies.
1G~
6.5. Conclusion
In this chapter we enlarged the analysís of the previous chapter by al-
lowing investors to trade the shares of the firm under consideration. In
first instance we considered the problem of a single taxable investor,
who has to determine the optimal policies with respect to dividend, in-
vestment and finance, and ín addition the optimal moment to sell the
shares of the firm at some known price. Thereafter, we relaxed the as-
sumption of the known price and known policy after the take-over by con-
sidering a model that simultaneously descrihed the optimal policy prob-
lem of both the initial investor as well as of the second investor, who
takes over the control of the firm. To these purposes we used optimal
control theory approaches. Finally, we considered a differential game
approach and discussed the implications of a cooperative strategy for
the two investors.
With respect to the firm's evolution a~eneral conclusion may be that
the optimal policy string always ends up with a stationary diviAend pol-
icy and the firm's stock is owned by the investor subject to the lowest
personal tax rates. Investors subject to high personal tax rates will
sell the shares of the firm as soon as the amount of capital goods has
reached such a value that the low taxed investor prefers a constant
amount of dividend.
In the next chapter we will study the implications of these strategies
in an equilibriuim framework.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
A TIME DEPF.NDENT EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH UNDER A
PROGRF.SSIVE PF,RSONAL TAX
7.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is an attempt to justify the thesis that
during each stage of their evolution firms will be controlled by inves-
tors in different tax brackets. To that end, we consider in a dynamic
setting the impact of personal taxation on the optimal policy strinp, of
value maximizíng firms and the equilibrium portfolio selection of ínves-
tors, both under the assumption of no separation of ownership and con-
trol.
In chapter five we have studied the case of a single investor who own-
ed and managed a single value maximizing firm. We have showed that the
optimal evolution pattern consists of subsequent policies concerning
investment, dividend and finance, and that it strongly depends on the
personal tax structure of the investor. So, different personal tax rat-
es, that is different investors will induce different optimal policy
strings. In fact, this analysis has been carried out under the assump-
tion of no real alternative investment opportunities, because the inves-
tor was forced to own and control the firm during a fixed planning per-
iod.
In chapter six we have enlarged this analysis by considering cases in
which the investor has the opportunity to sell the stock of the firm to
another investor. Zn particular, we explored a model with one firm and
two value maximizing ínvestors.
In this chapter we focus on the dynamic market equílibrium prohlem of
many investors and many shareholder controlled firms. So, investors have
actually the opportunity to select and control at any tíme firms in a
partícular state in order to maxímize the value of their investment.
As stated above the aim of this chapter is the justification of the
thesis that durinp, each stage of their evolution firms will be control-
led by investors in different tax hrackets. To do so, we firstly recall
1GG
the impact of personal taxation on the optimal investment~dividend pol-
icy of value maximizing firms. In section 7.2 we therefore consider a
dynamic model of firm behaviour that is appropriate for our purpose. All
variables, that for the moment being are beyond our scope, such as cor-
porate debt, are left out of consideration in order to simplify the
problem and model formulation. In this way we are able to concentrate on
the main contribution of the chapter. Thereafter we compute the values
of firms, which are continuously distributed over a range of feasible
production capacity levels, to investors in different tax brackets (sec-
tion 7.3). Next, we evolve an equilibrium valuation and portfolio theory
under personal taxation in section 7.4. Finally, we summarize the find-
ings in section 7.5.
7.2. Optimal behaviour of an equity financed firm
In this section we recall the deterministic dynamic model of a share-
holder controlled value maximizing firm that we have explored in chapter
five. However, we introduce some modifications with regard to the pez`
sonal tax system, the planning horizon and the use of corporate debt.
The objective of each investor is to maximize the value of any firm
under control. Investors may sell a firm's stock and thus surrender the
control of firms. We assume, however, that all firms will continue after
the take-over. So, the value of a firm may be expressed as the present
value at T of the net dividend stream over an infinite plan period:
~ -i (S-T)
V (T) :- ~ (1-T )D (S)e p dS
p S-T p p
where
Vp(T): personal value of a firm at time T to investor p
ip :[ime preference rate after personal taxation of investor p
rp : personal tax rate of investor p
Dp(T): dividend at T when investor p is the manager of the firm
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As stated before the time preference rate reflects the alternative rate
of return after personal taxation. Within our deterministic framework we
may therefore assume the time preference rate to be dependent on the
market interest rate r and the personal tax rate T. For simplicity we
P
define in particular:
i .- r(1-r )
P . P
(7.2)
Since we use only the tax rate on personal income, we actually impose
the classical tax system (T - T - 1). In addition we have taken taxdp rp p
exempt capital gain for granted when reproducing the investor's objec-
tive functional (7.1). However, we would obtain a similar type objective
functional if we had assumed that capital gain tax is paid at each T and
that for every investor the after tax yield on money investment must be
equal to the dividend plus the capítal gain both net of taxes. Hence,
r(1-rp)Vp(T) - (1-Tp)Dp(T) t (1-igp)Vp(T) (7.3)
This personal capital market equilibrium condition (see King (1977) is a
differential equation for V, which is in its integral form at T- 0:
(1-T ) m -r((1-T )~íl-T ))T
Vp(~) -(1-rdp) f Dp(T).e
rP 8P dT (7~4)
gp T-0
Under the classical tax system, Trp - rdp :- ip, and the definition of
rp by
(1-rp) :- íl-Tdp)I(1-Tgp) í7.5)
the objective functional, which is used by e.g. Yla-Liedenpohja (1978),
is similar to that of expression (7.1). Hence, with respect to the ob-
jective we assume an infinite time horizon instead of a finite one, and
impose the classical tax system with tax exempt capital gain. The latter
assumptions, however, do not affect the results of the analysis, but are
put forward only for sake of simplicity.
The final modification concerns the firm's financial structure, which
is assumed to exist entirely of internal equity; that is, the firm may
1 G F,
not attract debt and issues of new shares are prohibited. Conseqiiently,
the initial state assumption that guarantees the existence of alterna-
tives that are profitable from the start on, becomes: if K(T) - 0, then
(1-r )dO~dK ~ i .c p
Since all remaining assumptions of the chapter two and five models are
adopted, we may now formulate the firm's optimization problems as fol-
lows:
-i T
maximize { J (1-i )D (T)e p dT}
D, I T-0 p p
P P
suhject to K(T) - I(T) - aK(T)
P
X(T) - (1-t )0(K) - D (T)
c p
K(T) - X(T)
D (T) ~ 0 I (T) ) 0
P P






K(~) - X(0) - k0 ~ 0 (7.17.)
Notice that 0(K) may now be considered as the corporate profit before
taxation.
Equality (7.9) enables us to simplify the model by eliminating both
X(T) and Ip(T). The model in its reduced form can then be solved analy-
tically by applying optimal control theory. So, we first derive the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for an optimal solution by means of the
standard maximum principle of Pontryagin c.s. (1962), and afterwards we
apply the 'iterative policy' connecting procedure designed by Van Loon
(19R3), which is a convenient procedure in order to determine from the
set of necessary conditions a solution for the optimal policy of the
firm over the whole planninq period. Since the model under consideration
has much in common with the chapter five model, the optimal solution can
be easily obtained by setting some variables of the latter mentioned
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model to zero. Therefore, we do not elaborate on the derivation of the
optimal policy string, neither in this chapter nor in an appendix.
The optímal evolution patterns are very simple and consist at most of
two subsequent policies. Two of these patterns are depicted in the fig-









Figure 7.1: optimal policy string Fígure 7.2: optimal policy string
~ ~
when K(0) ~ l:p when K(0) ~ Kp
Due to the assumption of an infinite planning horizon, both evolution
patterns end up with a stationary dividend policy: the production capa-
~
city K(T) remains on a constant level K, such that marginal revenue
P
equals the shareholder's time preference rate: (1-t )dO~dK - i. Notice~ c p
that the desíred stationary level K depends on the investor's personal
P
tax rate.
Depending on the initial value K~ this policy is preceded by a maximum
growth (figure 7.1) or a contraction policy (figure 7.2). Due to the~
decreasing return to scale, marginal revenue of values of K(T) below Kp
exceeds marginal cost of equity, that ís (1-r )dO~dK ~ ip, if K(T) ~~ c
K. The optimal policy, therefore, is to retain earnings and use this
P
money to finance expansion investment in order to realize a maximum in-
crease of the productíon capacity and with that of the firm's profit.
If the production capacity is above the desired level K~ the optimal
P
policy is to cut down the capital stock at the maximum rate that is al-
~ ! q
lowed for, that is at depreciation rate a, for, due to the nonnegativety
constraint on investment, the firm cannot divest. All profit is paid out
to the shareholder.
The reader can imagine that a firm having an initial production capac-
~
ity just on the optimal level K, will keep on that level during the
P
whole planning period by investing at such a level as necessary only to
replace absoleted capital goods.
Finally, we survey the main results and features of the problem in an
appropriate way:
~
- the desired level Kp is fixed by the time preference rate ip, such
that (1-TC)dO~dK - ip. So, due to the concavity of 0(K) a higher level
of ip results in a lower desired equilibrium level of K(T). A far
reaching consequence of this dependence can be shown by considering
~ ~
two values of ip such that Kpl ~ K~ ~ KP2. If ip - ipl the shareholder
prefers a contractíon policy, whereas in the case of ip - ip2 a maxi-
mum growth policy is the optimal one. Moreover, since ip depends on
its turn on the personal tax rate T, investors in different tax
P
brackets may prefer different policies at one and the same state K~,
- The optimal dividend policy, and with that the resulting state tra-
~
jectory K(T), depends on only the present state of the firm K(T) and
~
the desired stationary level Kp, which on its turn is fixed by rp. The
optimal dividend policy is thus given by
D~(T) - {0(K)-aK} if K(T) {C} K~
p 0(K) ~ p
(7. 13)
Consequently, the optimal (future) policy of the firm depends on the
present production capacity level and the level of the personal tax rate
of the shareholder, who owns and controls the firm under consideration.
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7.3. Valuation of the firm's policy string
The final result of the previous section with regard to the dependence
of the optimal policy string on the firm's present state K and the per-
sonal tax rate T forces us to evolve an equilibrium valuation and port-
P
folio theory. To tliat end, we firstly analyse the value of firms, con-
tinuously distributed over the range of production capacity levels KD
~ ~
to K , to investors in different tax brackets. K is determinedpmax pmax
by (1-T )dO~dK - r(1-r ) where T is the personal tax rate of in-c pmax pmax ~
vestors in the highest tax bracket. So, K is the maximum desiredpm ax
stationary production capacity level, whereas K denotes the minimum lev-
~
el necessary to enter the market. The range K~ to KPmax thus covers all
relevant values for K.
According to (7,13) the optimal (future) policy of a firm is uniquely
determined by the present production capacity level and the level of the
personal tax rate of the present shareholder. Using the objective func-
tional (7.1) this implies that the value of a firm may be expressed as a
function of only state and personal tax rate. In order to construct such
personal value functions we first consider the optimal policy string of
a particular investor. In this way, any arbitrary value of K in the
~ ~
range K~ to K (with exception for K), say k, can be uniquely at-pmax p
tached to a moment tkp of the master policy string of the investor sub-
ject to the personal tax rate T. Thereafter we are able to determine
P ,~
the personal value of the firm by substituting both tkp and Dp(T) into
expression (7.1). Because tkp corresponds to one and only one value of
K, we have finally found the value of a firm with state k to an investor
~
subject to rp: Vp(k). If K- KP all points in the range tkdp to infinity
of the master policy string of the investor subject to the personal tax
rate rp can indeed be attached, but all these points provide neverthe-
less one and the same value.




In correspondence to the above preview we start with the consideration
of the optimal policy string of one particular investor. We need two of
these master strings, one of both starting at K~ and the other at
K~ . We label these evolutions the personal master patterns. The per~pmax
sonal policy strings and corresponding master trajectories, together
constituting the master patterns, of an investor in the rp th tax brack-
et are depicted in the figures 7,3 and 7,4. With the help of these fig-
ures we are able to attach an arbitrary value of K, over the range I~
~
to K~ax, to a corresponding moment of one of the two master patterns.
The arbítrary values kl and kZ are e.g. attached to tklgp and tk2cp. In
this way we are able to determine the time lag between the start of the
stationary dividend policy and the current moment. It wíll turn out that
such a time lag is of utmost importance with regard to the determination
of the personal value of a firm. Note, that the corresponding moments
t and t not only depend on the state of the firm, but also on
klgp k2cp
the tax rate of the investor, who is valueing the firm.
Figure 7,3: personal master
trajectory of investor
in T -th tax bracket
P
starting at K~.
Figure 7.4: personal master
trajectory of inves-




Using the value expression (7,1) we obtain the personal value of a firm









V(tk cp) - J (1-Tp)Dp(T)e 2 dT if k2 ~ Kp (7.14)
p 2 T-tk c2 P
where
tklgp: corresponding point in time on the~personal master trajectory
of the T-th investor in case k( K so that K(t )- kp 1 p klgp 1
t : corresponding point in time on the personal master trajectory
k2c p ,t
of the TPth investor in case k2 ~ Kp so that K(tk cp) - k2.2
Let Vp(k) denote the value of a firm with an arbitrary production capac-
ity level k to an i nvestor in the t -th tax bracket. Because any valueP ~
of the production capacity level with exception for Kp corresponds to a
unique point of one of the master trajectories of an investor in the
rpth tax bracket, we may finally rewrite (7.14) in a more general ex-
pression.
Recalling the expression of the alternative rate of return (7.2) and
still proceeding on the assumption that ownership and control coincíde,
we now find following expressions by substituting (7.13) in (7.14):
~ -ip(tgdptkgp)
if k ~ Kp(Dp~r).e
Vp(k) -FDp~r if k - Kp (7.15)
~
(Dp~r).e lp(tcdp tkcp f
Í p(1-Tp)Dp(T)e p kcp dT if k~ Kp
T-tkc
P
t cd -i (T-t )
where
tgdp: switching point on personal master trajectory from growth into
dividend policy to investor in T-th tax bracket
P
tcdp: switching point on personal master trajectory from contraction
into dividend policy to investor in T-th tax bracket
,~ P
D : desired level of stationary dividend policy to investor in
P .~
tpth tax bracket (corresponding Kplevel: (1-tc)dO~dK - ip).
Be aware of the notion that the time lags tgdPtkgp and tcdp tkcp~ that
is, the time lags between and the current moment the start of the sta-
tionary dividend policy, are of utmost importance and may be considered
as functions of only K and T.
P ~t
We may clarify the results of (7.15) as follows. If k- K the inves-
~ P
tor will immediately start to pay out dividend at the D-level and con-
P
tinue this policy for many a long day. iJsing (7.1) and (7.2) we then
get:
~ ~
m ~ -r T (1-t )D D
I (1-TP)Dp.e p dT - (1-Tp)rp - rPT-0 p
~
If k~ K the shareholder will yield the same amount of dividend pay-
P
ments. Since the dividend distribution only starts as soon as the pro-
~
duction capacity has reached the K-level, the value of this dividend
P
stream need to be discounted according the time lag tgdptkgp.
Finally, if the present production capacity is above the desired level
the shareholder not only yields the discounted value of the constant
dividend payments, but in addition the entire dístributed profit due to
the initial contraction policy.
We have now found an expression to determine the value of a firm with
state k to an investor subject to a personal tax rate T. Substitution
~ P
of all values of k over the range K~ to K results into personal val-pmax
ue curves.
We illustrate the above result graphicly in the case of two investors,
pl and p2 respectively, subject to tax rates such that Tpl ~ Tp2 and
thus ipl ~ ip2.
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Figure 1.5: Personal value of firms with a prociuction capacity le-
vel k to investors subject to t - T and T re-pl - pmax p2
spectively.
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The K-T-plane of figure 7.5, which is comparable with the figures 7.3
and 7.4, pictures both the locations tkgl and tkcZ corresponding to a
production capacity level of k and the optimal policy of the investors.
Investor pl will pursue a maximum growth policy, whereas the second in-
vestor prefers a contraction policy in order to decrease the production
capacity. So, given state k investors may control the firm in varying
ways and, consequently, attach different values to the same firm. These
values are depicted in the V-T-plane, which is a graphical reproduction
of expression (7.14). The V-K-plane, finally, pictures the personal val-
ue curves Vp(K). We observe that Vpl exceeds Vp2 for all values of K
~
over the range KG to K 1, where the latter, for simplicity only, is as-
~
sumed to be equal to K . Generally speaking we conclude that low tax-pmax
ed investors attach lower values to a particular firm than high taxed
investors, which is mainly due to the high discount rate.
7.4. Piarket equilibrium approach
In the previous section we have shown that due to a progressive personal
income tax investors may have different opinions with regard to the fu-
ture policy and value of the firm. Given these different taxes and valu-
ations, we now explore how adjustments in the demand for shares of the
firms affect the equilibrium value and future policy string of firms. As
the problem under consideration has much in common with the problem
Gordon elaborated on [see section 4.4j, we use the corrected version of
Gordon's approach to derive the equilibrium value function of the firm
[see section 4.61.
To deal with the equilibrium problem, let us at first consider two
groups of investors: wealthy organizations such as fully tax exempt,
which are pension funds, and private investors with límited and constant
private liabilities. Similar to previous sections their private income
is taxed at rate Tp, which varies with the investors initial wealth,
whereas capital gain is tax exempt. Firms are continuously distrihuted
~
over the range of production capacity levels K~ to K . Furthermore,pmax
all firms are assumed to face the same environment and to dispose of the
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same production techniques, organization structure, etcetera, so that we
may use the model (7.6)-(7.12) to descrihe the evolution of any firm.
New firms may enter the market at level k~ and evolve according to state
equation (7.7): K - I-aK.
Refore contin~iing the analysis we define following variables:
Vm: equilibrium market value of a firm
V1: personal value of a firm to any investor i, i-{p,e}
Vp: personal value of a firm to private investors subject to tax rate
T
P
Ve: personal value of a firm to tax exempt investors.
All Vp and Ve-curves in figure 7.6 now represent the personal equilib-
rium values of firms for those investors with the indicated tax rate. if
the values of all firms are on a particular curve, say Ve, tax exempt
investors will be indifferent to which firm is in his~her portfnlio.






F~ure 7.6: personal values of firms.
K
sonal value curves in figure 7.6 provides an equilihrium set of values
for the firms. We will show, however, the existence of a V~ curve, that
makes the excess demand for shares at each production capacity level to
zero.
To that end, it ís sufficient to describe the equilibrium in case in-
vestors are subject to just two tax rates, that is, we consider tax ex-
empt investors and private investors subject to a particular tax rate
Tp, say Tpmax' Let firms be partitioned according to their production~
capacity level into two groups, that is k~ to kbp and kbp to Kpmax (see
figure 7.7).
Figure 7.7: personal and market value of firms in case of two
groups of investors subject to t- ~ and T- Tp p pmax
respectively.
The partitioning is such that the total share value of firms in the
first group is equal to the share wealth of the private investors, and
the total share value of the remaining firms is equal or less to the
share wealth of the tax exempt investors. nue to the limited liabilities
investors strive at the maximization of (Vi-Vml~Vm, which is equivalent
to the maximization of Vi~Vm. So, we use the Present Value Index, PVI,
that is introduced in subsection 4.5.1 and defined by (4.2í3). We now
clarify that, the Vmcurve provides an equilibrium. In the sketch of
figure 7.7 Ve denotes the lowest personal value and thus fixes the lower
bound of Vm. Private investors, who intend to buy shares, have to pay at
least Ve in order to buy out tax exempt investors. With goal the maxi-
mization of the rate of return Vp~Vm - Vp~Ve private investors intend to
buy shares of firms with low production capacity levels, because of the
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negative derivative of the rate of net return with respect to K(a proof
of this statement is given in appendix C). So, firms dístributed over
the range k~ to kbp are controlled by private investors subject to tax
rate r. Consequently, the net rate of return of a production capacity
P
level kbp, denoted cp, is fixed by








The constant cp has a similar meaning as the constants NPT~~25 and
NPI~~~ used in the expressions (4.33) and (4.36) of section 4.6. To pre-
vent excess demand for shares at lower production levels market value
will adjust such that Vp~Vm is constant over the range under considera-
tion; that is, an investor subject to tax rate 7 finds Vp~Vm the same
P
for all firms in the first group whereas shares in the second group will
only provide smaller values of Vp~Vm. So, the equilibrium value curve Vm
is given by:
rVp(K)~cp i f kC t K t kbp
Vm(K) - I
L Ve(K) if kb ~ K~ K~ axP Pm
(7.19)
~
Finally, the size of the intervals k~ to kbp and kbp to Kpmax adjust to
make the excess demand for shares ín each group equal to zero.
Contrary to the leverage problem Gordon (1qR2) considers, firms may
now not adopt that production capacity level, which maximizes market
value. So, firms may not instanteneously adjust their production capaci-
ty, because its evolution is determined by state equation (7.7). More-
over, we wonder whether the firm's íncentive is still to adopt that
production capacíty level that maximizes the market value, since the
market value depends on the present shareholders and adjustments of
production capacity lead to changes in the group of shareholders.
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The above described problem may, of course, be extended to more than
one private investor. The derivation of the equilibrium market value
curve will be similar to the one used above. The partitioning of the
firms into groups need to be adjusted to the number of tax groups of
private investors. The result of a problem with two groups of taxable
investors, such as illustrated in the figures 7.5 and 7,6, is depicted
in figure 7.8. We observe a succession of investors subject to decreas-
ing personal tax rates.
Figure 7,8: personal and market equilibrium value in case of one
(group of) tax exempt investor(s) and two (groups of)
taxable private investors.
7.5. Final results and conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the impact of personal taxation on the
optimal policy string of value maximizing firms and the portfolio selec-
tion of investors. We may summarize the contribution of the chapter by
following conclusions.
The optimal policy string of shareholder-controlled-companies depends on
only the state of the firm and the personal tax rate of the shareholder,
Due to the progressive personal tax rates investors attach values which
vary along their tax rates. Nevertheless, we have been able to show the
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existence of the V-curve that makes the excess demand for shares atm
each production capacity level equal to zero.
Fach investor will move into the shares and corresponding production
capacity level of those firms for which the rate of return is maximized.
Investors subject to high tax rates prefer firms at low production lev-
els in order to pursue a maximum growth policy. Consequently, new firms
enter the market at k~ on the initiative of private investors. Tax ex-
empt investors, on the contrary, absorb going companies and exert them-
selves to pursue a stationary dividend policy as soon as possible.
In case private share wealth is of minor importance, no firm will ex-
~
ceed the K-level, desired by tax exempt investors. Accordingly, thee
optimal policy of each firm consists under absense of deht of a maximum
growth policy succeeded by a stationary dividend policy. This result is
shown in figure 7.9, where khp denotes the total share wealth of all
private investors. With regard to the 'investor string' we observe a











Fi ure 7.9: optimal equilihrium policy string.-~-----
] T
Finaliy we have found a justífication of the thesis that during each
stage of their evolution firms will he controlled by investors subject
to varying tax rates, because each investor will move into the shares
and corresponding production capacity level of those firms for which his
rate of return is maximized. Consequently, in the case that all firms
start at the same initial value k~ and face the same environment, each
ínvestor's portfolío consists of the shares of firms with capital sizes





In this book we paid attention to the inclusion of progressive personal
taxation into the deterministic dynamic theory of the firm. We consider-
ed the impact of both corporate and personal taxation on three important
features of the firm: the financing, the dividend and the investment
policy. Moreover, we inserted ourselves to general,ize the dynamic theory
of the firm by exploring an equílibrium framework. F7e now summarize the
main results and findings in this concluding chapter.
The impact of both corporate and personal taxation on the optimal policy
of the firm and the behaviour of investors is still an important issue
in finance theory. The inclusion of a progressive personal tax, in par-
ticular, brings on interesting features with respect to the equilibrium
market value of a firm and the resulting phenomenon of 'tax induced cli-
enteles'. Aoth topics are considered in this book.
With regard to the equilibrium valuation theory we distinguish between a
'before tax' and an 'after tax' theory. Exploring the latter theory
Miller (1977) argued that even in a world with progressive personal tax-
ation the value of a firm could be independent of its leverage. Although
many subsequent papers accepted and clarified the thruth of Miller's
result, it was Gordon (1982) who first questioned the correctness of
Miller's hypothesis. However, in our opinion Gordon's conclusion, that
the market value of a firm is a convex function of its leverage, is not
correct. We question both the objective functional Gordon uses to obtain
an upwards slopíng market curve as well as the supply adjustment process
he describes afterwards. In our opinion Gordon on his turn failed to
disprove Ptiller's explanation of capital structure. Moreover, we show
that Gordon's approach is very usefull to prove once again the correct-
ness of the Miller leverage irrelevancy theorem.
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Personal taxes induce tax clienteles: due to its policy a firm will at-
tract investors in specific tax hrackets. In the literature on finance
theory this notion has been discussed with respect to the dividend and
financing policy of the firm. We add 'tax induced investment client-
eles': generally speaking we may say that the willingness to accept in-
vestments with a low rate of return is negatively correlated to the lev-
el of the personal tax rate. So, firms that ínvest in low return pro-
jects could only attract investors in high tax brackets. 1Jnder the as-
sumption that the operating income is a concave function of the produc-
tion capacity level, this result implies that ceteris paribus large ex-
panding firms could only attract high taxed investors.
The framework of DeAngelo and Masulis (19R~a) may fruitfully be applied
to explain the nature of dividend and financial leverage clienteles. The
existence of these phenomena, however, depend strongly on the kind of
equity claim as well as on the tax system under consideration. We show
that in the case in which firms are supplying dividend claims only, no
single investor facing the classical tax system, neither subject to per-
sonal taxation nor tax exempt, will demand a positive quantity of equity
claims. In addition to the introduction of a dividend tax shelter
[DeAngelo and Masulis (19R(1a)1 a reform of the tax system into an impu-
tation system may establish such a positive demand.
Furthermore, we explore a model in which we consider the dividend and
the financing decisions as well as the resulting clienteles simultane-
ously. Under the imputation tax system we achieve a partitioning of in-
vestors according to their personal tax rate on debt income into three
tax groups, each characterized by a preference for a certain kind of
income. F.xtremely high taxed investors always prefer capital gain
claims, whereas other investors subject to a tax rate above the level
of the corporate tax rate prefer dividend claims. The remaining inves-
tors are only willing to buy debt claims. This partitioning is only at-
tainable if the imputation factor is close to one, that is, investors
will only demand positive quantities of dividend claims, if at least the
total fraction of the corporate tax paid on dividends is allowed to be
substracted from the personal income tax.
Personal taxation has a strong impact on the optimal dynamic policy of a
value maximizing firm. We show that the optimal policy string of a
shareholder controlled firm depends on both the state of the firm as
well as on the personal tax rate of the shareholder. In the case of a
fixed finite planning horizon we obtain in particular striking differ-
ences with the results of similar dynamic problems without personal tax-
ation, viz.
- in final stages no dividend will be issued
- in some situations the firm wants to get rid of debt, even when debt
is relatively cheap
- due to the gap between the levels of the tax rates on dividend and
capital gain, it may be optimal to start expansion investments with a
net return less than the time preference rate.
Investors in low tax brackets not only prefer a high leverage strategy
and dividend income rather than capital gain, but they also like to col-
lect earnings as soon as possible, whereas investors in high tax brack-
ets are willing to postpone this collection in view of their tax advan-
tage ad low time preference rate. Moreover, firms controlled by high
taxed ínvestors, are forced to reach higher production levels than firms
controlled by low taxed investors.
A switch of tax system from the classical into the imputation system
results in a sharp rise of the market value of a firm. In addition,
firms are less forced to expand the production capacity level, that is,
to invest in projects with low rates of return. Consequently, firms may
more easily attract providers of equity.
From the sensitivity analysis, we carry out, we find a striking impact
of the corporate tax rate. A reduction of the corporate tax rate stimu-
lates enterpreneur's activities and raises the profit, the stationary
production capacity level and thus the value of the firm. In addition,
such a reduction may cause a policy switch of the firm into a low lever-
age strategy, that is, a low corporate tax rate favours the providers of
equity.
]h4
In the situation of two differently taxed investors, the optimal policy
string of a shareholder controlled firm, facing an infinite planning
horizon, always ends up with a stationary dividend policy pursued by the
investor subject to the lowest personal tax rate. Investors subject to
high personal tax rates will sell the shares of the firm as soon as the
amount of capital goods has reached such a level that the low taxed in-
vestor will pay out a constant amount of dividend.
In the case of many shareholder controlled firms and many differently
taxed and budget constrained investors, we show the existence of an
equilibrium value function that makes the excess demand for shares at
each production capacity level equal to zero. Since each investor will
move into the shares and corresponding production capacity level of
those firms for which the rate of return is maximized, it turns out that
investors subject to high tax rates prefer the stock of firms at low
production capacity levels in order to pursue a maximum growth policy.
Consequently, new firms enter the market at the initial production ca-
pacity level on the initiative of private ínvestors, whereas tax exempt
investors, such as pension funds, absorb the going companies and exert
themselves to pursue a stationary dividend policy as soon as possible.
In case private share wealth is of limited and minor importance, the
optimal level of firms is determined by tax exempt investors.
During its evolution a firm will be succesively controlled by investors
subject to varying, that is, in the course of time declining, tax rates.
Consequently, each investor's portfolio consists of the shares of firms
with capital sizes comprised within a narrow range of levels.
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APPENDIX A1
THE SOLUTION OF THE OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEMS
FORMULATF.D IN THE CHAPTERS TWO AND FIVE
In this appendix we derive the optimal solution of the problem, that is
formulated in chapter five jeqs. (5.7)-(5.13)1. Since the basic problem
of chapter two is a special case of the more general problem formulated
in chapter five (that is Td - zr - T - 0) we consider only the latter
g
one.
In order to simplify the solution procedure, we wíll first eliminate the
variable Y(T). We, therefore, substítute (5.10)
Y - K - X (A.1)
into (5.7) -(5.13) and thus obtain the following optimal control model:
z
max {(1-Td) f D(T)e iTdT f( 1-Tg)X(z)e-iz}
T-0
subjec[ to x-(1-r~)fn(K) - r(K-X)1 - D
X((1) - X~ ~ 0
K - I - aK
K((1) - k~ ~ ~
K - X ~ 0






D ) (1 (A.7)
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I ~ 0 (A.R)
X ) 0 (A.9)
We assume the conditions (5.2) and (5.6) to be valid.
(5.2): i ~ (1-t )rc
(5.6): if K(T) - 0 then (1-t }d~-~ max {i, (1-T )}c dK c
As a negative value of X will not satisfy the constraints (A.5) and
(A.6) simultaneously, constraint (A.9) is thus superfluous. Therefore,
we will leave it out.
Since the control variables D and I appear linear in the above formu-
lation of the problem and have no upperbound in addition, jumps in the
state variables may occur. One way to avoid such jumps is to restrict
the control region by putting artificial boundaries to dividend and in-
vestment. However, due to the linearity of the model with respect to
both the control variables, we obtain either singular or corner solu-
tions. So, omitting the artificial boundaries implies the allowance of
instantaneous adjustments to the optimal level, that in fact may occur
at the initial moment. At other moments, such an adjustment is not feas-
ible because of the financial restrictions. The above is in line with
the proposition of Arrow and Rurz, that gives an indicatíon that with
our model formulation and assumptions a jump will never be optimal ex-
cept possibly at the initial time point (Arrow and Rurz (197~), p. 57].
So, in addition to the proposition to consider only continuous solu-
tions, the above provides an argument to omit the boundaries on the con-
trol variables with exception of the lower bound on dividend.
The constraints (A.5) and (A.6) are pure state constraints. In gener-
al, it may, therefore, happen that the corresponding co-state variables
will be discontinuous in the entry or exit points of the boundary ares
of such a state constraint, that is, in the points in which the state
constraint becomes active respectively inactive. To avoid such discon-
tínuities we could apply the maximum prínciple designed by Russak (197f1)
[see also Van Loon (19R3), pp. 1~7-113]. Geerts (19R5), however, showed
that with our assumptíons the co-state variables in our model formula-
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tion will be continuous. In particular, he has proved the following even
more general theorem [Geerts (19R5), p. 1551;
Theorem
Given an optimal control problem with two control variables, that appear
linearly and two state constraints, of whích at most one of them active
at any time, then the co-state variables, in the formulation of the ne-
cessary conditions for optimality given by Jacobson, Lele and Speyer
(1971), are continuous in the entry point if
- at least one of the optimal controls in not one of its boundaries,
neither during the time interval that the state constraint is active,
nor just before the entry point;
or if
- in case that each optimal control, that is not on one of its boundar-
ies during the time interval that the state constraint is active, is
on one of its boundaries just before the entry point and, in addition,
at least one optimal control variable is discontinuous in the entry
point.
Remarks:
- this theorem is also valid in the exit point of a state cons[raint;
- the theorem may just as well be stated in the case of more than two
state constraints.
In this way Geerts' (19R5) result is a contribution to the existing the-
ory on this topic, which mostly concerned with only one state constraint
[see e.g. Hartl (19A4)] or which requires e.g. regularity of the Hamil-
tonian function [see Feichtinger and Hartl (19R6)1. In our situation the
necessary conditions of Jacobson, Lele and Speyer thus coincide with the
maximum principle of Pontryagin et. al (1962) by using the 'direct ad-
joining approach'.
1FR
Let the Hamiltonian be
H - (1-Td)De-iT f ~lÍ(1-TC)(D(K)-rKtrX)-D1 t ~y2(I-aKl
and let the Langrangian or extended Hamiltonian be




~j: adjoint variables or co-state variables which denote the marginal
contribution of the j-th level state variable to the performance
level
dynamic Lagrange multipliers representing the dynamic 'shadow
price' or 'opportunity costs` of the s-th restriction.
For an optimal control history {D~,I~} of the problem formulated by~ ~
(A.2) through (A.9) with a resulting state trajectory {K ,X }, it is
necessary that there are functions ~j(T) and as(T) such that
~ ~ ~ ~
Hoptimal '- H(K ,X ,D ,I ,~j,T)
- max {H(K~,X~,D,I,y~j,T)} for all T, fl t T t z
D,I
Except at points of discontinuity of (D~,I~) we thus have:
optimality of control
aD - (1-Td)e-iT
- ~1 f a3 - n
aL
8I - ~2 - D
Euler-Lagrange equations
-~1 - ~Vl(1-TC)r f (lfh)a~ - al
-~2 -







V~ (z) ~ aS(K,X,z) - e-iz(1-t )1 ax g
~V (z) - as(K'x'Z) - o2 aK
where












~~(T) are continuous with piecewise continuous derivatives (A.21)
as(T) are nonnegative and continuous on intervals of
continuity of (D,I) (A.22)
From these conditions we derive that ~1(T) is a continuous function if
and only if a3(T) is continuous. As ~y2(T) always equals zero, it is also
continuous (see expressions (A.12), (A.13) and (A.27)).
For the sake of convenience we further derive from (A.13) and (A.15)
~1(1-rc)(dO~dK - r) - a2 f ~1 - 0
This result will be used later on.
(A.23)
We now apply the iterative policy-connecting procedure designed by Van
Loon (1983, pp. 115-117) in order to transform the set of necessary con-
ditions into a solutions which covers the optimal policy of the firm
over the whole planning period. This procedure consists of four steps.
step 1: Aased on the complemen[ary slackness conditions (A.18)-(A.2~) we
may discern 23 - 8 different policies, each characterized by
active and inactive states of the restrictions. This number will
be reduced, however, to five by assumptions (2.31) and (2.32),
or, equivalently, (5.2) and (5.6). The properties of these pol-
icies are summarized in table 2.1.
steP 2: The second step is the selection of those policies that may be a
final policy, that is, policies feasible at T- z. A feasible
final policy satisfies the transversality conditions (A.16) and
(A.17). Using the features of the policies we derive conditions
as presented in table 5.2. From this table we easily observe
that in case we consider the basic problem, that is, the problem
without personal taxation, only the policies 4 and 5 satisfy all
the conditions necessary to be a final policy.
step 3: To couple a feasible preceding policy with a final policy we use
the continuity properties of relevant variables. Therefore we
test each policy whether coupling with the final policy will or
will not violate the (necessary) continuity properties of the
state variables K and X and the co-state variables ~yl and ~2. If
the set of feasible preceding policies appears to be empty, then
the relevant final policy is the description of the optímal tra-
jectory of the firm for the whole planning period, supposing
that the initial state constraints mentioned in (A.3) and (A.4)
are fulfilled (step 4). If the set is not empty we apply the
testing procedure again. In this way we find a still longer
string of policies constituting an optimal policy string.
step 4: If the set of feasible preceding policies is empty we stop the
iterative procedure of step 3 and, finally, check whether the
initial state constraints mentioned in (A.3) and (A.4) are ful-
filled. In the case that the answer to this question is posi-
tive, we have found an optimal policy string; in the other case
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we have to start the procedure once again with another final
policy.
We now apply the above descrihed procedure on the prohlem under consid-
eration. We will illustrate the procedure by means of examples only,
because the derivations are both quite straight forward as well as sim-
ilar to those presented in other publications j see e.g. Van Loon (19R3)
and Van Schijndel (1986)].
step 1: feasible and infeasible policies
Rased on the complementary slackness conditions we may now discern eight
different policies. The next three are infeasible, however.
a. infeasibility of al - ~2 - ~3 - ~~
From (A.12) we get ~1(T) -(1-id)e-iT and so -~1 - i(1-Td)e-iT. Sub-
stitution of this result into (A.14) gives i-(1-r )r, which is ex-c
cluded by assumption (5.2).
b. infeasibility of al ~ ~' ~2 ~ ~' ~3 - ~~
al ~ ~ a K- X
i K - X - fl
a2 ~ 0 i (1~-h)X - K
The addition sum of (A.14) and (A.15) gives
-~1 - ha2 f ~1(1-TC)d(IIdK
From (A.12) we once again get ~1 - i~l, which results in:
iV~l - ~41(1-tc)dO~dK -~- ha2
As hJ~2 ~ (1 this implies (1-TC)d(1~dK ~ i, which is excluded by assump-
tion (5.6).
c. infeasibility of al ~(1, a2 ~ 0, a3 ~ 0.
In addition to the previous case we get the next result:
a3~ OaD-~
so that
K- X- I- D- 0,
So, the firm i s in a stationary state with initial value X(t~) - ~.
This state is infeasible, however, because
- no feasible evolution exists that ends up with a zero amount of
equity;
- the above state does not satisfy the initial state constraints men-
tíoned in (A.3) and (A.4), so that this state can not be an initial
state as well.
The five remaining policies are feasible and have the characteristic
features that are presented in table 2.1 and which we derive now.
Policy 1: al - (1, a2 ~ ~, a,l ~ 0
f rom (A.lA): al - ~: K) X
from (A.19) : J~2 ~ 0: K - (1-~h)X
from (A.20): 13 ~ (1: D - ~
from (A.23): ~yl(1-TC)(d(1~dK-r)-a2-0
from (A.12): ~1-(1-Td)e-iT t a3 ~ 0
df1~dK ~ r
from (A.3) : X-(1-TC)(0(K) - 1}h rK). As 0(K) is
a concave function of K and d~~dK ~ r
this implies~0(K) ~ rK.~ 1}h rK and











Policy 2: al - a2 - 0, a3 ~ 0.
from (A.18): al - 0 i K~ X
from (A.19): a2 - 0-~ K c(lth)X
from (A.20): a3 ~ 0 i D- 0
from (A.23): ~1(1-tc)(dO~dK - r) - 0





from (A.12): ~1 - (1-Td)e-iTta3 ~ 0
; dO~dK - r
2
differentiating (A.23) gives d2 K- 0 and
so: I - aK
dK
from (A.3) : X - (1-tc)[0(K) - r(K-X))
As 0(K) is a concave function of K and
dO~dK - r, this implies 0(K) ~ dO~dK K-
rK and therefore X~(1-T )rX ~ 0.. . c
Since K- 0 i Y C 0.
Policy 3: al ~ 0, a2 - 0, a3 ~ 0
from (A.18): J11 ~ 0 i K- X
from (A.19): ~2 - 0 ; K ~ (lth)X
from (A.20): a3 ~ 0 a D- 0
from (A.23): ~1(1-tc)(dO~dK-r)ta1-0
from (A.12): ~1 - (1-Td)e-iTfa3 ~ 0














from (A.3) : X-(1-TC)0(K) ~ 0 I K and X are
increasing
Policy 4: al ~ 0, a2 - 0, a3 - 0
from ( A.18): al ~ 0 i K- X
from (A.19) : a2 -(1 i K C( lfh)X
from (A.2~): a3 -(1 i D~ ~
from (A.14) f (A.15): -~1 - y~l(1-rc)dO~dK
from (A.12) : ~1 - ( 1-Td)e iT and thus
-~1 - i~l which imnlies
(1-t )dO~dK - ic
from (A.14) f(A.15) and ( A.12) we get
2 .
~yl(1-TC)d2 K- 0 i K- 0
dK
from (A.14): -~1 - ~yl(1-TC)r - al or
iV~l -~U1(1-TC)r - al i i ~ (1-tc)r
Policy 5: al -(1, a2 ~ ~, a,l - 0
from (A.18): al -(1 a K~ X
from (A.19): a2 ~ 0 a K-(lfh)X
from (A.2(1): a,l - (1 a n ~ (1
from fl-~h)~(A.14) f (A.151: -~1-~1(1-TC)Í(lfh)áK - hrl
from ( A.12): ~1 -(1-Td)e iT and thus - ~1 - i~l,
which implies
(1-ic)dO~dK - lfh i } ]fh (1-ic)r



















from (A.14): -~1 - y~l(1-rc)r t a2 or
iV~l - V~1(1-tc)r t a2 a i~ (1-tc)r
step 2: final policies
only feasible
if i ~ (1-t )rc
A feasible final policy satisfies the transversality conditions (A.16)
and (A.17). Due to (A.13) the condition (A.17) will always hold. Substi-
tution of (A.16) into the first order condition (A.12) gives at T-z:
(1-Td)e iz - (1-Tg)e-iz } a3(z) - 0
or




This expression points out that under different personal taxes a diví-
dend policy [a3 - 0] can never be an optimal final policy. On the other
hand, under absence of personal taxation a3(z) - ~ holds, so that the
amount of distributed dividend may be positive.
A policy may be a final policy if it satisfies (A.25). Because
~3(tex) - ~~ this condition is equivalent with
z
a3(z) - J ~3(T) dT
T- tex
where
tex: exit point of dividend policy.







iJsing (A.14), ( A.15) and the expression of the marginal return on equity
(5.16), this expression i s equivalent with
a3(z) - Í [-~1(T)RX(T) f i(1-Td)e-iT]dT
T-tex





which needs to equal the derivative of (A.26) with respect to z. Hence,
dt z
-ia3(z) - ~3(texr dz } x3(z)
f J [dx3(T)Idz]dT
T-tex
- ~1(tex)i - i(1-rd)e
iteX -





- i(1-zd)e-iteX - (1-Tg)e izR (z)
f i(1-Td)e-iz - ia3(z)
Hence,







Using the properties of the policies, we get
policy property final policy if
1 RX ~ (1-TC)r 1 C(1-Tg)I(1-Td) ~ iI(1-TC)r
2 RX - (1-TC)r (1-Tg)I(1-Td) - iI(1-TC)r
3 RX ~ (1-TC)r (1-Tg)I(1-Td) ~ iI(1-rc)r
4 RX - i (1-Tg)I(1-Td) - I
5 RX - i (1-Tg)I(I-Td) - 1
step 3: coupling of feasible policies to master policy strings
We consider two master policy strings, both ending up with policy 3,
that according to table 5.2 can be a final policy if
i ~ (1-TC)r and (1-Tg)I(1-Td) ~ 1
or
i ~ (1-TC)r and (1-Tg)I(1-Td) ~ iI(1-TC)r.
Which policy can precede policy 3? To give an answer to this question we
will concentrate on the continuity properties of the state and co-state
variables. We wíll denote the coupling moment between the policies a and
b by tab and the left hand side limit of a variable by an arrow to the
right. So,
i
K(tab) - lim K(T)
T4t ab
which is the final value of K at the state described by policy a.
policy 1 i policy 3
K and X can not be símultaneously continuous, because
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i a
K(t13) - (lfh)X(t13), h ~ ~
F t
K(t13) - X(t13)
policy 2 -~ policy 3
Recause the same expression for ~1 will hold under both policy 2 and
policy 3, ~1 can be continuous (see (A.12)].
i i i i




So, K and X can be simultaneously continuous if K(t23) - X(t23).




K(t23) ~ K~ and K~ ~ under policy 3.
Later on it will turn out that this combination of policies with policy
3 as a final policy, will only be feasible if i~(1-TC)r, since policy
5 will be one of the precessors.
policy 4 t policy 3
Under both the policies the firm's assets are financed by equity only.







K can thus be continuous if KX ~ KYX, that is, if i~ (1-TC)r.
Furthermore we have to check the continuity of the co-state variable
~1'
-. -it43






So, ~yl is continuous if a3(t43) - 0, that is, if ~3 ~ 0 when a3 - fl un-
der policy 3. From (A.12) we derive with the use of (A.14) and (A.23)
that
x3 - ~1 f i(1-td)e-it43
- -~a3 f (1-rd)e it43)(1-TC)dK } i(1-td)e-it43
~
So, if i~(1-ic) dO~dK, that is, if K(T) ~ KX under policy 3, the above
expression is positive and ~1 can therefore be contínuous.
Policy 5 i policy 3
K and X can not be simultaneously continuous, because
i a f t
K(t53) - (lth)R(t53) and K(t53) - X(t53
Moreover, even K single can not be continuous, because
i ~ f ~
K(t53) - KY and K(t53) ~ KYX.
~ ~
Continuity of K requires KYX ~ KY, or, equivalently,
1 h(1-tc)r ~ lth i } lfh (1-TC)r
ian
which is only possible when i ~(1-TC)r. However, policy 5 is only feas-
ible if i~(1-T )r, so that the above inequality will not hold and Kc
will be discontinuous.
When we summarize the above described results, we get:










if i ~ (1-T )rc
if i ~ (1-t )r
c
X discontinuous
So, we have to distinguish two cases. However, we only survey the re-
sults of these remaining analyses.
a. The case i~(1-TC)r and (1-Tg)~(1-Td) ~ i(1-TC)r










only feasible if i ~(1-t )rc
K discontinuous










K and X not simultaneously continuous
only feasible if i ~(1-t )rc











only feasible if i ~(1-TC)r
isi
b. The case i ~(1-tc)r and (1-zg)~(1-Td) ~ 1.











only feasible if i ~ (1-T )rc









K and X not simultaneously continuous
K discontinuous
only feasible if i ~ (1-r )rc











only feasíble if i ~ (1-t )rc
Summarizing the above tables we get the next optimal master policy
strings under personal taxation:
if i ~ (1-TC)r and (1-tg)~(1-id) ~ 1:
policy 1 a policy 2 i policy 3 i policy 4~ policy 3
if i ~ (1-rc)r and (1-rg)~(1-Td) ~ i~(1-TC)r:
policy 1 i policy 5~ policy 1~ policy 2 a policy 3
In absense of personal taxation we get a subset of the above strings,
viz. [see also table 5.2 for the selection of the final policy)
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if i ~ (1-rc)r:
policy 1 a policy 2 a policy 3 i policy 4
if i ~ (1-TC)r:
policy 1 ~ policy S
1R3
APPENDIX A2
DERIVATION OF A PARTICULAR EXPRF.SSION IN CHAPTER FIVE
In this appendix we prove the similarity of the expressions (5.19) and
(5.20) of chapter five by means of the necessary conditions for an op-
timal solution. To that end, we firstly recall expression (5.19):
~
~
(1-tdi)e eXax(tex) - (1-tgi)e izaX(z)
where
~
tex: the optimal exit point of the stationary dividend stage.





Substitution of the corresponding values of ~1(teX) and ~1(z) gives the
above statement.
Expression (5.20) also points out a relation between the revenues at~
T- t and T- z:
ex
~
(1-tdi)e-iteX - (1-tgi)e-iz.exp( J ~ Rx(T)dT)
T-tex
(A.35)
This statement can be proved by solving the differential equations for
~1'
To that end we recall the expressions (A.14) and (A.15). iJsing (A.13)
we get:
(A.14) f (A.15) : -~1 - V~1(1-tc)dO~dK f ha2
(A.36)
(A.14) f (lfh)~(A.15): -~,1 - ,yl(1-tc)[dO~dK(lth) - hr] t hal
1RL
Using the features of the policies as described in Appendix A1 and the
expressions for the marginal return to equity, that is
al - 0, aZ ~ ~ ~ Y- hX RX -(1-ic)(dOIdK(lfh)-hr)
al - 0, a2 - 0 i 0 ~ Y ~ hX RX -(1-TC)r -(1-tc)d(1~dK
al ~ 0, a? - ~ ~ Y-(1 RX -(1-TC)d~~dK
we may write
-~1 - ~1 7C
Solving this differential equation we get
~ Z
~1(tex) - exp( f ~ RXdT).exp(c)T-tex
(A.37)
(A.38)
After determining exp(c) by means of the transversality condition (A.16)
we get
~1(tex) - ( 1-tgi)e-iz
eXp( r ~ RX(T)dT)
T-J tex
(A.39)
From (A.17) we derive that on the stationary dividend stage it holds
that
V~1(T) - (1-Tdi)e-iT
and thus we p,et
lA.4n)
~




DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL SWITCHING POINT
Let us firstly rewrite the model as described in section 6.2 by elimina-
ting the control variable Y.
t -i T -i t
max{(1-idl) f D1(T)e 1 dT f(1-tgl)e 1 Vm(t)
T-0
(R.1)
subject to Vm - 12Vm - D2 (A.2)
Vm(~) - Vm0
X - (1-tc)(0(K) - r(K-X)) - D1
X(0) - x0
K- I-aK
K(0) - 1c0 ~ 0












In order to determine the optimal end point t of the above problem, we
need only the Hamiltonian and the transversality conditions.
Let the Hamiltonian be
-i T
H - (1-Tdl)Dle 1 ~- ~V~[i2~mD2) t ~41[(1-tc)(H(K)-rKfrX)-D1
t ~2[I-aKj








Ide now use the usual condition to derive the optimal end-point fsee e.g.
Feichtinger ~ Hartl (1986)]:
~
t - 0
if H(t~) {~} - át then {H C t~ ~ t}
t - t
where
S: the salvage value of the objective functional.
Substitution of the above results yields:
(R.15)
-ilt -ilt ~ -ilt
(1-Tdl)nl(t)e f (1-Tgl)e [í2Vm(t)-n2(t)~ {~} il(1-Tgl)Vm(t)e
or
e i1tÍ(1-Tdl)D1(t) - (1-T~1)n~(t) f (i2-il)(1-Tgl)Vm(t)1 {~} fl
which is after substitution of (6.14) similar to (6.3).
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APPENDIX R2
SOLUTION OF THE OPTIMAL CONTROL PRORLEM
FORMULATF.D IN CHAPTER SIX
In this appendix we derive the optimal solution of the problem described
by the expressions (6.30) through (6.41) in chapter six.
Firstly, we present the necessary conditions for an optimal solution
by means of a method that strongly resembles Pontryagin's Maximum Princ-
iple. According to the theorem of Geerts (19R5) [see appendix A1] we may
use the direct adjoining approach. In line with the argumentation used
in appendix A1, we omit the artificial boundaries on the control vari-
ables.
Secondly, we apply Van Loon's iterative policy connecting procedure in
order to obtain optimal policy strings.
Since the derivation of this solution has much in common with the one
presented in the appendix A1, it suffices to give only the main expres-
sions and lines.
Let the Hamiltonian be
-i T -i T' -i (T-T')
H- S(1-Tdl)Dle 1 f(1-S)(1-tgl)e 1 D2e Z
t y~l[(1-TC)(0(K)-r(K-X))-D1-D2]





L- H t a1D1 t a2D2 t a3I1 t a4I2 t as(K-X) t a6[(lth)X-K1
t a7S t aR(1-S)
- ~Yl t a2 - 0
For an optimal control history of the problem formulated by (6.30)
through (6.41) with a resulting state trajectory, it is necessary that
there are co-state variables ~~(T) and Langrange parameters as(T) such
that
Hoptimal - max H
(B.1R)
(R.19)
Except at points of discontinuity of (D~, D~, I~, I~, S~) we thus get:1 2 1 2
-i T













3L -i1T -i1T' -12(T-T')
3S - (1-Tdl)Dle - (1-Tgl)e D2e t ~3
t a7 - aR - 0
-~1 - ~1(1-TC)r - a5 t a6(lth)
-~2 -'Y1(1-ic)(~K - r) - a~y2 t a5 - a6
(i -i )T' -i T
-~3 - (i~-il)e 2 1 e 2 (1-S)D2







~`311 - 0 a4I2 - D (B.29)
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Tim
lim ~2(T)K(T) - 0
T~




~j(T) are continuous with piecewise continuous derivatives










1. Note that due to the positive initial value of K, the state equation
of K and the upperbound on debt, that is, the expressions (6.34),
(6.33) and (6.38) of chapter six respectively, it holds that both K
and X are always positive, so that the transversality conditions
(6.36) and (6.37) may be simplified.
2. If one particular investor is the owner of all the firm's shares,
then the control D~ of the other investor will be equal to zero.
example: Let S(T) - 1, and so a7 - 0 and aB ) D. Substitution of
S(T) - 1 in (B.21) gives
V~1(T) - a2(T)
Substitution in (B.2f1) gives
-i T




From (B.37) and (B.38) we get a2 ~ 0 and thus D2(T) - 0.
3. This derivation starts with investor 1 as initial investor and deci-
sion maker. Analogous we may consider the problem with investor 2 as
initial decision maker.
We now apply the policy connecting procedure designed by Van Loon
(1983), whích consists of four steps as described in the appendix A1.
The policies we derive in the first step are almost similar to those
derived in the appendix A1. In addition, however, we have to consider
contraction policies as described in chapter six. So, an investor j has
to his disposal the síx policies that are indicated in table 6.3.
In the second step we check which policy may be a feasible final pol-
icy. Using the modified versions of the transversality condition (B.32)
and the optimality conditions (B.20) and (B.21) it turns out that the
final policy is always a divídend policy, pursued either by investor 1
or 2. That is,
-i T
lim [S(T)(1-Tdl)e 1-~1(T) -I- al(T)] - 0 if lim al(T) - 0
T-rm T-im
(i -i )T' -i T
lim [(1-S(T))(1-rgl)e 2 1 e 2-~U1(T) f a2(T)J - 0
Tt~




Only policies with al - 0 or a2 - 0 satisfy these conditions, which im-
plies that a dividend policy will be final policy.
In the case that the final policy is pursued by investor 1, we get the
next results:
Because no switch of investor occurs it holds that S(T) - 1 for all
feasible T, which implies:
(B.27): -,~3 - 0
(B.34): lim ~3(T) - 0, because T'(T) - T~ 0
Tt~
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Hence, ~3(T) - 0 for all feasible T.
In the case that the final dividend polícy is pursued by investor 2, it
holds that
(i2-i11T' -12T
(R.74): ~3 - (1-tgl)D2e e - ~y
(i -i )T' -i T
(R.27): -~3 -(i2-il)e
2 1 e 2 D2 ~ fl
(R.34): lim ~3(T) - 0 if T'(T) ~ 0
T-~
The transversality condition (B.34) may be fulfilled if ~3(T) ~ 0 at the
final dividend policy. (B.42)
Step 3 connects the feasible policies to optimal policy strings. To that
end we use the continuity properties of relevant variables. We mostly
summarize the findings in tables only, hecause the analysis is quite
straight on.
We have to consider six cases, which are summarized in the next table.
case condition final policy a property
a i2 ~ il ~(1-tc)r 5,1
~ ~
KY? ~ KY1
b i2 ~(1-ic)r ~ il 4.1 Ky2 ~ KyXl ~ KX1
c i2 ~(1-zc)r ~ il 4.1
~ ~
KX2 ~ K~C1
d i2 ~ il ~(1-tc)r 5.2 KY~ ~ KYI
e i2 ~(1-tc)r ~ il 5.2
~ ~ ~
KY2 ~ KYX1 ~ KXI







(1-TC) dK ~ - i~~ (1-ic) dK - (1-TC)r and
~
d0(K ) i .
(1-TC) dKY - ifh } lfh (1-TC)r
a) Final policy: stationary dividend with maximum debt in the case
12 ~ il ~ ( 1-TC)r.






K and ~,1 discontínuous
K and ~r3 discontinuous















K and y~,l discontinuous
K and ~3 discontinuous
only feasible if i2 ~(1-TC)r
K discontinuous
~1 discontinuous
If we repeat the same procedure once again, we find no feasible pol-
icy that can precede the above string. We now apply the fourth step
of the iterative procedure: under which conditions may the initial
state constraints be satisfied? We find the next results:
~t
K(~) - KY1: stationary dividend policy 5.1
~
K((1) ~ KY1: contraction policy 6.1 i stationary dividend policy S.1
b) Final policy: stationary dividend without debt pursued by investor 1
in the case i2 ~(1-TC)r ~ il.
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Analogous to case a) we find only a contraction policy pursued by
investor 1 as a feasible and thus optimal preceding policy of the
stationary dividend policy. Since il ~(1-TC)r both the contraction
and the dividend policy are financed by equity only. The following
strings also satisfies the initial state constraints of step 4:
~
if K(0) - KX1: stationary dividend policy 4.1
~
if K(0) ~ KX1: contraction policy 6.1 i stationary dividend policy
4.1
c) Final policy: stationary dividend policy 4.1 without debt in the case
il ~(1-TC)r, i2 ~(1-TC)r, il ~ i2.
The results of this case are similar to that of the previous one, to
which we for convenience sake refer.
d) Final policy: stationary dividend policy 5.2 with debt in the case
i2 ~ il ~ ( 1-TC)r.
























K and X not continuous simultaneously
only feasible if il ~(1-tc)r
K and ~1 discontinuous
~1 discontinuous
~3 discontinuous
K and ~3 discontinuous
K-X and ~3 discontinuous
only feasible if i2 C(1-tc)r
We illustrate the above selection by means of two examples. We denote
the coupling (or switching) point by t.
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The string policy 1.1 t policy 5.2
a -i t a




~1 may be continuous since C ~(1-Tgl)e -(1-tdl)e - al(t).
Continuity of ~2 i s no problem, because a3 -~4 - C~a i
Continuity of ~ (t): ~ (t) - a (t) ~ C3 t3 A -i t t
~3(t) -(1-Tgl)e 1 D2 - ay(t) ~ 0 due to (A.42)
So, the continuity of all the co-state variables is possible.
String policy 1.2 i policy 5.2
i a
Continuity of ~3(t): ~~(t) - -ay c C
f (i2-il)T' -i1T t
~3(t) - (1-igl)e e D2 - ay(t) ~ C
Hence, ~3 will not he continuous, so that this coupling is not pos-
sible.
We can show in a similar way that no policy can precede the two
strings we found above. So, we get the next strings, that also satis-
fy the initial state constraints:
~
if K(0) ~ KY2: contraction policy 6.2 i stationary dividend policy
5.2
~
if K(~) - KY2: stationary dividend policy 5.2
~
if K(~) ~ KY2: growth policy with debt 1.1 i stationary dividend
policy 5.2
195
e) Final policy: stationary dividend polícy 5.2 with debt in the case
il ~ (1-TC)r ~ i2.
The results of this case are similar to those of the previous one, to
which we for convenience sake refer.
f) Final policy: stationary dividend policy 4.2 without debt i n the case
il ~(1-ic)r, 32 C(1-tc)r and il ~ i2.

























K and ~1 discontinuous
only feasible if il ~ ( 1-rc)r
~1 discontinuous
K and ~3 discontinuous
K and ~3 discontinuous
~3 discontinuous
only feasible if 12 ~(1-TC)r
So, we have two substrings:
fl: policy 3.1 ~ policy 4.2
f2: policy 6.2 i policy 4.2
ad fl: selection of policies preceding policy 3.1 ~ policy 4.2
Because we know the switch-point, only policies pursued by investor
1 can precede this string (otherwise ~3 will be discontinuous). So,
we may apply the analysis of appendix A1, which results in:
growth policy 1.1 with debt ~ redemption of debt 2.1 i
growth policy 3.1 without debt i stationary dividend 4.2
19F
ad f2: selection of policies preceding policy 6.2 ~ policy 4.2
We find no policy that may precede this string.
Summarizing and combining the above findings we get the results that
are presented in the final part of section 6.3.
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APPENDIX R3
A PARETO SOLUTION OF A DIFFERENTIAL ~AME
In this appendix we look for candidates for a Pareto soliition of the
model presented in chapter six by the expressions (6.42) through (6.47).
We solve the related optimal control model of maximizing V1fV2 under the
assumptions: i- il - i2 and tdl ~ t - td2~g
[de simplify the model by defining A(T) :- S2(T) - S1(T) and by elímin-
ating the variable Y(T). For the sake of convenience we present the
problem in its full length.
maximize { f D(T)[(1-tdl)Z1 t (1-td2)(1-Z1)]e-iTdT
T-~
f [X(z) - t (X(z)-X(0))le-izlg J
Sub~ect to x-(1-t )[n(K) - r(K-x)] - nc
X(0) - x~ ~ 0
K - I - aK
K(0) - k0 ~ 0
Z1 - A
Z1(0) - z10 and z10 ~ 1
D ~ 0
I ~ 0









(lfh)X - K ~ 0
A - A ~ 0max
A - Amin ~ D




Due to (B.45), (A.4A) and (R.50) the state constraints X~(1 and K~ 0
are always satisfied, so we omit them.
Formulating the problem in this way we have to solve an optimal con-
trol problem. The procedure, we apply, is once again similar to that of
appendix A1: firstly we derive the necessary conditions for an optimal
solution and thereafter we apply the iterative policy-connecting proce-
dure designed by Van Loon. Moreover, we use the direct adjoining ap-
proach and omit artificial upper bounds on the control variables D(T)
and I(T).
Let the Hamiltonian be
H - [(1-Tdl)DZ1 f (1-id2)D(1-Z1)le-iT
}
y~lf(1-tc)(0(K) - r(K-X)) - Dl f
~Z[I - aKl }
~y3A
and the Lagrangian
L- H f a1D f a2I f a3[K-X] f a4[(1-h)X-K1 f
~5[Amax A~ }~h[A-Amin~ f ayZl t aR[1-Z1~
(B.53)
(R.54)
For an optimal control history of the prohlem formulated by (R.43)
through (R.51) with resulting state trajectory, it is necessary that
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there are co-state variables y~~(T) and Lagrange parameters ~s(T) such
that
Hoptimal ' maximum H
D,I,A
Except at points of díscontinuity of (D~,I~,A~) we have:
2D - I(1-rdl)Z1 f(1-Td2)(1-Z1))e-iT




-~yl - ~Y1(1-TC)r - a3 f a4(lfh)
-~2 -~1(1-tc)(áK - r) - a~y2 f a3 - a4













y~~(T) are continuous with piecewise continuous derivatives (B.65)
a(T) are nonnegative and continuous on intervals of continuitys
of {D,I,A}
and, in addition, the usual complementary slackness conditions.
(B.66)
According [o the derivations of chapters two and five, we have to dis-
tinghuish two cases:
a) i~(1-t )r and b) i~(1-T )rc c
~nn
Recause the derivatíons of both cases run in the same way, we consider
only the former one and leave the derivation of the latter one to the
reader. As stated before, we apply an iterative solution procedure, that
consists of four steps.
step 1: The disposable policies are the same as used until now in this
book. However, because each policy may be pursued by either in-
vestor 1 or investor 2, or even by both investors together, we
will summarize the policies with its features and labels in the
next table.
investor(s) 1 2 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2
Z1 1 0 -F } f t
Z 0 0 0 - - f
1
A 0 0 0 - ~min -
growth with debt 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.12 1.12m 1.21
redemption 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.12 2.12m 2.21
growth without debt 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.12 3.12m 3.21
dividend without debt 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.12 4.12m 4.21
dividend with debt 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.12 5.12m 5.21
contractíon 6.1 6.2 6.0 6.12 6.12m 6.21
step 2: We select the candidates for a final policy by substituting the
transversality conditions (A.62)-(R.64) into the first order
conditions (B.56)-(R.SR):
f(1-tdl)Z1 t (1-Td2)(1-Z11]e-iz - (1-Tg)e-iz } ~1(z) - 0 (B.67)
a2(z) - 0
-a5(z) -F a6(z) - 0





} al(z) - 0 (R.70)
Because a5 - a6 ~ 0 implies that A is on its lower and upper
bound at one and the same moment, which is impossible, a final
policy need to satisfy the following conditions:
~ Z1(z) - 0 and al(z) - 0 or (B.71)
Z1(z) ~ 0 and al(z) ~ 0 (B.72)
~ a2(z) - 0 a I(z) ) 0 (R.73)
~~5(z) -~6(z) - 0 i Amin ~ A ~ Amax (B.74)
We are able to eliminate many policies by means of these condi-
tions.
~ Because we consider only the case i~(1-tc)r we may eliminate
all policies 4.number, which are only feasible if i~
(1-ic)r.
~ Condition ( B.71) eliminates the policies 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1,
which are characterized by al ~ 0.
~ Due to (B.73) all contraction policies may be left out of con-
sideration.
~(B.74) implies that there i s no need to consider policies with
A on one of its boundaries.
~ Condition ( B.72) eliminates those dividend policies in which
investor 1 is involved, that is, the policies 5.1, 5.0, 5.12
and 5.21.
After these eliminations only 10 policies are left, which may be
divided into two groups:
1. stationary dividend policy 5.2, pursued by only investor 2;
2. zero dividend policies, pursued by both the investors.
The existence of the second group of policies can be clarified
by recalling the results of chapter five and the corresponding
appendix A1: due to the lower tax rate on capital gain than on
2 (12
dividend, it may be in favour to the investor to pursue a zero
dividend policy at decision moment close to the planning hori-
zon.
step 3: The selection of preceding is based on some relevant contintiity
properties, in particular with respect to the state and co-state
variables.
iJe first consider the selection of preceding policies of the
second group of final policies. We know from chapter five that
in the case that a zero dividend policy is a final policy, the
marginal return on equity is below the time preference rate.
Furthermore, such a policy (string) will generally by preceded
by a stationary dividend policy. We now show that the problem
under consideration prevents such a succession.
On the dividend stage it holds that
-~3 - n(Td2-Td])e
-iT (R.75)
Since y~3 ( z) - ~ and ~3(T) - 0 on the ( final) growth policies,
this implies that ~y3(T) ~ Q during the dividend policy. Substi-
tution of this resiilt into (R.SA) gives a~(T) ~( 1 and thus A(T)
- Amin' which implies that the final value of 7.] on the dividend
stage i s rather zero than positive.
We thus conclude that no policy can precede a growth policy as
final policy. This result implies that such a policy ( string)
need to satisfy the initial s~ate constraints in order to be a
feasib]P ~~ -~ y ~string).
..~~en we consider the final policy 5.2 we know form the analysís
of chapter two that we may eliminate in the case that i~
~
(1-TC)r and K(0) ~ KY2 all the policies with 2., 3. and 6., as
first index. Furthermore, the continuity of Z1 requires that
investor 2 forms part of the preceding policy. We thus concen-
trate on the next policies:
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a non feasible policy
a non feasible policy
~,1 discontinuous
Policy 5.12 is non feasible policy, because a5 - a~ - ~, which
implies ~3 - 0, whereas -~3 - p(7d2-rdl)e-iT
~ U.
Policy 1.2 turns out to be a non feasible policy too, because
a5 - ab - 0 implies ~Y3 3 0, whereas -V~3 -~2 ~ 0.
The string 1.12m } 5.2 is not possible because of the disconti-
nuity of ~y3. On p~licy 1.12m it hold~ that ~3 --ab and
-~3 - 0, so that ~3(t) ~ 0, whereas iV3 - 0.
Until now we found two strings ending up with policy 5.2. If we
apply once again the selection procedure, it turns out that no
policy can precede the first string 5.12m i policy 1.2, and that
only policy 1.~ may precede the second string.
step 4: We check whether the above strings may satisfy the initial state
constraints. We find the followíng results:
~
K((1) - KY~: policy 5.17.m a policy 5.2
~
K(0) ~ KY2: policy l.fl ~ policy 1.17. -~ policy 5.2
~
If we allow an initial value K(0) such that K(~) ~ KY2 we can
analogously prove that the next string is optimal:
~
K((1) ~ KY2: policy 6.12m i policy 6.2 ; policy 5.2
~nt~
APPENDIX C
DF.RIVATION OF A PARTICULAR EXPRESSION IN CHAPTF.R SEVF.N
To prove d(Vp~Ve)~dK ~ 0 we distinguish two cases.
~ ~
case 1: K~ K ~ K.e p
~ ~











Since the derivative with respect to K can p,enerally be expressed by
d(Vp~Ve)~dK - d(Vp~Ve)~dT . dT~dK
we find that




After substitution of the derivatives with respect to time of both (C.1)
and (C.2), that is with respect to tkp and tke respectively, this re-
sults in:
r((1-T )- 1] V ~V dT~dK
d(V IVe)~dK - ~PO ' 0'~ 0 ~ nP (C.6)
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~ ~
case 2: K C k C K.e p
According to (7.15) the value of Ve(k) is now given by
,~ tcde
Ve(tke) - Delr.exp(-r(tcde-tke)) f Ttt D(T)exP(-r(T-tke))dT (C.7)
ke
Hence, for any tke it holds that
dVe~dtke - rVe(tke) - D(tke)
We now get with respect to tke
d(V ~V )
dk e - [Ve(dVp~dk) - Vp(dVe~dk)]~Vé
-[V d-.~
. dt~
- V dVe -. dtke 2
e dtkp dK p dtke dK ],Ve
which with the use of (7.7)-(7.9) and (7.13) results in
(C.8)
C.9)
d(V ~V ) ~dV dV
-á~- -[Ve dt ~ ( 1-tc)0(K) - Vp ~ ~ aK)~Vé (C.10)
Substitution of (C.8) and the derivative with respect to time of (C.1)
into (C.10) gives:
d(V ~V )
-- d~ - Vp[Ver(1-tp)~(1-tc)0(K) - (rVe-D)~aK]~Ve
~Due to De ~(1-tc)0(K(tke)) it holds that
(1-tc)0(K(tke)) (1-tc)0(K(tke))





Ver(1-r )~(1-t )0(K) ~ 1 (C.13)p c
~nF
In addition it holds due to (7.13) and (C.12) that
(rVe - D)~aK - [rVe - (1-TC)0(K) - aK]~aK
- [rV - (1-t )0(K)]~aK - 1 ~ -1e c
Putting these results together we get
Ver(1-Tp)~(1-TC)0(K) f(rVe-D)~aK ~ 1 t(-1) - 0





B : retention rate,
inflow of debt
BL : market value debt of
levered firm
C : cash outlays
C(L): leverage related costs
CF : cash flow
CY : marginal costs of debt
D : dividend
E : total corporate profit
Fj : acceptence indicator j
G : capital gain
I : gross investment
K : production capacity,
amount of capital goods
L : labour
NPI : net present index
NPV : net present value
0(K): operating income
PJ : current market price per
Q
dollar J, J- D, G, Y
: production level
a : depreciation rate
b : retention rate,
redemption rate
: rate of growth
h: debt to equity rate
i: time preference rate of
shareholders
1: labour to capital rate
n : number of projects
q : capital productivity
r : market interest rate
r' : net return on capital
rd : demand interest rate
ro : tax free interest rate
rs : supply ínterest rate
s : imputation factor
t : free end point
ten: entry point dividend stage
teX: exit point dividend stage
w : wage rate
z : planning horizon
R : revenue project, marginal
return to total capital
~no
RX : marginal return to equity Tc : corporate profit tax
S : selection variable rcd: corporate tax rate on
Sj : selling rate investor j distributed dividend
S(K): sales level yd : personal tax rate on dividend
SD : market value dividend claims t: personal tax rate on capital
8
S~ : market value capital gain p,ain
SL : market value equity of z: personal tax rate private
P
levered firm
STJ : market value equity of
unlevered firm
T : time
T' : artificial time
TTL : total tax liability






: personal tax rate on debt
: rate of imputation
: personal value of a firm to a tax exempt investor
VL : value of a levered firm
Vm : market value of a firm
Vpi : personal value of a firm to an investor subject to
Tri
VU : value of an unlevered firm
X : equity
Y : debt
Zj : fraction of the stock that the j-th investor possesses
Small letters are constants, capitals are variables.
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Het algemene doel van dit boek is het betrekken van een progressieve
inkomstenbelasting in de zogenaamde 'dynamische ondernemingstheorie'. In
het boek wordt derhalve de invloed nagegaan van een door de vermogenver-
schaffer af te dragen inkomstenbelasting op het optimale tijdsafhanke-
lijke dividend-, financierings- en investeringsbeleid van een onderne-
ming, die als doel nastreeft het maximaliseren van haar marktwaarde voor
de huidige aandeelhouders. Er wordt met name getracht een rechtvaardi-
ging te vinden voor de stelling dat de aandelen van een onderneming in
de loop van haar ontwikkeling onder invloed van de inkomstenbelasting en
ten gevolge van veranderingen in de politiek met betrekking tot boven-
staande beleidsinstrumenten telkenmale van vermogenverschaffer wisselen.
Het onderzoek vindt zijn bouwstenen in de theorie van de ondernemings-
financiering, kortweg financieringstheorie genoemd, en de dynamische
ondernemingstheorie. ne lezer wordt daarom in de hoofdstukken 2 en 3
eerst vertrouwd gemaakt met de belangrijkste, voor het onderzoek rele-
vante, bevindingen van beide theorieën. Vervolgens wordt stapsgewijze de
invloed van een progressieve inkomstenbelasting binnen een dynamisch
ondernemingsprobleem geanalyseerd.
2. T~namische ondernemingstheorie
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de relevantie aangegeven van de factor tíjd voor de
economie. Gesteld wordt dat de maatschappij en de economische orde zich
in een proces van continue beweging bevinden. Het wekt derhalve geen
verbazing dat ook de bedrijfseconomische wetenschapper zich bezig houdt
met het opnemen van de factor tijd in zijn analyses. Aan de hand van een
aantal voorbeelden wordt de ontwikkeling in de tijdsafhankelijke pro-
bleemformuleringen geillustreerd.
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De aanwending van werkelijk dynamische modellen binnen de bedrijfseco-
nomie, waardoor beslissingsvariabelen in de tijd gezien steeds andere
waarden mogen aannemen en waardoor ook de ontwikkeling van variabelen
tussen twee punten in de tijd kan worden beschreven, heeft eerst in de
laatste jaren een grote vlucht genomen. Deze versnelde ontwikkeling
wordt onder meer toegeschreven aan de introductie van het zogenaamde
'maximumprincipe van Pontryagin' binnen de bedrijfseconomische theorie.
Met behulp van deze wiskundige techniek, die de belangrijkste bouwsteen
vormt van de 'Optimal Control Theory', is het mogelijk om van een dyna-
misch probleem de noodzakelijke voorwaarden, waaraan de optimale oplos-
sing dient te voldoen, op analytische wijze te bepalen.
In het hoofdstuk wordt een aantal van de vele toepassingsmogelijkheden
opgesomd. De meeste aandacht gaat uit naar de zogenaamde groeimodellen
van de onderneming. Aan de hand van een basismodel, waarin nog geen in-
komstenbelasting is opgenomen, wordt een overzicht gegeven van de in de
literatuur bekende deterministische modelformuleringen, die zijn ontwor-
pen om voor een waarde maximaliserende onderneming simultaan de optimale
dividend-, financierings- en investeringsbeslissingen gedurende een aan-
gegeven planperiode te bepalen. Het resultaat, dat behulp van Optimal
Control Theory en een door Van Loon ontwikkeld koppelingsmechanisme
wordt afgeleid, is dat de onderneming een aantal verschillende ontwikke-
lingsfasen doorloopt om uiteindelijk een evenwichtige eindfase te berei-
ken, waarbij het marginale rendement op eigen vermogen gelijk is aan de
tijdsvoorkeurvoet van de aandeelhouder. De onderneming verkeert dus
steeds in een situatie van gedaanteverandering, waarbij de politiek
wordt aangepast aan de actuele toestand.
3. Relasting en haar invloed op de onderneming
In het derde hoofdstuk wordt aan de hand van een aantal voorbeelden ge-
illustreerd dat belastingen vele acties en beslissingen van ondernemin-
gen beinvloeden, zowel door het gekozen stelsel als door de hoogte van
de tarieven. Relangrijk bij deze analyses is het bep,rip 'neutraliteit'.
Een belasting wordt neutraal genoemd indien een verandering in de belas-
tingvoeten geen invloed heeft op de marginale waarden van de factoren,
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die relevant zijn voor een te nemen beslissing. Men andere woorden, een
neutraal belastíngstelsel oefent geen invloed uit op de beslissingen van
ondernemingen of van individuen.
Vervolgens passeert een aantal gangbare belastingstelsels de revue,
zoals het klassieke stelsel en het verrekeningsstelsel, waarna lange
tijd wordt stilgestaan bij de relatie tussen de marktwaarde van een on-
derneming en haar vermogensstructuur. Deze relatie is een bekend onder-
werp van discussie binnen de financieringstheorie. Beschreven wordt dat
deze discussie in 1963 door Modigliani en Miller werd geopend door op
hun beroemd geworden irrelevantiestelling, dat bij afwezigheid van be-
lastingen de marktwaarde van een onderneming onafhankelijk is van de
financiële structuur, de volgende correctie aan te brengen: omdat voor
een onderneming de kosten van vreemd vermogen fiscaal aftrekbaar zijn en
de kosten van eigen vermogen niet, zal de rentabilíteit van het eigen
vermogen toenemen door met maximaal vreemd vermogen te financieren.
Daar deze theorie op gespannen voet leeft met de resultaten van vele
empirische studies, wordt vervolgens ingegaan op een aantal factoren,
die van invloed zou kunnen zijn op de marktwaarde van een onderneming,
zoals faillissementskosten. In de overtuiging echter dat de invloed van
deze factoren wordt overvleugeld door belastingheffingen, stelt Miller
in 1977 dat de marktwaarde toch onafhankelijk kan zijn van de vermogens-
structuur door naast vennootschapsbelasting ook de inkomstenbelasting
van de vermogenverschaffers in de beschouwingen te betrekken. Naast deze
zogenaamde 'after tax'-evenwichtstheorie wordt ten slotte ingegaan op de
'before tax'-evenwichtstheorie, die gebruik maakt van het Miller en
Scholes argument, dat iedere vermogenverschaffer in de gelegenheid is
een effectieve belastingvoet gelijk nul te realiseren, waardoor zelfs in
het geval van persoonlijke belastingen de resultaten van de theorie van
Modigliani en Miller van toepassing kunnen zijn.
4. Marktevenwicht en client~les-effecten
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat nader in op de evenwichtswaarde van de onderneming bij
aanwezigheid van inkomstenbelasting en de hieruit voortvloeiende clien-
telès-effecten.
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Allereerst wordt de irrelevantiestelling van Miller op een meer model-
matige wijze gepresenteerd. Door gebruik te maken van het in 1980 door
DeAngelo en Masulis gepubliceerde model is het tevens mogelijk de ver-
schijnselen 'dividend clientèles' en 'financial leverage clienteles'
nader toe te lichten. Het eerstgenoemde houdt in dat vermogenverschaf-
fers met hoge marginale inkomstenbelastingtarieven vermogensaanwas pre-
fereren boven dividenduitkeringen. Dientengevolge trekt een dividend-
uitkerende onderneming vermogenverschaffers uit de lagere belastíng-
schijven aan. Het laatstgenoemde verschijnsel heeft betrekking op de
financieringsbeslissing van de onderneming: beleggers in de hogere be-
lastinggroepen hebben een voorkeur voor persoonlijke schuld boven onder-
nemingsschuld. Met andere woorden, in de ogen van deze vermogenverschaf-
fers dient een onderneming ter financiering van de investeringen eigen
vermogen aan te trekken in plaats van vreemd vermogen.
Vervolgens wordt in het hoofdstuk nagegaan wat de invloed is van ver-
schillende belastingstelsels op bovengenoemde resultaten. Het blijkt
bijvoorbeeld dat eigen-vermogen-financiering in combinatie met dividend
uitkeringen alleen onder het verrekeningsstelsel geïnteresseerde beleg-
gers zal vinden.
Ook wordt een derde vorm van clienteles-effect geintroduceerd: 'tax
induced investment clienteles'. Dit verschijnsel, dat in tegenstelling
tot de twee eerder beschreven effecten nog niet is p,ebaseerd op een
evenwichtstheorie, is een gevolg van de negatieve relatie tussen de ren-
tabiliteit van nieuwe investeringen en de hoogte van de marginale inkom-
stenbelastingvoet van de geinteresseerde vermogenverschaffer.
Ten slotte wordt in het hoofdstuk uitgebreid ingegaan op de kritiek
die Gordon in 1982 heeft geuit op de analyses van Miller en diens irre-
levantiestelling, die in eerste instantie in vele publicaties van andere
wetenschappers werd gesteund. Naar de overtuiging van Gordon is het on-
der de veronderstellingen van Miller niet mogelijk aan te tonen dat de
waarde van een onderneming onafhankelijk is van haar vermogensstructuur.
In de lijn van de analyses van Modigliani en Miller beweert hij dat de
marktwaarde een convexe functie is van de schuldverhouding en dat, dien-
tengevolge, elke waardemaximaliserende onderneming een maximale schuld-
verhouding zal nastreven. In het hoofdstuk wordt kritiek geuit op zowel
de doelstellingsfunctie van de vermogenverschaffers, die Gordon gebruikt
bij de afleiding van de convexe marktwaardecurve, als ook op het door
~~n
hem beschreven aanpassingsproces dat hierop volgt. Naast de presentatie
van een gecorrigeerd criterium, wordt tevens aangegeven dat een correct
gebruik van Gordon's denkpatroon juist leidt tot een bevestiging van
Miller's stelling. De conclusie i s dan ook dat Gordon niet in staat is
geweest om uitgaande van de veronderstellingen van Miller de 'after
tax'-evenwichtstheorie te ontzenuwen.
5. Inkomstenbelasting in een dynamisch ondernemingsmodel
In dit en de volgende hoofdstukken wordt teruggekeerd naar de dynamische
ondernemingstheorie. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt het basis model uit het tweede
hoofdstuk uitgebreid door de introductie van inkomstenbelasting op zowel
dividend, vermogensaanwas als op overig inkomen, zoals rente.
Er wordt een individuele onderneming beschouwd, die over een gegeven
planperiode een zodanige dividend-, financierings- en investeringspoli-
tiek dient te bepalen dat haar marktwaarde voor de aandeelhouders na
afdracht van vennootschaps- en inkomstenbelasting maximaal is. Een ver-
gelijking van de optimale opeenvolging van de verschillende politieken
met die van het basismodel zonder inkomstenbelasting, geeft de volgende
verschillen:
- op de eindpaden wordt ten gevolge van het verschil tussen de belas-
tingvoeten geen dividend uitgekeerd. Het is voor de aandeelhouder
voordeliger om op het in de toekomst gelegen moment van verkoop belas-
ting te betalen over de gerealiseerde vermogensaanwas, dan het fiscaal
zwaarder belaste dividend te ontvangen
- vreemd vermogen kan zelfs in situaties dat het relatief goedkoop is
worden afgelost ten gunste van het duurdere eigen vermogen, dat dan
vervolgens in de vorm van vermogensaanwas aan de aandeelhouder toekomt
- de tijdsvoorkeurvoet komt niet overeen met het geeiste rendement op
eigen vermogen, zodat de onderneming kan investeren in projecten met
een netto rendement kleiner dan de tijdsvoorkeurvoet van de aandeel-
houder.
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Voorts worden de verschillende ontwikkelingspatronen verklaard met be-
hulp van twee beslissingsregels, die betrekking hebben op de financie-
ringspolitiek enerzijds en de dividend~investeringspolitiek anderzijds.
Ook worden beide beslissingsregels gecombineerd in een criterium dat,
afhankelijk van alleen het marginale rendement op eigen vermogen, de op-
timale politiek bepaalt.
Ten slotte wordt uitgebreid ingegaan op de resultaten van gevoelig-
heidsanalyses, waarbij vanzelfsprekend de inkomstenbelastingvoeten cen-
traal staan. Hogere inkomstenbelastingtarieven leiden tot een korter
durend dividendpad en stimuleren groei zodanig dat de onderneming een
grotere omvang zal moeten aannemen dan bij lagere tarieven. Dientenge-
volge dient de onderneming te investeren in steeds slechter renderende
projecten. Van belang hierbij is echter het belastíngstelsel dat van
toepassing is. Een omschakeling van het klassieke belastingstelsel, zo-
als dat in Nederland van kracht is, naar bijvoorbeeld het verrekenings-
stelsel heeft een sterke stijging van de marktwaarde van de onderneming
tot gevolg. Bovendien neemt de noodzaak van een sterke expansie af en
nemen de mogelijkheden om eigen vermogen aan te trekken juist toe.
Een verlaging van de vennootschapsbelastingvoet verhoogt de omvang van
de winst en de waarde van de onderneming. De investeringsmogelijkheden
van de ondernemer nemen toe en het gewenste stationaire evenwichtsniveau
komt op een hoger niveau. Bovendien zal financiering met eigen vermogen
de voorkeur krijgen van een grotere groep van vermogenverschaffers.
6. Competitie tussen vermogenverschaffers
In dit hoofdstuk wordt de situatie van meerdere potentiële vermogenver-
schaffers en een onderneming bestudeerd. Het is vermogenverschaffers
toegestaan om op een nader te bepalen moment de aandelen van de betref-
fende onderneming tegen de geldende marktprijs te verkopen aan andere
beleggers. Voor de bepaling van de oplossing van dit probleem wordt ge-
bruik gemaakt van zowel een Optimal Control model als ook van een dyna-
misch spel. In beide gevallen wordt echter gemakshalve uitgegaan van
slechts twee beleggers, waarvan één belastingvrijgesteld. Deze laatste
veronderstelling is niet cruciaal en kan worden vervangen door de eis
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dat de belastingvoeten van de ene beleggers hoger zijn dan die van de
andere belegger.
De Optimal Control benadering valt in twee delen uiteen. In het ene
geval wordt de marktwaarde exogeen in het model opgenomen, in het andere
geval i s het een endogene variabele als functie van de politiek die de
koper, zijnde de tweede belegger, in de toekomst zal gaan uitvoeren. Uit
de oplossing blijkt dat de belegger met het hoogste belastingtarief de
aandelen van de onderneming vanaf het startpunt in bezit heeft en de
onderneming een politiek van maximale groei oplegt. Zodra echter het
niveau i s bereikt waarop de tweede belegger c.q. de markt een stationai-
re dividendpolitiek voorstaat, veranderen de aandelen van bezitter.
De formulering als dynamisch spel gaat uit van twee samenwerkende be-
leggers met wederom verschillende belastingtarieven. In de literatuur
staat zo'n benadering bekend als een coóperatief differentiaalspel,
waarvoor een Pareto-oplossing wordt gezocht. Deze oplossing vertoont
veel gelijkenis met die van de Optimal Control benadering. Het enige
verschil is dat het niet uitmaakt wie van de beleggers de groeipolitiek
bepaalt, omdat beiden in dit opzicht geen verschil van mening hebben.
7. Een evenwichtsbenadering
In dit hoofdstuk wordt een rechtvaardiging gezocht voor de stelling dat
de aandelen van een onderneming in de loop van haar ontwikkeling onder
invloed van de inkomstenbelasting telkenmale van vermogenverschaffer
verwisselen. Hiertoe wordt een probleem geanalyseerd van meerdere beleg-
gers, waarvan een aantal met beperkt beschikbaar vermogen en meerdere
ondernemingen. Onder de veronderstelling dat de aandeelhouder de poli-
tiek van de onderneming bepaalt, wordt voor elke omvang van zo'n onder-
neming een evenwichtsmarktwaarde berekend, zodat er op de aandelenmarkt
geen sprake is van vraagtekorten of -overschotten.
In de evenwichtssituatie zullen beleggers de aandelen kopen van die
ondernemingen, waarvoor het netto rendement maximaal is. Dientengevolge
zullen nieuwe, kleine ondernemingen tot de markt toetreden op initiatief
van particulieren met hoge marginale belastingtarieven, terwijl de 'go-
ing concerns' in handen zijn van belastingvrijgestelde beleggers, zoals
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institutionele instellingen, die gegeven de marktfactoren de maximale
omvang van de onderneming bepalen.
De conclusie is dus dat de groep van vermogenverschaffers steeds van
samenstelling verandert en wel zodanig, dat naarmate de omvang van de
onderneming toeneemt de hoogte van de belastingvoet van de corresponde-
rende aandeelhouder afneemt.
Stellingen behorend bij het proefschrift van Geert-Jan C.Th. van Schijn-
del: "Dynamic firm and investor behaviour under progressive personal
taxation".
1. Verlaging van het vennootschapsbelasting-tarief leidt niet alleen
to[ meer ruimte voor investeringen en ondernemingsgroei, maar heeft
tevens een stijgende marktvraag naar eigen vermogen-schuldtitels tot
gevolg.
2. De vergoedingen aan eigen vermogen-verschaffers dienen tot een be-
drag da[ gelijk i s aan de kosten van een overeenkomstige hoeveelheid
vreemd vermogen gerekend te worden tot de fiscaal aftrekbare kosten
van de onderneming.
3. Vanuit fiscaal oogpunt bezien investeren institutionele maatschap-
pijen hun vermogen in stationaire ondernemingen met een s[abiele
dividendpolitiek, terwijl - veelal particuliere - beleggers met een
hoog marginaal belastingtarief belangstelling tonen voor startende,
zich expansief ontwikkelende ondernemingen.
4. De presentatie van de 'after tax'-evenwichtstheorie van Miller kan
inzichtelijker plaatsvinden door niet he[ rendement op vreemd vermo-
gen, maar de prijs van een oblígatie als afhankelijke variabele te
kiezen, waardoor vraag- en aanbodcurve de gebruikelijke vorm aanne-
men.
(M.H. Miller (1977), Debt and taxes, Journal of Finance 32)
S. De iteratieve koppelingsprocedure van politieken, ontwikkeld door
Van Loon (1983), kan ook worden toegepast bij differentiaalspelen,
met dien verstande dat dan strategieën worden gekoppeld.
(P.J.J.M. van Loon, (1983), A dynamic theory of the firm: produc-
tion, finance and investment, (Springer Verlag, Berlijn))
6. Er is geen sprake van het 'gunnen' van een order aan een binnenland-
se onderneming, indien de kosten van die order kleiner zijn dan de
som van de kosten van een in het buitenland geplaatste order en de
subsidie, die díentengevolge aan de binnenlandse onderneming moet
worden verstrekt om de continuiteit te waarborgen en werkgelegenheid
te behouden.
7. Het feit dat universiteiten op de arbeidsmarkt moeten concurreren
met het bedrijfsleven is een indicatie dat een bedrijfsmatige bena-
dering bij de organisatie van universiteiten onontbeerlijk is gewor-
den.
8. Het komt de stabiliteit van de maatschappij en de economie ten goe-
de, indien binnen een tijdsbestek van een jaar maximaal één verkie-
zing plaatsvindt ten behoeve van politieke gremia.
L0. Het wetenschappelijk onderwijs heeft zich zodanig ontwikkeld, dat
van een 'assistent in opleiding' de wetenschappelijk hoogst gekwali-
ficeerde publicatie wordt verwacht.
11. Er breken gouden tijden aan voor de econometrist, nu het managen
nieuwe stijl zich weer rich[ naar de leuze: 'meten is weten'.
9. De doorstroomsnelheid van de Nederlandse wegen kan worden vergroot
door een socialer gedrag van de gemiddelde weggebruiker. Een actief
voorlich[ingsbeleid via de media is hierbij van groot belang.
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